Aristotle archive 2/94 a ------- VersaTerm-Link Mail Archive ------- X-Date: Sat, 19 Mar 94 16:33:31 EST X-User: "Lance Fletcher" X-Mbox: Mailbox [aristotle] ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 2 Feb 1994 13:59:00 +0000 Subject: Introduction From: "reg (r.m.) foulkes" Hello fellow Aristotelians, my name is Reg Foulkes. This listserver couldn't of come at a more opportune time for myself, since only a few weeks ago I started a slow read of the Politics-- by myself. (Lance thank-you for your effort in putting this list together. It is appreciated.) Naturally, I would like to suggest that we start with the politics since I've already done some of the ground work, however I am will to discuss any of Aristotle's works. If you wish, I am willing to facilite any discussions on the Politics or even Nicomanchean Ethics. I feel that I am not quailified enough to lead in his other works. I am going to be away on Thursday and Friday, but if everyone agrees in a slow read of the Politics-I will start it. On a side note -- Lance, has the slow reading of the Poetics been going on long? Reg Foulkes riskit@bnr.ca or reg.foulkes@bnr.ca (613) 763-4131 De gustibus non disputandum est-- ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 2 Feb 94 15:53:40 +0000 Subject: Re: Hello From: "Lance Fletcher" Dear Tom, You are very welcome. >I would most like to engage in a discussion of the Physics. >My second choice would be the Metaphysics. I am very much >a novice, so I have some doubts as to my ability to lead a >discussion. If a lack of expertise is not an obstacle, and >the time requirement of leading a discussion is not much >greater than that of participation, I would consider leading >a discussion on the Physics. I have not really thought through a process for selecting discussion leaders, so let me think out loud here: First of all, one of my strongest intentions in setting up these slow reading lists is to provide an opportunity for subscribers to learn by teaching. I believe that the lack of such opportunities is one of the most serious weaknesses of conventional education. Allow me to recount a personal anecdote. When I was a graduate student, I once enrolled in a lecture course on Leibniz offered by Aaron Gurwitsch, a formidable Central-European phenomenologist. On the day of registration I approached Professor Gurwitsch, who had never met me and did not know who I was, and told him that, in addition to taking the final exam for the course, which was the only course requirement, I would like to write a course paper. Remember that he had never met me and did not know my name, or anything about me except that I was registered in his class. His reply, in its entirety, was: "I wouldn't be interested in reading anything you wrote. You're ideas are half-baked." Of course my ideas were half-baked! But it seems to me that it is difficult for people's ideas to become fully-baked unless there is some way for them to be listened to while they are still half-baked. So lack of expertise is not an obstacle. Here is what you need, and you need to judge yourself, because I do not want to set myself up as a selection committee: 1. You need commitment. Remember that you are taking on a responsibility. Don't take it on unless you are serious about it. 2. Strength in listening. The power of your listening will determine the power of your speaking. 3. A plan and a delimited scope. Aristotle's Physics is a very long book. If you are not experienced, it might be better to take on the challenge of leading the discussion a short section--even a single chapter. As for a plan, it's useful to decide on the frequency of your posts, and let people know, so they will remind you if you are late. It helps a lot if the discussion leader has already read the text to be studied in its entirety. But that problem can be handled by shortening the selection under consideration. Ideally the discussion leader already has some familiarity with the practice of slow reading, but in these days of speed reading I suspect that slow reading is going to involve a lot of on-the-job training. I think I have said enough about that for now. Let me know what you plan to do. > >I am curious about a couple things. How new is this list? >Have there been any postings already made to it? If so, >are they available anywhere? The list is very new. I created it just about a week or two ago, and the first real announcements were posted yesterday. Your message was one of the very first. In a little while, perhaps a few weeks, I will begin to archive the messages and make the archives available via anonymous ftp and gopher and possibly other means. I will make an announcement about this when the time comes. > >I'm quite excited about this list. I think it could become >a very valuable resource. Thanks. I am hoping so. Lance Fletcher The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher to: lance.jvnc.net or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 2 Feb 94 12:18:07 CST Subject: Hello From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com Hello fellow students of Aristotle, My name is Tom Hayosh and I am a computer scientist with Motorola in the suburbs of Chicago. Several years ago, when I was in college at Michigan State, I took two classes on Aristotle from Prof. Harold Walsh. The first course covered the Organon, Physics, De Anima, and Metaphysics and the second covered Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. As you might have guessed, I did not come anywhere near reading all this material. Nevertheless, I loved these classes and was fascinated by the text that I did read. There are numerous issues in Aristotle's philosophy which interest me. Most recently, I have wanted to gain a better understanding of the matter-form distinction and the relationship between form, secondary substance, and essence. I would most like to engage in a discussion of the Physics. My second choice would be the Metaphysics. I am very much a novice, so I have some doubts as to my ability to lead a discussion. If a lack of expertise is not an obstacle, and the time requirement of leading a discussion is not much greater than that of participation, I would consider leading a discussion on the Physics. I am curious about a couple things. How new is this list? Have there been any postings already made to it? If so, are they available anywhere? I'm quite excited about this list. I think it could become a very valuable resource. o Tom Hayosh d:-)=;==| / ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 3 Feb 1994 15:40:26 -0500 (EST) Subject: From: "Laura Wedner" Dear subscribers, I am a philosophy graduate student at Emory University mostly interested in ancient philosophy. I recently took a course on Aristotle and was entranced! I am particularly fond of the Metaphysics Iota, and I'd like to work through the Metaphysics if I had the choice, but really any text would be pleasant. Thanks-- lwedner@emory.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 3 Feb 1994 17:22:24 -0500 (EST) Subject: BOUNCE aristotle@world.std.com: Admin request (fwd) From: "Lance Fletcher" Approve: slowread ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 3 Feb 1994 12:20:14 -0500 From:aristotle-approval@world.std.com To: aristotle-approval@world.std.com Subject: BOUNCE aristotle@world.std.com: Admin request >From pb6755@csc.albany.edu Thu Feb 3 07:20:08 1994 Return-Path: Received: from sarah.albany.edu by world.std.com (5.65c/Spike-2.0) id AA21741; Thu, 3 Feb 1994 12:20:12 -0500 Received: from thor.albany.edu by sarah.albany.edu (4.1/SMI-3.2) id ; Thu, 3 Feb 94 12:20:09 EST Received: by thor.albany.edu (5.65/DEC-Ultrix/4.3) id AA05078; Thu, 3 Feb 1994 12:20:08 -0500 From: pb6755@csc.albany.edu (BROWN PHILIP H) Message-Id: <9402031720.AA05078@thor.albany.edu> Subject: personal introduction To: aristotle@world.std.com (aristotle list) Date: Thu, 3 Feb 1994 12:20:08 -0500 (EST) X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 1000 My name is Phil Brown. I'm a part-time graduate student in philosophy at the University at Albany. I was in a seminar last spring in which we read the Nicomachean Ethics. I'm taking a Theory of Art course this semester in which we will be reading much of the Poetics. (Can someone tell me how to subscribe to the Poetics list?) Because I have a full-time job and 3 children, I only take one course at the university at a time. As far as this on-line discussion goes, I'll probably be a lurker, mostly, but I hope to contribute something once in a while. I did my seminar paper on Aristotle's notion of theoria, or contemplation -- which is the summit of happiness, in Aristotle's view. Everyone agrees that theoria encompasses theology, or contemplation of the divine. Does it also include the contemplation of the truths of mathematics and physics? Does it include research as well as contemplation? If anybody is interesting in these questions, I'll be glad to share my views with them. Phil ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 3 Feb 94 17:15:07 MST Subject: Introduction From: "John Markos O'Neill" Hello, I'm John Markos O'Neill, a new subscriber to this list. I first read Aristotle in my freshman year in college, and I have wanted to make a deeper study of his works ever since. The idea of a slow, thoughtful reading of the major works sounds great to me, and I'm looking forward to it. My particular interest in Aristotle comes from the fact that I've always envied the kind of order that he seems to represent. But perhaps studying Aristotle in depth will relieve me of the bias that he is supremely ordered. I have always been fascinated by symbolic systems and the attempt to make a comprehensible representation of phenomena. This leads me to study both the phenomena themselves and the systems we use to classify them. Aristotle started most of these systems, so it makes sense to me to begin the latter study with him. I'm perfectly happy to start with the _Poetics_, and see where that takes me. At this point I still don't know how one work has greater merit for study than another. I may just lurk for a little while in order to get a feel for the style of conversation. At this point I don't feel ready to lead any discussion, but perhaps my reluctance will change soon. ---------------------------------------------------------------- John Markos O'Neill jmo@t10.lanl.gov ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 4 Feb 1994 12:22:38 EST Subject: New subscriber From: "Sean A. Kelsey" My name is Sean Kelsey, and I'm a new subscriber to the slow-read Aristotle discussion. I'm currently a graduate student in the Classical Philosophy program at Princeton. I got my BA from Thomas Aquinas College, a small, Catholic, great books school (the curriculum is modelled very much after that at St. John's College (Annapolis and Santa Fe)). My main interest is in Aristotle, and I'd be willing to discuss almost anything. I'm currently taking a seminar with Myles Burnyeat where we're spending a semester reading Metaphysics Z (Bk. VII). That'd be a great place to start; but I'd also be interested in discussing slowly the bits in the N. Ethics and De Anima on pleasure, or just about anything else. Forewarned is forearmed: I'm pretty partial to Thomistic interpretations; but, as was pointed out, one could do worse. I look forward to the discussion. Cordially, Sean Kelsey sakelsey@phoenix.princeton.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 4 Feb 1994 14:46:49 -0500 (EST) Subject: new kid on the list From: "Carl Pearson" I have just joined the slow-reading list and would like to respond as instructed. I am a graduate student in a history of science department whose main interest lies in late antique physics, metaphysics and epistemology. of course, familiarity with Aristotle (et alia) is requisite. so I have joined the list. I would be quite interested in a discussion of either De anima or any of the Metaphysics....being a graduate student I don't know how much time I might be able to spend in front of the computer, but i'm excited about the medium of exchange and the potential for philsophical discussions on/about the Net. hope the ball is rolling soon, carl pearson--packet man ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 4 Feb 1994 17:00:35 -0500 Subject: introducing myself From: "Luc Borot" Hello! I'm Luc Borot, Professor in the English dept at Universit=E9 Paul Val=E9ry, Montpellier, France. My main field of research in the political and historical thoughts of Hobbes. I translated his *Behemoth, or the Long Parliament* (Paris: Vrin, 1990) and I am preparing a translation of his rhetorical tracts in collaboration with 2 of my partners of the Montpellier Elizabethan Centre. I also belong to the Research Group that is translating the works of Hobbes into French (Paris-based, directed by Yves Charles Zarka). I'm not a philosopher by training, but I deal in and with philosophy on a daily basis, which may amount to being a 'free-lance' philosopher as some of you here on the line call yourselves. I am currently interested in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* for obvious reasons if you remember what I wrote above... Can I lead a discussion on this work? not at the moment, as I'm in the throes of organizing a conference and transcribing two Latin rhetorical manuscripts associated with Hobbes and Aristotle (plus ordinary academic work). But in a few weeks time, I may feel the heart to... to everyone else's risk. Yours Luc Luc Borot Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Elisabethaines Universite Paul Valery -- Montpellier (France) ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 4 Feb 1994 16:59:20 -0600 Subject: New subscriber self-introduction From: "Richard Diamond" I am Richard Diamond, a grad student at the University of Dallas in the political philosophy program. I'm interested in reading the Nicomachean Ethics above all, since I am working on it at the moment. In particular, I am trying to think through (slowly, of course) the passage on Natural Justice & related issues. I'm also working on a translation of it (for my own purposes), so starting with Book I would be a great way for me to think things through as well. I must also reveal my reading prejudices: St. Thomas informs my understanding of the text, and the "vocabulary of Latin Aristotelianism" doesn't bother me :) Richard ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 04 Feb 94 18:44:07 CST Subject: Re: introducing myself From: "carol poster" re: Luc Borot's comment: I also am interested in History of Rhetoric, and have read the Rhetorica several times. If we're to read it in English, should we use Kennedy? Carol Poster ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 4 Feb 94 19:54:35 -0500 Subject: Introduction From: "james a tucker" As per the list owner's request, here is my short introduction. I'm a sophomore classics major at the University of Kentucky. After finishing my four years here, I'll begin studies for the priesthood. I've read very little of Aristotle (other than the little tid-bits and generalizations one expects from broad introductory courses) but am hoping that I'll get a firmer grasp of his thought by reading and following along with this list. --- -- -=+ James A. Tucker jatuck00@mik.uky.edu +=- -=+Classics/Economics Undergraduate University of Kentucky+=- -=+ "Vex not thy spirit at the course of things; +=- -=+ They heed not thy vexation." +=- -=+ --Marcus Aurelius, quoting Euripides +=- ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 4 Feb 94 19:53:20 CST Subject: Categories From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com Hello again fellow Aristotle students, I am very pleased to see the rush of introductions today. The range of Aristotle's works which we've indicated that we want to discuss is very broad. This might have some impact on how slow our slow readings progress. I think we will have to determine to what extent those actively engaged in one discussion will want to engage or even lurk in the others. If many of us want to follow numerous discussions, we will probably want to progress in each slower than we would if most participants are limiting their attention to a single reading. I've previously indicated my desire to read the Physics. Lance suggested some criteria for leading a discussion which at this point I do not believe I satisfy for the Physics. I do think I qualify to get us started with the Categories, however. Since this work covers subjects which seem to be prerequisite to the Physics, I'm considering leading a reading of the Categories. I'd like to find out how much interest there is on the list. I do not have a specific plan defined yet, but if there is interest in the Categories, I'll try to put something together. I'm planning to follow up the Categories with a reading of book 1 of the Physics, but I'll wait until I see how leading one discussion goes before committing to a second. For those who may not have been here when Lance posted the criteria mentioned above, I'll copy them here: > 1. You need commitment. Remember that you are taking on a responsibility. > Don't take it on unless you are serious about it. > > 2. Strength in listening. The power of your listening will determine the > power of your speaking. > > 3. A plan and a delimited scope. Aristotle's Physics is a very long book. > If you are not experienced, it might be better to take on the challenge of > leading the discussion a short section--even a single chapter. As for a > plan, it's useful to decide on the frequency of your posts, and let people > know, so they will remind you if you are late. > > It helps a lot if the discussion leader has already read the text to be > studied in its entirety. But that problem can be handled by shortening the > selection under consideration. Ideally the discussion leader already has > some familiarity with the practice of slow reading, but in these days of > speed reading I suspect that slow reading is going to involve a lot of > on-the-job training. Thanks, Tom Hayosh hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 04 Feb 94 20:29:51 CST Subject: Re: Categories From: "carol poster" Categories WOULD be a good choice. It would appeal to the rhetoricians in the group, the physicists, and others. I read it in Greek as an undergraduate -- but have forgotten most of it ... ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 4 Feb 1994 21:34:02 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories From: "Peter Orlowski" Count me in on the Categories! It is a nice short book, and what a better way to start off reading Aristotle word by word, then by starting off with a book on the categories of words! /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 4 Feb 1994 22:12:19 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories From: "Brian Burtt" > > Count me in on the Categories! It is a nice short book, and what a better > way to start off reading Aristotle word by word, then by starting off with > a book on the categories of words! > Ditto. I have just picked it up from the library as recommended background for a class I am taking. In way of introduction... my name is Brian Burtt. I am an undergraduate major of German at Michigan State University. I am interested in pursuing linguistics in graduate school; philosophy is a useful hobby. My knowledge of Aristotle is almost nil and all of it second hand, so I'm eager to learn and think about his work. --Brian Burtt burttbri@studentb.msu.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 5 Feb 1994 09:32:00 +0000 Subject: Re:Categories From: "reg (r.m.) foulkes" My e-mail tells me that there is a growing desire to do a slow read of the Categories. Is this the will of the majority? Assuming that this is the wish of the majority: a) is there anyone willing to lead the discussion? (I willing to ask many questions.) b) Which translation is most appropriate? (I have an electronic copy of Categories, by E.M. Edghill how good is it?) c) How do we break this up for discussion? Does anyone have a suggested reading schedule? Reg Foulkes riskit@bnr.ca or reg.foulkes@bnr.ca (613) 763-4131 De gustibus non disputandum est-- ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 5 Feb 1994 11:30:46 +0100 Subject: Re: Categories From: "luc borot" >Categories WOULD be a good choice. It would appeal to the rhetoricians in the >group, the physicists, and others. Excellent idea: I am the linguistic adviser of the group currently translating Hobbbes's *1st Draught of the Optics*, and need to improve my basics in A-lian physics; as it's so important in the rest and in dialectics and rhetoric, everyone might be happy about it. **************************************************** *Luc Borot * * * *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Elisabethaines * *Universite Paul Valery * *Montpellier (France) * **************************************************** ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 5 Feb 1994 15:11:00 +0000 Subject: Categories e-text From: "reg (r.m.) foulkes" For all those who have asked me for the e-text of the Categories. It can be found with gopher. Simply gopher to gopher.nd.edu and use the foolowing path Library and Information Resources/Access to Electronic Book/ Electronic Books from the Eris Project/Aristotle I don't remember the menu numbers. I cannot make this text available via FTP since I'm stuck behind a firewall that you cannot access. However, if a number of you fellow netters need an electronic copy and don't have access to gopher, then I will post it to the list if Lance does not mind. Reg Foulkes riskit@bnr.ca or reg.foulkes@bnr.ca (613) 763-4131 De gustibus non disputandum est-- ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 5 Feb 1994 12:21:41 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re:Categories From: "Peter Orlowski" On Sat, 5 Feb 1994, reg (r.m.) foulkes wrote: > > My e-mail tells me that there is a growing desire to do a slow read of > the Categories. Is this the will of the majority? > > Assuming that this is the wish of the majority: > > a) is there anyone willing to lead the discussion? (I willing to ask > many questions.) > > b) Which translation is most appropriate? (I have an electronic copy > of Categories, by E.M. Edghill how good is it?) > Send it! Some may not have copies of any translation. Since the Categhories was written in Greek, do we really want to limit ourselves to one translation anyway? > c) How do we break this up for discussion? Does anyone have a > suggested reading schedule? > I suggest we just read, slowly, and let the pace of the reading be dictated by the progress in the discussion. I am anxious to start! > > Reg Foulkes > riskit@bnr.ca or reg.foulkes@bnr.ca > (613) 763-4131 > De gustibus non disputandum est-- /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 5 Feb 1994 19:16:30 +0100 Subject: Re: Re:Categories From: "luc borot" > b) Which translation is most appropriate? (I have an electronic copy >of Categories, by E.M. Edghill how good is it?) > I personally work on a French translation, but never mind: why not try to make your text available on a ftp or tell us where to get it if it is already somewhere, and of course public domain. Otherwise, let's have a good start with the beginning of the *Organon*, the categories have so much importance elsewhere that it seems an excellent choice. Yours Luc **************************************************** *Luc Borot * * * *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Elisabethaines * *Universite Paul Valery * *Montpellier (France) * **************************************************** ------------------------------------------- Date: 05 Feb 1994 13:39:44 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories From: ROWEW1@JAGUAR.UOFS.EDU This is William Rowe at the University of Scranton. My principle interests in Aristotle would be the METAPHYSICS (on which I am currently teaching a course) and the NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (whichis also a regular part of my teaching). But the CATEGORIES can also be a good place to begin; the text is short and belongs to the "organic" (ie, logical) works, and it is philosophically simple (it is probably an early work). But the fact that it is placed at the beginning by Aristotle's student- editors, compiling many years after he composed the text, doesn'[t mean it's where Aristotle himself would have begun. In some respects book one of the METAPHYSICS is better; book six of the NICOMACHEAN ETHICS is also good. Rowe ROWEW1@JAGUAR.UOFS.EDU ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 5 Feb 1994 13:52:12 -0500 (EST) Subject: From: "Laura Wedner" I have translations of the Categories by Barnes and Ackrill. I agree with whoever said we should all read our own translations because we will then be in a better position to point out discrepancies and refer to the Greek text when necessary. I'm not sure I have anything illuminating to say about chapter i, but when we get to chapter two I'd love to discuss the issue of "non-substantial individuals." --Laura Wedner lwedner@emory.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 5 Feb 1994 14:32:08 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Re:Categories From: "Peter Orlowski" I have frequently gone to the gopher at Virginia Polytech, where they have a Blacksburg Electronic Village, with Electronic Books. This list has nearly all the great philsophers on it, including the extent works of Aristotle. You can then download the text. I think it is gopher.vt.edu /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' On Sat, 5 Feb 1994, luc borot wrote: > > > b) Which translation is most appropriate? (I have an electronic copy > >of Categories, by E.M. Edghill how good is it?) > > > I personally work on a French translation, but never mind: why not > try to make your text available on a ftp or tell us where to get it if it > is already somewhere, and of course public domain. > > Otherwise, let's have a good start with the beginning of the > *Organon*, the categories have so much importance elsewhere that it seems > an excellent choice. > > Yours > Luc > > **************************************************** > *Luc Borot * > * * > *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Elisabethaines * > *Universite Paul Valery * > *Montpellier (France) * > **************************************************** > > ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 5 Feb 1994 15:25:12 -0500 (EST) Subject: intro From: "Scott Carson" A brief intro, as per the list-owner's suggestion. I did a PhD in classics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1986, and am presently trying to finish up a PhD in philosophy at Duke; for both degrees I have concentrated mainly on the works of Aristotl. My main interests are in the logical and metaphysical treatises, and the biological works to the extent that they can shed light on the issues in the former category. I would be happy to read whatever is of interest to the list as a whole, however. _____________________________________________________________________________ Scott Carson Department of Philosophy voice mail: (919) 660-3052 Duke University FAX: (919) 660-3060 201 West Duke Building e-mail: sketters@acpub.duke.edu Durham, NC 27708 ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 05 Feb 1994 12:54:36 -0800 Subject: Aristotle From: "CRAIG WALTON" Dear fellow slow-readers of Aristotle; My name is Craig Walton, have been working on Aristotle since Herbert W. Schneider opened the doors for me in a class on classical philosophy in 1959. When I hitchhiked around Europe in 1961 i had one book in my rucksack, the Modern Library Intro to Aristotle. I've been re-reading the Nicomachean Ethics at least once a year since then, usually in various trans lations, occasionally a bit of effort with my poor Attic Greek. I had a seminar with Philip Merlan on the Metaphysics, maybe the original model for slow reading since we took a semester to do the first paragraph of Alpha (though the way he did it, we sallied into every other part of the work to figure out the first paragraph). Our assignment was to write our own metaphysics in corroboration or rebuttal of Aristotle's - so we boldly went where only fools had gone, and I am sure made fools of ourselves (I did my own version of Zeta/Eta/Theta). So, I'll be glad to take whatever part I can; if we start with CATEGORIES, that is fine -- I have the Ross/Oxford transl. here -- is that OK? Craig ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 5 Feb 1994 15:51:47 -0600 (CST) Subject: Re: Categories From: "Faruq abd ul-Rafi" Peter Orlowski wrote: > > On Sat, 5 Feb 1994, reg (r.m.) foulkes wrote: > > > > > b) Which translation is most appropriate? (I have an electronic copy > > of Categories, by E.M. Edghill how good is it?) > > > > Send it! Some may not have copies of any translation. Since the > Categhories was written in Greek, do we really want to limit ourselves to > one translation anyway? > No, please don't send it over the net. My mailbox is filled to capacity as it is. I couldn't cope with receiving the Categories through the mail. If translations are to be made available, an ftp or gopher site would be more appropriate. _____ Faruq abd ul-Rafi (R. A. Nelson) University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Philosophy E-mail: faruq@uiuc.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 5 Feb 1994 18:01:11 -0500 (EST) Subject: Who is leading the categories discussion? From: "Peter Orlowski" I forgot. /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' >From anon@info.nd.edu Ukn Feb 5 17:46:56 1994 Return-Path: Date: Sat, 5 Feb 94 17:46:21 -0500 From: anon@info.nd.edu (U of ND Gopher) Subject: Categories (categori) Apparently-To: aristotle@world.std.com 350 BC CATEGORIES by Aristotle translated by E. M. Edghill 1 Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only. On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other. Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word 'gramma', and the courageous man from the word 'courage'. ------------------------------------------- Date: 05 Feb 1994 20:05:11 -0500 (CDT) Subject: Introduction From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu Greetings: My name is Jeff Taylor, and I am a graduate student in philosophy at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN. I work on both ancient phil. and 19th & 20th century Continental phil. Some recent work, influenced by Heidegger's recently published lecture courses on Aristotle, attempts to read Aristotle as a phenomenologist of sorts (see, e.g., Remi Brague, _Aristote et la question du monde_ [PUF 88). It is also becoming clear that Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein in _Being and Time_ is in fact H's interpretation of Nic.Eth.VI. So, I would most like to read this; but Aristotle's work is so systematic, practically anything is acceptable. Thus, I am willing to do the Categories. Meta.IX is also interesting. ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 12:02:00 +0000 Subject: Re: Who is leading the categories discussion? From: "reg (r.m.) foulkes" In message "Re: Who is leading the categories discussion?", you write: >Aristotle seems to be saying here that the same word can have two >meanings. Now, we use "animal" when referring to the painted animal >in an elliptical sense. That is, if we point to a drawing and say, >"This is an animal," we really mean "This is *the drawing* of an >animal." In the latter sentence, isn't the sense of "animal" the same >as when we use the word to refer to a real ox or a man? Whether it is >or not, there is a strong relationship between the senses of "animal" >in Aristotle's example. I wonder if he meant to include in the >"equivocal" category pairs of words that are unrelated (or very >distantly related), such as "plane" (flying machine) and "plane" >(carpenter's tool)? Sure he did. I think his opening paragraph is laying the ground work for the reader. Is he not simply saying to the reader-- beware we have an oddity in language that allows us to use the same word for different meanings? And if you don't pay attention you might be 'off plane' in thinking that the 'plane' in your hand was the the same 'plane' that just 'planed' the surface of the water while it was taking off. Certainly this is confusing when we are trying to develop our intellect to a higher 'plane'. This type of confusion can arise in any language, so what we must do in Aristotle's eyes, is to hang the appropriate definition on the appropriate word at the appropriate time. Doing otherwise will lead us and our fellow interlocutors into confusion. Reg Foulkes riskit@bnr.ca or reg.foulkes@bnr.ca (613) 763-4131 De gustibus non disputandum est-- ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 14:52:00 +0000 Subject: Re: Categories Latin text From: "reg (r.m.) foulkes" In message "Re: Categories Latin text", you write: >>If anyone is interested, I can type in Boethius' Latin translation of the >>Categories as we go along. This of course assumes we go slowly enough >>through the text that I have time to do so. Why the Latin? Because the >>genuises who came up with the Internet haven't quite figured out how to >>standardize non-Latin alphabets yet, so Greek is out of the question, and >>Latin translations can always stick closer to the Greek than any English >>translation can. >> > Excellent suggestion, if you can cope. Lucky it's a short text. > >Luc > I am also interested. Thanks for offering. Reg Foulkes riskit@bnr.ca or reg.foulkes@bnr.ca (613) 763-4131 De gustibus non disputandum est-- ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 10:24:38 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Who is leading the categories discussion? From: "BROWN PHILIP H" > > 350 BC > CATEGORIES > by Aristotle > translated by E. M. Edghill > 1 > > Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a > common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for > each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to > the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though > they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name > differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an > animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that > case only. Aristotle seems to be saying here that the same word can have two meanings. Now, we use "animal" when referring to the painted animal in an elliptical sense. That is, if we point to a drawing and say, "This is an animal," we really mean "This is *the drawing* of an animal." In the latter sentence, isn't the sense of "animal" the same as when we use the word to refer to a real ox or a man? Whether it is or not, there is a strong relationship between the senses of "animal" in Aristotle's example. I wonder if he meant to include in the "equivocal" category pairs of words that are unrelated (or very distantly related), such as "plane" (flying machine) and "plane" (carpenter's tool)? Or would he consider these two different words in that their meanings are so disparate? In my translation (by Irwin and Fine), equivocal words are called "homonymous." Is this a transliteration from the original Greek? Phil Brown ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 11:09:37 -0500 (EST) Subject: Introduction From: "William Straw" Greetings: My name is William Straw and I am an ecology grad student at the Univ. of Georgia, Athens, GA. My vocation is in plant (forest) ecology, restoration ecology, and natural resource management. My avocations include: environmental ethics, philosophy, religion and mysticism, gregorian chants, medieval music, calligraphy, and stone sculpture. Over the past ten years, I have read Aristotle's "Ethics" and portions of "Poetics" and "Metaphysics," and Theophrastus's "De causis plantarum," which may have borrowed heavily from or been strongly influenced by Aristotle. I look forward to reading and rereading Aristotle's works and to listening to other people's interpretations of these works. ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 17:56:26 +0100 Subject: Re: Who is leading the categories discussion? From: "luc borot" As I was reading the text sent by Peter Orlowski, and compared it with the French translation which I am slow-reading from, I was struck by the same questions as Phil Brown. Jules Tricot translated the three modes of nomination as 'homonyms', synonyms' and 'paronyms'. Instead of 'termination', he uses the grammatical term 'case', with a reference to Poetics 20, 1457, a 18. The notion of 'equivocation' implied by the text below is only present in one of Tricot's notes, but he kept it out of his text. He introduces more strictly aristotelian concepts in his translation. E.g. in the first sentence, he writes that the name only is common, whereas the *notion* designated by this name is different; likewise the last sentence sounds like: "For if one wants to account for the reason why each of them *accomplishes the essence* of animal, each will have to receive a special definition." (I have used * * for emphasis.) To accomplish the essence and 'to be' may have different echoes in Aristotelian ontology, unless I'm wrong. Now, I would disagree with Phil on the term "elliptical" when he writes that "Now, we use "animal" when referring to the painted animal in an elliptical sense." In rhetoric, this is not an ellipsis but a metonymy: the representation linguistically designates the represented. Nothing is praetermitted, which would be requisite to have an ellipsis stricto sensu. I strongly regret that I'm not a hellenist, but I also realise that having to compare translations implies comparing slow readings of the text previously done by others. As a translatot myself, I could even SWEAR that translation is very slow reading indeed. Yours till next post Luc <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Aristotle says: >> >> Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a >> common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for >> each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to >> the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though >> they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name >> differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an >> animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that >> case only. > And Phil Brown commented: >Aristotle seems to be saying here that the same word can have two >meanings. Now, we use "animal" when referring to the painted animal >in an elliptical sense. That is, if we point to a drawing and say, >"This is an animal," we really mean "This is *the drawing* of an >animal." In the latter sentence, isn't the sense of "animal" the same >as when we use the word to refer to a real ox or a man? Whether it is >or not, there is a strong relationship between the senses of "animal" >in Aristotle's example. I wonder if he meant to include in the >"equivocal" category pairs of words that are unrelated (or very >distantly related), such as "plane" (flying machine) and "plane" >(carpenter's tool)? Or would he consider these two different words >in that their meanings are so disparate? > >In my translation (by Irwin and Fine), equivocal words are called >"homonymous." Is this a transliteration from the original Greek? > >Phil Brown **************************************************** *Luc Borot * * * *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Elisabethaines * *Universite Paul Valery * *Montpellier (France) * **************************************************** ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 12:18:27 -0600 Subject: Categories Latin text From: "Richard Diamond" If anyone is interested, I can type in Boethius' Latin translation of the Categories as we go along. This of course assumes we go slowly enough through the text that I have time to do so. Why the Latin? Because the genuises who came up with the Internet haven't quite figured out how to standardize non-Latin alphabets yet, so Greek is out of the question, and Latin translations can always stick closer to the Greek than any English translation can. Caput I Aequivoca dicuntur quorum solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut _animal_ homo et quod pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vero substantia ratio diversa. Si quis enim assignet quid sit utrumque eorum, quo sint animalia, propriam assignabit utrisque rationem. Univoca vero dicuntur quorum nomen commune est, et secundum nomen eadem ratio substantia, ut _animal_ homo atque bos, communi enim nomine utraque animalia nuncupantur, et est substantiae ratio eadem. Si quis enim assignet utrisque rationem quid utrumque sit, quo sint animalia, eamdem assignabit rationem. Denominativa vero dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo, solo differentia casu, secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a grammatica _grammaticus_, et a fortitudine _fortis_. Richard Diamond ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 20:36:03 +0100 Subject: Re: Categories Latin text From: "luc borot" >If anyone is interested, I can type in Boethius' Latin translation of the >Categories as we go along. This of course assumes we go slowly enough >through the text that I have time to do so. Why the Latin? Because the >genuises who came up with the Internet haven't quite figured out how to >standardize non-Latin alphabets yet, so Greek is out of the question, and >Latin translations can always stick closer to the Greek than any English >translation can. > Excellent suggestion, if you can cope. Lucky it's a short text. Luc **************************************************** *Luc Borot * * * *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Elisabethaines * *Universite Paul Valery * *Montpellier (France) * **************************************************** ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 15:39:27 -0800 (PST) Subject: re:introducing myself From: "Kevin Guilfoy" I am Kevin Guilfoy a grad student in philosophy at the University of Washington. My area of interest is mediaeval logic, specifically I'm working on Peter Abelard's theory of propositions and truth. Naturaly I need to know Aristotle as well. What I would most like to read is the organon (or at least those books that were known to the latin west in the 12th century) We seem to have already started the Categories so I won't bother to actually vote. I have just joined the list so I don't know what the time schedual, if there is one, is. That is when should we have read chapter 2? Kevin Guilfoy ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 06 Feb 1994 17:48:12 -0600 (CST) Subject: Categories, 1a1-6 From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu First, some comments about the translation: a)"Things are said to be named equivocally..." There is no separate word for "things" in the greek, but simply "homonuma" which =aequivoca in the Latin. Thus we can say either "homonyms" or "equivocals". Since the -onym of "homonym" is the greek onoma(=name), either "said" or "named" needs to be dropped from the translation. Thus the first phrase can read: "Equivocals are said..." b)"...when, though they have a common name..." This is better rendered as: "when only the name is common..." c)"...the definition corresponding with the name differs for each." There is an important omission in this phrase. It should be: "the definition [logos] OF THE SUBSTANCE [ousia] corresponding with the name..." This holds as well when the phrase is repeated in the next sentence. BROWN says: "Aristotle seems to be saying here that the same word can have two meanings." It is probably more accurate to say that the same *name* can have *more than one* meaning. For at this points we don't know to what extent names(=onoma) are distinguished from other types of words, like verbs(=rhema). We do know that names have substances corresponding to them, and that the number of substances corresponding to the same name need not be limited to two. Or more accurately, it is not the substance simply which corresponds with the name, but the definition or logos of the substance. Thus, what makes for homonymy is not definition of names but definition of things. For Aristotle, homonyms are not different words, as some nowadays are wont to make them. Like BOROT, I must disagree with BROWN when he says that "we use 'animal' when referring to the painted animal in an elliptical sense." But I also wouldn't call it a metonymy, for rhetorical tropes are not at all at issue here. This use of the word "animal" is precisely homonymic (is this a word?), as indeed *every* use of the word "animal" would be. So when we point to a drawing and say, "This is an animal", we really mean "This is an animal", for our use of the word "animal" here is just as proper as when referring to a real animal. Jeff Taylor ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 20:26:33 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Aristotle's endoxa and Reid's common sense From: "Peter Orlowski" On Sat, 5 Feb 1994 ROBINSOD@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu wrote: > Yes, indeed, and I said as much in my chapter on A's theory of > Perception in my "Aristotle's Psychology" (Columbia, '89), even > likening the theory to the realism developed by Reid contra Berkeley > and the "ideal" theories. More lpater I would not say that A. realism is like Reid's "common sense"attack on idealism at all. First of all, I would say that Reid and his like are irrationalists. Their notion of "common sense" lumps numerous propositions into the bin of certitudes beyond examination. But if thought is unable to reject or doubt these judgements, although they are neither evident nor demonstrated, it will have to submit to certitudes which are at once in conformity with reason, (inasmuch as reason accepts them,) yet irrational, since they cannot be justified. This is far from Aristotle. This notion of common sense was fashion specifically to combat Cartesian methodical doubt (and Berkeley's idealism) by taking what Cicero called "sensus communis" (which were merely propositions that the rhetorician could consider to be commonly accepted) and adding a philosophical certitude to them which Cicero never intended. This of course is much different from the medieval "sensus communi" or Aristotle's "koine aisthesis" which was a power of the inner sense organ, the heart, where all the perceptions of the five senses congregated, as it were; where motion, number, shape, etc. were sensed. To call these two kinds of "common sense" the same is pure equivocation. Reid's common sense was more like Aristotle's "koinai doxai" insofar as both were propositions, but the similarly does not go much further. Aristotle gives as an example of these koinai doxai the principle of non-contradiction. 996b27. This is not a postulate, but rather a principle, and it is evident. Furthermore, it could be defended against those who would deny it. The common beliefs of Aristotle were starting points of inquiry. As he and Descartes recognized, every inquiry must begin somewhere. Something has to be evident for anything else to be proved. Looking at a list of "common sense" propositions of the irrationalist, e.g. "God exists," however, you can easily see the difference. /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 20:33:07 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Who is leading the categories discussion? From: "BROWN PHILIP H" Luc writes: > Now, I would disagree with Phil on the term "elliptical" when he > writes that "Now, we use "animal" when referring to the painted animal in > an elliptical sense." In rhetoric, this is not an ellipsis but a metonymy: > the representation linguistically designates the represented. Nothing is > praetermitted, which would be requisite to have an ellipsis stricto sensu. I wasn't using "elliptical" in a technical sense. I merely meant that "animal" when referring to a painted animal is shorthand for a longer phrase, "drawing of an animal." Perhaps I misused the word even in its non-technical dictionary sense. Is everyone agreed that the category of equivocal or homonynous names in the Categories includes all pairs (or groups) of names that sound alike? So "plane" the flying machine, "plane" the carpenter's tool and "plain" the flatland are homonymous? These names differ from A's example in that none of the names is shorthand for a longer expression. Or is it possible that the confusion Aristotle wants to dispel arises not merely when two names sound alike but when two names sound alike and have a similar meaning? I just want to be clear about the matter before moving on. Phil Brown ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 22:33:32 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Aristotle's endoxa and Reid's common sense From: "Peter Orlowski" My apologies to all slow readers on this listserv. I sent my message (re: common sense in Reid and Aristotle) to the wrong address. Please ignore it. It has nothing to do with slow-reading Aristotle's Categories. But this does: I wondered several things: do the names sounding the same have to be spelled the same, e.g. "rain" and "rein"? The latin text graciously forwarded to us all used the latin for "ousia" in the first line. Is ousia in the greek, and if so, would Aequivoca include same verbs, e.g. "rain" and "reign?" What or other words not of the same kind at all, e.g. "threw" and "through?" /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 07 Feb 1994 00:57:47 -0600 (CST) Subject: Categories 1a1-6 From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu The question, raised by both BROWN and ORLOWSKI, as to whether names merely have to *sound* the same, or whether they also must be *written* the same way in order to be homonyms, is an interesting one. My first thought was that they would have to be both written and pro- nounced the same, for if they were written differently, it would be possible to show that they are not the same word after all. But on the other hand, the context does seem to be one of speech, as indicated by the presence of the word "legetai"(=IS SAID). And above all, at De Interpretatione 16a20, Aristotle says, "A noun [onoma] is a vocal sound..." So, does homonymy apply to writing at all? Or does it apply...equivocally? I would also like to amplify my previous comment that "indeed *every* use of the word 'animal' would be [homo- nymous]." I would say rather that there is no question of homonymy unless the "same" name is spoken *more than once*, when the definition of the substance corresponding to different occurences of the name is also different. But whether or not *I* happen to use "animal" to refer to different substances, is and has been properly used to refer to different substances by others, at some time or another. I don't think it matters how close in space or time other uses have to occur in order for some single use to be declared homonymous or not; only that other uses have in fact occurred (and, I presume, are in some sense socially recognized--otherwise *every* occurrence of *every* word would be homonymous). I would point out too that the word "animal"(=zoon) in greek has two distinct meanings (which is what Aristotle was concerned with here): 1.a certain type of living being, and 2."in painting and sculpture, a figure or image, not necessarily of animals." Thus, pace BROWN, using "animal" to refer to a painted animal is *not* a shorthand or elliptical expression for anything else, (except perhaps for its corresponding definition [logos]) but is just as literal an expression as when it is used to refer to a living thing. So it does seem to me that homonyms, as defined here, do include all groups of names that sound alike. It doesn't matter how close or how far their "meanings" are, just so long as they're different. Categorically yours, Jeff Taylor ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 07 Feb 1994 02:30:19 -0600 (CST) Subject: Categories 1a1-11 From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu I notice that in my last posts, I spoke of things having "the same name". But looking over the greek text for the sections on homonymy and synonymy, I notice that Aristotle always speaks of a *common*(=koinon) name, whose opposite (which doesn't appear here) would be "akoinOnEtas". However, when speaking of the logoi corresponding to the names, he uses instead the pair same/different(=autos/heteros). Does anyone have any ideas on the significance of the difference Jeff Taylor ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 03:54:12 -0500 (EST) Subject: Aequivocal Names From: "Peter Orlowski" On Mon, 7 Feb 1994 TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu wrote: > The question, raised by both BROWN and ORLOWSKI, as to > whether names merely have to *sound* the same, or whether > they also must be *written* the same way in order to > be homonyms, is an interesting one. My first thought > was that they would have to be both written and pro- > nounced the same, for if they were written differently, > it would be possible to show that they are not the same > word after all. But on the other hand, the context does > seem to be one of speech, as indicated by the presence > of the word "legetai"(=IS SAID). And above all, at De > Interpretatione 16a20, Aristotle says, "A noun [onoma] > is a vocal sound..." > > So, does homonymy apply to writing at all? Or does it > apply...equivocally? > > I would also like to amplify my previous comment that > "indeed *every* use of the word 'animal' would be [homo- > nymous]." I would say rather that there is no question > of homonymy unless the "same" name is spoken *more than > once*, when the definition of the substance corresponding > to different occurences of the name is also different. > But whether or not *I* happen to use "animal" to refer > to different substances, is and has been properly used +++> to refer to different substances by others, at some time > or another. I don't think it matters how close in space > or time other uses have to occur in order for some single > use to be declared homonymous or not; only that other > uses have in fact occurred (and, I presume, are in some > sense socially recognized--otherwise *every* occurrence > of *every* word would be homonymous). > > I would point out too that the word "animal"(=zoon) in > greek has two distinct meanings (which is what Aristotle > was concerned with here): 1.a certain type of living > being, and 2."in painting and sculpture, a figure or > image, not necessarily of animals." Thus, pace BROWN, > using "animal" to refer to a painted animal is *not* a > shorthand or elliptical expression for anything else, > (except perhaps for its corresponding definition [logos]) > but is just as literal an expression as when it is > used to refer to a living thing. So it does seem to me > that homonyms, as defined here, do include all groups > of names that sound alike. It doesn't matter how close > or how far their "meanings" are, just so long as they're > different. > > Categorically yours, > Jeff Taylor /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 09:07:17 EST Subject: Re: Categories From: "Sean A. Kelsey" The Categories sound fine with me. Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 09:14:17 EST Subject: Categories From: "Sean A. Kelsey" Laura Wedner mentions that she has translations of the Categories by Barnes and Ackrill. Where is Barnes' translation, do you know? BTW I also have Boethius' Latin translation. SEan Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 09:44:52 -0500 (EST) Subject: Introduction From: "David Westbrook" Greetings all. My name is David Westbrook and I am an MA student in Social & Political Thought at York University where my focus is mostly on Hegel and on psychoanalysis. My background is primarily in philosophy (BA from University of Toronto). I was introduced to philosophy through Aristotle, in a course I took at U of Waterloo before I became a student in earnest, and I anticipate delight at returning to him with (hopefully!) some philosophical maturity. It appears that we will be reading the Categories. That is fine by me since I am happy to work on anything and the Categories is the traditional place to start. Other works I would especially like to study are the Physics, On The Soul, and the Nicomachean Ethics, with no order of preference implied. I look forward to working with you all. David Westbrook Social & Political Thought York University ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 7 Feb 94 16:19:05 CST Subject: Leader and "Equivocals" From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com Wow! The response to starting off our reading with the Categories is much stronger than I expected. Given the progress of the discussion over the weekend, it seems that responsibilities of a discussion leader might be limited to breaking up longer chapters into smaller sections for slow reading, making sure that we don't skip or gloss over any of the text, and suggesting when to move on to a new section of text. I think it is clear that there is no need for a leader to be making any kind of introductory or summary posting for each section of reading. Even the tasks which I enumerated (in what I think is the order of decreasing importance) might be achievable without assigning them to a single participant. Peter Orlowski has suggested that we just read slowly and let the pace of reading be dictated by the progress in the discussion. Part of my interest in this issue is due to my indication on Friday that I was considering leading the Categories reading. I don't want to drop the ball after we've gotten off to such a good start, but it is not completely clear to me what leading entails. Also, from my reading of discussion over the weekend, it is evident to me that there are several other participants who are better qualified than me to serve as the leader/facilitator. I'd like to thank Jeff Taylor for answering my first question before I even posted it! I have the Edghill translation and I wondered why the text read "Things are said to be named equivocally..." instead of "Things are named equivocally..." and whether this was an issue of translation. Jeff has also provided me with a new question. Is there any difference between "Homonyms are said..." and "Equivocals are said..."? Jeff indicated that either "said" or "named" needs to be dropped from the first line in Edghill's translation. Since the term homonym derives from name, we would be able to drop "named" if we used "Homonyms are said..." Is equivocal closer to the Latin for say or for name? If the former, we might be inclined to drop "said" and use "Equivocals are named...", but this gets awkward when followed with "when only the name is common..." Other reasons for preferring "Homonyms are said..." are that homonym is closer to Greek than equivocal and that homonym is a more common English word, thus fitting better with Aristotle's reputation for employing common language. Tom Hayosh hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 21:13:23 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: introduction From: "Karen R. Schnakenberg" I'm a novice reader of Aristotle coming to other works via my initial interest in the Rhetoric. I'm currently madly racing to finish a dissertation exploring contemporary interpretations and representations of the Rhetoric; the question of why so many of them treat the text as either an "icon" or a "relic," in either case making it virtually inaccessible as a resource for building or informing contemporary rhetorical theory; and how we (here referring specifically to rhetoricians and historians of rhetoric) could develop better methods of both teaching and using the Rhetoric in our scholarship. I'm interested in the conversation in a general sense to eavesdrop and begin to develop approaches to the whole body of work and in a much more specific sense that focusses on these kinds of questions: How are works other than the Rhetoric read and made accessible as contributors to contemporary philoso- phizing? (It's interesting that works such as the Ethics are experiencing a real surge of recent interest and exploration, while the Rhetoric seems to be difficult to revive, at least beyond a fairly small circle.) How might detailed knowledge of the other works help me to understand the Rhetoric better? (the Organon, Ethics, and Politics seem especially pertinent) And, most specifically, how to issues, concepts, etc. from the other works (and the corpus as a whole) help to illuminate A's concepts of the ethos-pathos-logos triad. Here I've become interested in the common tendency in both rhetorical theory and history to reduce logos to "logical argument" and logical argument to something akin to strict mathematical logic and the accompanying tendency to reduce pathos to a manipulation of emotion often defined as passion. As you might guess, I'd be most interested in exploring the Ethics and the various logical works, and, of coure, the Rhetoric, if anyone else out there is interested. Working against a deadline as I am, I will probably listen in more than participate but join in when I can. If anyone out there is interested in conversing about the issues I've raised about the Rhetoric, I invite you to get in touch via my home e-mail address. Karen Schnakenberg Department of English Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA voice mail at CMU: 412-268-3714 voice mail & answering machine: 412-731-3046 e-mail: ks3c@andrew.cmu.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 00:51:14 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories 1a1-6 From: "BROWN PHILIP H" Jeff Taylor writes: > > I would point out too that the word "animal"(=zoon) in > greek has two distinct meanings (which is what Aristotle > was concerned with here): 1.a certain type of living > being, and 2."in painting and sculpture, a figure or > image, not necessarily of animals." Thus, pace BROWN, > using "animal" to refer to a painted animal is *not* a > shorthand or elliptical expression for anything else, > (except perhaps for its corresponding definition [logos]) > but is just as literal an expression as when it is > used to refer to a living thing. So it does seem to me > that homonyms, as defined here, do include all groups > of names that sound alike. It doesn't matter how close > or how far their "meanings" are, just so long as they're > different. Since "zoon" had these two meanings, the distinction I saw doesn't exist. One other thing I'd like to get straight before we move on is what exactly does Aristotle mean by "account of the essence." (Is this a translation of logos?) Is an account of the essence a description? Is it a scientific definition? How does "account of the essence" differ from our "meaning"? I have not studied Greek, so I apologize if my questions are simple. Phil Brown ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Feb 94 1:44:05 EST Subject: Introduction From: "Michael Polis" Hello, I'm a Computer Scientist and programmer with a BS from Carnegie Mellon. That is, as far as I can tell, unrelated to my interest in Aristotle, which comes mainly from discussions I have had with my father. These give me a Scholastic viewpoint. I've been trying to teach myself Ancient Greek, though I haven't gotten very far. I'm not particuraly interested in ethics or literary works, more in the Physics, Metaphysics or De Anima. Categories does seem like the right place to start, though. First principles first. ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 08 Feb 1994 04:24:01 -0600 (CST) Subject: Categories 1a1-16 From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu In response to Phil Brown's question as to what is an "account of the essence": This is the phrase "logos tEs ousias", which is sometimes rendered simply as "definition", as Edghill does. But I would prefer that it be made explicit that the word "ousia"(=substance) is in there, especially here in this context, to make it clear that names are in some way correlated with substances. So a better rendering is "expression (account, statement) of the substance". I also wouldn't use "essence" here, for the sake of consistency. I like the procedure used by H.G. Apostle (see below), who always trans- lates "ousia" by "substance", reserving "essence" for the phrase "to ti En einai"(literally,="what it was to be"), and reserving "whatness" for "ti esti" (=what it is). Now, what logos is and what ousia is, and whether a logos of an ousia is a description, scientific definition, or a meaning, are very good and very large questions. I don't think we will be able to answer them adequately without reading more widely, particularly in the Metaphysics, if even then. Regarding Tom Hayosh's points, I guess I was using interchangably "homonyms" and "equivocals", and it probably is a good idea to settle on one--probably "homonym", since it is indeed closer to the Greek, and even though all 3 translations I have use "equivocal". (The same goes for "sunOnuma", which for "univocal" we could substitute "synonymous") The Latin root in "equivocal" is "vox"(=voice) which I think would be equivalent to the Greek "audE". I don't know that "onoma" has, in itself, any definite connection with voice. (By the way, where are all those Classicists who introduced themselves?) The very first word of the Categories is of course "homOnuma". It is unclear exactly what part of speech this is. Somewhere in there is the sense of a noun, which is manifested in the universal desire of English trans- lators to insert the word "things". It could also be an adjective or an adverb, and is often translated "equi- vocally". But of course, "equivocal" in English can be either a noun or an adjective. The three types (of names? things?) in ch.1 are thus homOnuma, sunOnuma, and parOnuma: homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms. This last gets rendered as "derivatives" (or "denominativa" in the Latin) in most English trans- lations. But it probably is a good idea to preserve the etymological connections between the three terms, even though "paronym" as an English word is much less common than the first two. [Regarding the translation of "parOnuma", one might want to wonder to what extent modern translators are interpreting the text via Latin.] In the last paragraph, on paronyms, Aristotle does not mention substance. I am guessing that since not even the names are common in this case, there is no problem involved in determining the sameness or difference of substances. Does no one have any thoughts on the possible significance of the fact that Aristotle, when it is a question of *names*, uses *only* the word "common"; but when it a question of logos, he uses *only* the pair "same/different"? I don't know what, if anything, to make of this. (I notice that Edghill maintains this difference in the first paragraph, but conflates the difference in the second. The Latin maintains the distinction.) A remark on translators: I have a translation of the Categories (and several other works by Aristotle) by Hippocrates G. Apostle. I find his translations *very* consistent in their terminology, and are *much* more literal than most other English trans- lations, all without abusing English idiom or sounding in the least bit awkward. I highly recommend his work. He has entirely translated the Categories, De Interpretatione (which he entitles _Propositions_), Posterior Analytics, Physics, Metaphysics, De anima, Nic. Ethics, Politics, and the Poetics. He also has a basic writings anthology out, which has fragments of several other works (Prior anal., Topics, Rhetoric). These are all published by The Peripatetic Press, Grinnell, Iowa; are all out in paperback; all have extensive notes, Greek to English and English to Greek glossaries, and indexes; and cost between $8 and $12. For my money, these are by far the best English translations available. It's too bad that he died before finishing all of Aristotle. Jeff Taylor ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 10:11:50 -0600 (CST) Subject: Disagreement on translation re: "equivocals" From: "Richard Diamond" I am wondering whether it is right to say that "THINGS are said to be equivocal, etc." isn't a proper translation. Unfortunately, I already deleted the original message which proposed the idea. As I recall, the argument was, there's no "things" in the text. But there is: hOn (latin: quorum). The relative pronoun in the plural carries along the notion of "things which" "(things) whose". Hence, "things whose names alone are common are said to be/called/named equivocal". I cannot think how removing "things" from the English translation does anything but hide the fact that in this first sentence Aristotle is talking about naming things. Here's how I would render the first sentence as a whole: Things are said to be equivocal whose name alone is common, but the definition corresponding to the name of the substance is different; _animal_, for example, which is both a man and a drawing [of one]. For only the name of these is common, and the definition corresponding to the name of the substance is different. I'm surprised we haven't spent much effort on what the title of the work means... Richard Diamond diamond@acad.udallas.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: 08 Feb 94 13:01:05 EST Subject: introduction and preferences From: JKAHLE@walldata.mhs.compuserve.com I'm James Kahle, a tech writer with a philosophy B.A. Despite the demands of my "real" job writing software manuals, I continue to read in philosophy. My participation here is for two reasons: I'm interested in Aristotle's teachings on things aesthetic, rhetorical, and metaphysical, and I'm intrigued by the possibilities of computer-mediated study. My vote for our first text is also the Categories. ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 12:27:11 -0600 (CST) Subject: Re: Disagreement on translation re: "equivocals" From: "harry ide" Richard Diamond suggests: > I am wondering whether it is right to say that "THINGS are said to be > equivocal, etc." isn't a proper translation. Unfortunately, I > already deleted the original message which proposed the idea. As I > recall, the argument was, there's no "things" in the text. But there > is: hOn (latin: quorum). The relative pronoun in the plural carries > along the notion of "things which" "(things) whose". > > Hence, "things whose names alone are common are said to > be/called/named equivocal". I cannot think how removing "things" > from the English translation does anything but hide the fact that in > this first sentence Aristotle is talking about naming things. In English we usually use `thing' quite broadly, to include not only material objects, but also states of affairs, events, properties, etc. Philosophers tend to use it more narrowly, of objects. So one relevant question is whether the accounts in _Categories_ 1 apply only to objects. I would guess not: states of affairs, for example, might be homonymous, too. So if `thing' suggests `object', we have a reason not to use `thing'. This would also be a reason not to translate _ousia_ as substance, since `substance' does seem to suggest `object'. Harry A. Ide hide@unlinfo.unl.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 11:16:02 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: Disagreement on translation re: "equivocals" From: "Marc Cohen" On Tue, 8 Feb 1994, Richard Diamond wrote: > Here's how I would render the first sentence as a whole: > > Things are said to be equivocal whose name alone is common, but the > definition corresponding to the name of the substance is different; > _animal_, for example, which is both a man and a drawing [of one]. > For only the name of these is common, and the definition > corresponding > to the name of the substance is different. > I agree with Harry Ide's reasons for avoiding "substance" as a translation of "ousia" here. The phrase "logos tEs ousias", literally "account of the essence", pretty clearly means "definition" in this context. (This is one of those places where an unexceptional rule such as: reserve "essence" for "to ti En einai" causes more trouble than it avoids.) Like most translators, I take "logos", not "tounoma", to govern the genitive "tEs ousias". So the translation "definition corresponding to the name of the substance" gets the grammar of "ho de kata tounoma logos tEs ousias" wrong. The correct translation is "definition (i.e., `account of essence') corresponding to the name." The name need not be the name of a substance. ============================================================================ S. Marc Cohen | e-mail: smcohen@u.washington.edu Department of Philosophy DK-50 | voice: 206-543-6895 University of Washington | FAX: 206-685-8740 Seattle, WA 98195 | ============================================================================ ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 14:28:04 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories 1a1-16 From: "BROWN PHILIP H" Jeff Taylor writes: > > Regarding Tom Hayosh's points, I guess I was using > interchangably "homonyms" and "equivocals", and it > probably is a good idea to settle on one--probably > "homonym", since it is indeed closer to the Greek, and > even though all 3 translations I have use "equivocal". > (The same goes for "sunOnuma", which for "univocal" > we could substitute "synonymous") If we are to choose one translation of these terms over another, I agree with Jeff that we should stick to "homonyms," "synonyms" and "paronyms," because these are closer to the Greek. Unless, that is, someone can make a strong case for preferring the Latinate words. In any case, we should come to some agreement on this. Phil Brown ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 14:47:57 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories 1a1-16 From: "Peter Orlowski" Taylor recommends homonym, synonym and paronym rather than the latin based words equivocal, etc. He wonders why translators always use the lainate words instead of the helenate (?) words. I wonder if it is not for this reason: the medievals who coined the latin words gave them meanings which were equivalent to the greek words. The english words synonym, etc. are not equivalent to the greek words or at least not Aristotle's understanding of them. In english, for example, synonyms are words which have the same logos but not the same name. In greek, sunOnuma, however, have the same logos, AND the same name. In english, equivocals have both the same logos and the same name. Thus, "sunOnuma" and "equivocals" are synonyms, but not univocals ('cuz they sound different.) On the other hand, "sunOnuma" and "synonym" are not synonyms ('cuz they mean different things) but the are practically equivocals ('cuz they sound the same but have different definitions.) Thus, synonym is an erroreous translation of sunOnuma. It is just a transliteration. I say we stick with the latinate equivocal etc. Any one else have an opinion? /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 14:57:11 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories 1a1-16 From: "Peter Orlowski" On Tue, 8 Feb 1994, BROWN PHILIP H wrote: > If we are to choose one translation of these terms over another, I > agree with Jeff that we should stick to "homonyms," "synonyms" and > "paronyms," because these are closer to the Greek. As I said, the english transliterates are closer to the greek SOUND, but not to Aristotle's MEANING. > Unless, that is, > someone can make a strong case for preferring the Latinate words. > > In any case, we should come to some agreement on this. > > Phil Brown > > /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 16:23:38 -0500 Subject: From: "Sean A. Kelsey" It has been suggested in recent postings that `homonyms', `synonyms', and `paronyms' be used to translate `homOnuma', `sunOnuma', and `parOnuma', because the English words are etymologically closer to the Greek words they translate. There has also been some discussion as to whether they ought to be translated as nominatively (as subjects or predicates of their respective sentences) or adverbially. 1. Should we take `homOnuma', etc., nominatively or adverbially? The Greek has homOnuma legetai hOn onoma monon koinon, ... If we take `homOnuma' nominatively, the sentence would be translated: A. [they] are called (or named or said [to be]) `homonyms' (or `univocals') whose name alone is common, ... If we take `homOnuma' adverbially, the sentence would be translated: B. [they] are called (or named, etc.) `homonymously' (or, univocally) whose name alone is common, ... I am inclined to favor translation (B). For it is NAMES that are called, named, or said to be `homonyms' (or `univocals'). But it seems strange to talk about names "whose name alone is common". On translation (A), however, `[they]' should refer to certain names, viz., those names "whose name alone is common." On the other hand, what are called, named, or said to be `homonymously' (or `univocally') are not names themselves, but the things named. Of these, it is natural to speak of those "whose name alone is common." On translation (B), `[they]' refers to certain things named, viz., those things named "whose name alone is common." For these reasons I think translation (B) is the better, with `homOnuma', etc., taken adverbially. 2. Should we translate `homOnuma', etc., by `homonymously' or `univocally', etc.? I am in this case inclined to favor the cognates to the Latin. First, I'm not sure that `homonym' and `paronym' have adverbial forms in English. Second, I think that even in the case of `sunOnuma' the `Latin' translation is better. For in English, I think, it is correct rather to say that ONE WORD is being used UNIVOCALLY of SEVERAL THINGS, than that one word is being used synonymously of several things; and again, that SEVERAL WORDS are being used SYNONYMOUSLY of ONE THING, than that several words are being used univocally of one thing. But Aristotle appears to be using `synOnuma' to describe the naming of several things "whose name is common", i.e., SEVERAL THINGS with ONE NAME. Hence `univocally' appears to better capture in English what it is he is getting at. Now, in the case of `parOnuma' Aristotle appears to be talking about several related names for several related things; to say that such things are named `derivatively' captures this point well in English, I think. Does anyone have any ideas on how we ought to take `ti estin autOn hkaterOi to zOiOi einai'? If we could get clear about this, we could perhaps make more definite sense of `ho kata tounoma logos tEs ousias' (the `account of the substance' discussed in earlier postings) as used here. I am inclined to translate the former as `what it means for each of them to be an animal' (more literally: `what "being an animal" is for each of them'); but I'm not sure. If this is right, then in this context `ho kata tounoma logos tEs ousias', `the account of the substance according to the name', might mean something like `what one takes the thing to be when one calls it by such and such a name'; in short, a definition of the meaning of the word as applied to this thing, or, perhaps better, a definition of the thing as named by this word. The Latin, I think, supports the latter; it has `quid sit utrumque eorum, quo sint animalia': `what each of them is, by which they are animals', or, `what each of them is, in virtue of which they are [called] animals'. This is closer to `a definition of the thing insofar as it is named by this word' than to `a definition of the meaning of the word insofar as it names this thing'. So, for things named univocally, when we say what it is they are in virtue of which they are called by such and such a name, we will in each case say the same thing, whereas for things named equivocally, we will in each case say something different. Does this make relatively straightforward sense of `kata tounoma logos tEs ousias' in this context? Sean Kelsey sakelsey@phoenix.princeton.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 11:33:32 -1000 (HST) Subject: Introductions From: "Brian Richardson" I'm Brian Richardson, a grad student at the University of Hawaii (doing a PhD in Political Science and an MA in Philosophy). I've done some Aristotle before (primarily the ethics and the politics), and I think the Categories would be great (but then probably anything would be ....) ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 94 04:50:49 +0000 Subject: Late arrival From: "Lance Fletcher" [List owner arrives very late, finds discussion has taken off without him, looks unsuccessfully for vacant seat, at length clears his throat...] Ahem. Greetings. My apologies for being late. Starting eight lists simultaneously has swamped me with administrative tasks -- to such an extent that I now have almost no time for slow reading. But I have read all the messages posted so far on this list. It's wonderful to find that I am superfluous! At last count there were 63 people subscribed to this list. Of those, between 20 and 25 have already spoken. Among those who have expressed themselves it seems a consensus has formed around reading the Categories. I think that is excellent, but I want to remind you that this does not need to be an exclusive choice. My idea was that this list would serve as an incubator for slow readings, and that whenever the amount of message traffic on a particular topic reached some critical magnitude I would spin it off into a separate list, and in the meantime we can accomodate multiple discussion threads by adopting some simple conventions for identifying the discussion thread in the subject line of the message. So, while the consensus has formed around the Categories, that's a consensus among those who have spoken (you could say that the one's who keep silent don't count, but that's not my view) And in any case there have already been several expressions of interest in reading the Nicomachean Ethics, the Metaphysics, De Anima, the Physics and the Rhetoric. I think my personal preference would be for one of the first two, however the real scarcity is not texts by Aristotle that are worth reading, it's people willing to lead discussions. So whoever is willing to lead a reading is probably going to get to say which text. I would like to ask something about the character of the discussion so far: In the original announcement of these slow reading lists I said, "Our intention is to conduct readings that are rigorous, yet so fundamental that no previous interpretation will be presupposed." We are fortunate to have a number of quite accomplished scholars in our midst, and I do not mean anything I say to be seen as a constraint. However, I think it would be useful to ask ourselves, first of all, do we all really accept that intention, which to begin with was simply MY intention? And if so, are we fulfilling that intention in the way we are conducting our discussion? I am really not sure. I do know that as a teacher I always learned much more from teaching novices than from teaching advanced students, because to make the material intelligible to the novices required me to clarify a lot of things that I didn't need to think about when I taught advanced students. My own training in slow reading came mostly from studying with Seth Benardete. His practice, which I think he may have appropriated from Leo Strauss, was something like this: First a passage of the text would be read aloud, usually by a student appointed as the reader. Then the translation was corrected and points of language discussed where necessary. Then Benardete would point to what was going on in the passage, after which there was discussion. I wonder if it would be helpful if I quoted here what appears to me as an excellent example of slow reading. This is from a transcript of Benardete's course on the Metaphysics about 1973, the passage is 993b1-11, the beginning of book 2: "The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another way easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but everyone says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed. Therefore, since the truth seems to be like the proverbial door, which no one can fail to hit, in this respect it must be easy, but the fact that we can have a whole truth and not the particular point we aim at shows the difficulty of it" Here Benardete interrupted the reader to say, "There's something wrong with the text here. I think it should be, "The fact that it is not possible to gain the whole, and yet have the part..." Alexander remarks that some people wanted to conjecture that. I think that makes better sense. Okay, go on." "Perhaps, too, as difficulties are of two kinds, the cause of the present difficulty is not in the facts but in us. for as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident to all." At which point Benardete said, "Okay, let's stop there. So he says philosophy is easy and not easy. That is, the truth cannot be missed entirely. That has some connection with the Platonic observation that the utterly false sentence is impossible. But Aristotle thinks something a little stronger than that. I think what he means is that the whole, whose knowledge we want, is elusive; whereas the parts of the whole by their very multiplicity cannot be elusive, at least not elusive in the same way. So it turns out that there is a funny kind of agreement between the natural manifold of parts on the one hand, and the partial knowledge that each contributes to the common store, on the other. That means that we have partial knowledge of the parts; but full knowledge of the parts is not possible without prior knowledge of the whole, because it is the whole which necessarily determines the part-ness of the parts. but the relation in things between part and whole is just one difficulty; the other difficulty is ourselves. It can be put this way: he says, we see better the less naturally evident things. That is, our mind is more attuned to the facts than to the "why" of the facts. So the situation you are in is as follows: That which is self-evident to us is unintelligible; that which is intelligible is not self-evident. Now, the question we have to raise is this: is there a connection between these two difficulties?" My point in quoting that passage is in a way to take issue with something that Tom Hayoshi said: In his message of Monday he wrote, "I think it is clear that there is no need for a leader to be making any kind of introductory or summary posting for each section of reading." That's not so clear to me. That is, I admit that we can get by without it, but I think we will not fulfull the promise of slow reading if someone does not take up the challenge of "saying" the text in a way that points to what is important there and to what the questions are that Aristotle is dealing with. Having said that, I am a little apprehensive that some of our distinguished company may take offense, may feel that I am criticizing the discussion that has already taken place. Please do not think that. I think the discussion so far is very impressive, and I am only looking for how it can be enriched. Lance Fletcher The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher to: lance.jvnc.net or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 94 04:52:44 +0000 Subject: List owner's Intro From: "Lance Fletcher" List Owner finally makes an appearance: [This same message is being posted to all the slow reading lists. For those who are subscribing to more than one list, I apologize for the duplication that will result.] I want to introduce myself here in such a way that you will understand how these slow reading lists are, for me at least, a direct expression of who I am. Who I am is a philosopher. A free lance philosopher, as I said in the welcome message for this list, meaning in part that, like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza, I never received a PhD and have spent little of my life in the employ of educational institutions. But what does a philosopher do if he's not employed as a professor of philosophy or engaged in studies preparing to be a professor of philosophy? Maybe he can be a self-employed philosopher. And what is that? Severn Darden, one of the original members of the Second City Company, and also a college friend of my teachers Seth Benardete and Allan Bloom, had a comic routine about "The Metaphysician" that I heard once on a record. For this skit Darden had created a persona called something like "Jacob Von der Vogelfeinder," who had a ridiculous German accent and an exaggerated Germanic academic manner. At some point in this skit he spoke about "unemployed philosophers", and he explained, parenthetically, that an unemployed philosopher is a philosopher who happens not to be thinking about anything at the moment. On that principle, a *self*-employed philosopher must be one who thinks for himself. And, by that standard, would any self-respecting philosopher take employment as a philosopher for somebody else? In any event, that is what I am: a self-employed philosopher. Among my teachers, the ones who had the greatest impact on my thinking were F.S.C Northrop, Allan Bloom, Seth Benardete and Hannah Arendt. Northrop is not read much these days, but about 40 years ago reading his "The Meeting of East and West" is what made me conscious of my philosophical vocation. I read the Republic with Bloom when he had just completed his translation, and when I finished I realized that I had not known how to read before. If Bloom taught me to read, Benardete taught me to read slowly. It was in his classes that I first experienced the possibility of thinking with a text, of using the reading of a text to think about the questions that the author was thinking about. Although I took some classes with Hannah Arendt, her impact on me was primarily through her writing. My encounter with "The Human Condition" in 1962 was a life-altering experience. What had first driven up the philosophical calling in me was my discomfort with the so-called "fact-value" dichotomy and the then-prevalent ego-centrism of modern thought which viewed politics as merely peripheral and instrumental to the wishes and appetites of the individual. Hannah Arendt was the first writer I encountered who wrote in a vocabulary that did not presuppose that atomistic point of view, and the experience was like falling in love, like discovering at last that I was no longer alone in the world. Nearly twenty years ago, after a few years as a college teacher, I began to reflect on whether the university was the appropriate place for me to express the philosophical vocation. At the time the early works of Marx were much in vogue, and many people were in the habit of quoting the "11th thesis against Feuerbach," which read, "Hitherto philosophers have only interpreted the world. The point, however, is to change it." Most of the academic philosophers I knew, although they may have disputed what Marx said was "the point," pretty much agreed with his characterization of philosophers. But I began to ask myself, Is this accurate? Can we truthfully describe people like Plato and Aristotle and St. Thomas and Spinoza and Kant by saying that they devoted their lives merely to "interpreting the world," without wishing or working to change it? Not so, I thought. It seemed clear to me that all those thinkers were as much committed to transforming the world as to interpreting it. Indeed, they saw no fundamental distinction, since they thought that it was through understanding the world that it would be transformed. And that made me think, Perhaps the academic interpreters of these thinkers, those who failed to dispute Marx's characterization of their field, were actually engaged in a work of sabotage, subverting the transformational intent of the great philosophers and converting their works into a set of mere opinions. It seemed, and still seems, pretty clear to me that philosophy is not a body of doctrines or opinions. What philosophy is, of course, is itself a major subject of philosophical inquiry, but I find it helpful to say that philosophy is a conversation that empowers us to escape from the prison of circumstance in which we confine ourselves. In other words, philosophy is what gives us access to our native capacity for self-determined action. That, at any rate, is what I am committed to, and in such writers as Plato and Spinoza I recognize my greater ancestors and leaders in that endeavor. And so the upshot of this period of reflection was that I turned my back on the university, not to abandon philosophy, but to pursue it more authentically in another place. I had two objectives: One was to change the world by engaging in politics, particularly the politics of urban economic development. The other was to create a structure for inquiry of a sort that seemed more consistent with the intentions of the great philosophers than most of what I had myself experienced in universities. For most of the last twenty years I have been engaged in public and practical affairs, working at various times as a law enforcement officer, social worker, economic development consultant, legislative aide, politician, civic activist and as a businessman developing housing for low-income families. About a year ago I realized that I was in a position to stop working for money, and I decided that it was time to turn my attention at last to the second objective, the present shape of which is this venture of creating vehicles for free lance philosophy, contexts for philosophical self-employment. So that is who I am. Lance Fletcher The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher to: lance.jvnc.net or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance