Aristotle archive 2/94 b ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 08:52:19 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories 1a1-16 From: "David Westbrook" I agree with Peter Orlowski's opinion that we retain the Latinates "equivocal", "univocal" and "derivative" over the English transliterations of the Greek. It seems to me that the context of the first section clearly indicates that Aristotle is writing about equivocation et al, rather than synonymy. With regard to 'ousia': The H.G. Apostle translation gives '*substance*' (italicized) for 'ousia' in this passage. The glossary to my edition expresses the distinction between '*substance*' and 'substance' (non-italicized, also a translation of 'ousia') thus: substance: "Substances are things in which all attributes are present, e.g., men and trees and chairs and the like; and they are separate from other things." (This would be the sense of substance that several of us are trying to avoid in this passage.) *substance*: "The substance of a thing is the nature or form of that thing, and it is applicable to all categories. For example, the substance of a man is his soul, and of a house it is its form. Syn: 'essence'." As previously mentioned (I forget for the moment by whom) Apostle saves 'essence' for 'to ti en einai'. This strikes me as a workable solution and one that maintains consistency of translation. Perhaps we could adopt this strategy. David Westbrook Social & Political Thought York University ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 94 14:41:17 +0000 Subject: Categories: leadership From: "Lance Fletcher" List host announcement: After consulting privately with both Jeff Taylor and Tom Hayoshi, I am pleased to announce that, at my request, Jeff has agreed to be designated as the leader of the slow reading of the Categories, and Tom has agreed to support Jeff in that role. I believe I speak for all of us in thanking Tom for his contribution in getting this discussion started, and in acknowledging the enormous command of the text which Jeff has manifested, from which we are bound to profit in the coming weeks. Lance Fletcher The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher to: lance.jvnc.net or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 09 Feb 1994 09:42:43 -0600 (CST) Subject: Categories ch.1 From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu (1)First of all, on the issue of whether to use Latin or Greek cognates for the translation of "homOnuma", &etc.: I still prefer the greek forms, first of all to preserve the etymological connections a) between homOnuma, sunOnuma, & parOnuma, b)between these 3 and "onoma" (I think "-nym" is close enough to "name" to keep the connection before our eyes.) This is important, I think, for keeping in view the fact that names are (at least part of) what is at issue here. I thus see no warrant for annihilating these connections in translation. Secondly, the english cognates for the greek terms are not *merely* trans- literations (as Orlowski seems to suggest) but are etymologically related. As long as we keep constantly in mind that these terms have a technical meaning here, we will not be misled by their modern meanings and connotations. I also see no reason why we can't use them adverbially. If "synonymously" is a perfectly acceptable word, then I see nothing wrong with "homonymously" and "paronymously", since each is constructed according to the same pattern as a closely related word, and are hardly something we just pulled out of our hat. (continued in para. 4) (2)As for the word "things": I still stand by my statement that, strictly speaking, there is no separate word for "things" in the greek. However, it is true that I should have paid more attention to the word "hOn". The sense of "things" here though is still rather indistinct, so I would instead use something like "they" or "those", in agreement with Kelsey. As for the worry expressed by Diamond that this would "hide the fact that in this first sentence Aristotle is talking about naming things", I think that whatever sense of "things" is at issue here would be expressed not by "hOs", but by "ousia". (3)Which leads to the next point, the translation of "logos tEs ousias". I think there is a lot to be said for rendering "ousia" consistently as "substance". For "ousia" itself is homonymous. All we need to do is recognize that therefore in translation "substance" is likewise homonymous. I see no good reason at all why we should rush to eliminate this homonymy from our translation by translating "ousia" now as "substance", now as "essence", now as part of "definition". For Aristotle did use the word "ousia" and the phrase "logos tEs ousias" here, and not some other word or phrase such as "horismos" or "to ti En einai". Thus, pace Ide and Cohen, I see no problem in rendering the phrase as "expression/ account/statement of the substance". Thus we leave open the question as to exactly what sort of "things" are at issue here. (4)I think a lot of the problems mentioned by Kelsey with using the greek cognates can be solved by translating "legein" as "to address". Thus : "Those are addressed synonymously whose name is common and whose expression of the substance, according to the name, is the same..." We would thus be taking names not as words said of things, but as words addressed to things, as in the next sentence: "For a man and an ox are addressed [prosagoreuetai] by the common name animal..." Thus it might be possible after all to say that *things* are synomyms. Just as (in modern English) synonymous words are the same at one level (qua meaning) and different at another (qua spelling and pronunciation), likewise (in Aristotle's greek) synonymous things are the same at one level (qua being addressed by the same name and the same logos according to that name [e.g., being taken under the same genus]) and different at another (qua species and individual). Let me know if this sounds too far-fetched. (5)A few comments on Kelsey's explication of "ho kata tounoma logos tEs ousias". Kelsey says: "...when we say what it is they are in virtue of which they are called by such and such a name..." I'm not sure that things are called by such and such a "name" in virtue of what they are. It is the logos, and not the onoma, which is rendered in virtue of what it is to be the named thing. Names are not an essential part of what it is to *be*, but only an essential part of *how this being is addressed*. Logos thus seems to be some sort of interface between being and speech. I don't see here any clear expression of the relation between being [einai] and logos. But the question of their relation is a very important and very obscure one. But the logos and the name stand in a relationship which is expressed by "kata". I also find this a very important and very obscure question: what does it really mean to "correspond to" or to be "according to"? Jeff Taylor ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 11:22:40 -0600 (CST) Subject: Things again From: "Richard Diamond" In thinking about whether one ought to insert a "things" into the translation of the first line, I stumbled onto an interesting question that Mr. Kelsey (& probably some others) noticed. That is, does Aristotle want us to say "equivocal" of things, names, concepts, or something else? Or a combination of them? My inclination is strongly to say that Aristotle is speaking in the first line of THINGS. Why? Because it is a thing which has a name applied to it, and one forms an account of the substance/essence of that thing -- i.e. the thing has some sort of definition. This account here, however, does not seem to exclude the idea that he is talking about concepts, but I incline away from that sort of position. In any case, this is a point I think we ought to be clear about. I disagree with Mr. Kelsey that taking homOnuma nominatively makes any difference on the question. In fact, to say "things are said" instead of "they are said" makes the point most clearly (again, the justification for "things" comes from the plural relative pronoun). Richard Diamond diamond@acad.udallas.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 11:32:59 -0600 (CST) Subject: intro From: "Colin Anderson" I have been following the conversation so far, but have only now found time to send a note of introduction, per Lance's suggestion. Anyway, my name is Colin Anderson and I am currently a graduate student in the philosophy dept. at Loyola U. in Chicago. My primary areas of interest are in ancient phil. and 20th cen. "continental" philosophy. I find Plato more in keeping with my temperament, but have been recently realizing that many of my prejudices or difficulties with Aristotle are more a result of working with certain translations. When I return to the greek I find Aristotle less staid and less dry, than the Aristotle which has been conveyed to us through the "latinized" tradition. I am quite interested in the reading which has begun here. And hope to be able to discover the time to keep abreast of the conversation. Colin Anderson canders@orion.it.luc.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 12:51:56 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories ch.1 From: "Peter Orlowski" The debate on translation of sunOnuma, etc. seems to come down to this: do we use words which mean what the greek means (univocal=sunOnuma, etc.) but have different parts which do not mean exactly what the greek means (uni=/sun and vocal=/Onuma), or do we use words which do have parts that do mean what the greek means (syn=sun & onym=Onum) but the meaning of the english word is NOT the same as the meaning of the greek word (synonym=/sunOnum)? Taylor proposes that we do the former (i.e use synonym, etc.) and just ALTER the meaning of the english word by inventing a technical meaning. His reason seems to be that he likes the parts to remind us of the meaning, even if the whole may be deceiving. We might add to his reasoning this argument: greek sounding words are nicer than latin words because they remind us of the language of the author, and technical words are nicer than common words because they require that anyone who wants to participate in the discussion first be trained in the theory and lingo. Now I still think we should respect the meaning of the english words. We have a perfectly good english word to do the job. If however people like the reasons given above (technical language, reminders of the language of author, and reminders of the meaning via the roots) then why not just use the greek sunOnuma, etc. and respect the english language as it is commonly understood. Those who are in the know will know what we mean, those who know greek will recognize the meanings of the parts, and everyone will not forget that Aristotle wrote in greek and had a greek view of things. After all, if we use synonym, etc. one would have to be in the know to know what we mean, one would have to know greek to know the meaning of the roots, and one would have to know that Aristotle wrote in greek to see the significance of our word choice anyway. Nothing seems to be gained by inventing new meanings for old english words that cannot be gained by just using the greek. So it comes down to this: would we rather use the greek words and avoid the confusion of giving new meanings to english words, or would we rather use english words with latin ancestory, english meanings that fit the greek, and a technical history to boot? /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ...sed homo lingua non est! ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 13:30:35 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Things again From: "Peter Orlowski" /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' On Wed, 9 Feb 1994, Richard Diamond wrote: > My inclination is strongly to say that Aristotle is speaking in > the first line of THINGS. Why? Because it is a thing which has a > name applied to it, and one forms an account of the substance/essence > > position. In any case, this is a point I think we ought to be > clear about. > > > Richard Diamond > diamond@acad.udallas.edu I strongly agree that this point is of great importance if we are to continue. ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 94 15:17:17 -0500 Subject: From: barnes%uhavax.dnet@ipgate.hartford.edu It seems to me that either the synonym-homonym paronym set or the Latinate language will do. Possibly the Greek set has the advantage of warning the reader that the language is being used in a technical sense, at least in the occurrence of paronym. But let's not use "substance" for "ousia". Over the years when I've given classes on Aristotle, I've had a struggle getting students to stop reading "substance" in the sense it has in Descartes and other modern philosophers. What is at stake is both that "substance" suggests something that underlies the appear- ances (worlds behind the scene), and that certainly isn't what Aristotle means. Second, "ousia" with its derivation from eimi is much more a processive word. Substances just stand there, but ousia means something like "beinging" or "in process of being." Both terms have problems from a pedagogical standpoint. You either have to explain that "substance" doesn't have the post-1637 meaning or else explain what "ousia" meant. I greatly prefer the latter. Bill Barnes barnes@hartford (bitnet) barnes@uhavax.hartford.edu (internet) ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 94 15:51:31 CST Subject: homonuma, sunonuma, paronuma From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com It occurs to me that we might want to keep all of our alternative translations for homonuma, sunonuma, and paronuma active until the end or near the end of our reading of Ch. 1. Our discussion is primarily concerned with identifying exactly what Aristotle means by these terms, and I think we will make this task unnecessarily more difficult by ruling out alternatives before we've completed the portions of the text in which Aristotle illustrates what he is talking about. I have two questions pertaining to this issue: 1. What are the closest English equivalents of homo-, suno-, and paro-? (Also, should that be hom-, sun-, and par- instead?) 2. Is it necessary to translate these three terms with a single English term, or could English phrases be used instead? (I.e., The same name but different words/concepts address those whose name alone is common...) o Tom Hayosh hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com d:-)=;==| / ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 17:14:29 EST Subject: Re: Categories ch.1 From: "Sean A. Kelsey" A couple brief notes on translation ... (1) No translation is perfect; I concede that the Latin cognates lose the etymological connections with the Greek. However, the English cognates ("homonymously", "paronymously") to the Greek are not English words at all. They do not bring anything to the mind of the reader. I think we'd better leaving them untranslated than using the Greek cognates. (2) A general point of translation. The translator should translate consist- ently, at the price of ambiguity, in order as not to interpose himself between the reader and the author. The idea is to let the reader try and figure out what the author means by what he says himself; he can't do this if he doesn't know what the author says. But we are the readers; we are not preparing a translation for pub- lication. Consequently, when faced with `account of the substance', which has been translated literally so that we could figure out for ourselves what it means here, we have to do just that: figure out what it means here. The translator translates "account of the substance" so as not to bring to mind something which perhaps Aristotle did not intend. But Aristotle intended to bring something to mind; it is our job as readers, not translators, to make at least a tentative decision as to what that is, subject, of course, to revision later on. My proposals for `ho kat' onoma tEs ousias' was a pro- posal about what we ought to take this phrase to mean here, not a proposal for how we ought generally to translate it. In short, our job, as readers, is to make determinate, so as to eval- uate, what, as translators, it is our job to leave indeterminate. If, then, the Latin cognates get at what Aristotle means (whereas the Greek ones are, at best, indeterminate), then I think we should stick with them, particularly for the benefit of the Greekless readers. Further, while the Latin cognates have no etymological connection with the English word `name', their meaning brings to mind that we are talking about names: for it is names that are used univocally, etc. (3) So, as for logos tEs ousias: my suggestion is that Aristotle means to say that when we name things univocally, and are asked, `what do you mean by calling that thing a so-and-so', we will say the same thing in each case: we will say what the thing is, in virtue of which we call it a so and so. Why do you call that a man? Because it is a rational animal ... or a featherless biped. Why do you call that thing a man? Because it is a picture of a man. Etc. I may be wrong here. But I think this is all Aristotle means HERE when he uses logos tEs ousias. I agree that for Aristotle there is some mediation be- tween names and things; cf. De Int., ch.1 ... but I don't think he means to make that particular point here. Though I may be wrong. (4) Lastly, as to Mr. Diamond's question about the title of the work ... we're not likely to be in a position to answer that question until we've got more if not all of the work under out belt ... though I think it would be an excellent question to round off our discussion, and one to keep in mind as we're reading. Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 17:26:02 EST Subject: Re: Things again From: "Sean A. Kelsey" If you say "things are said ..." you have to finish. If you say "things are said [to be] homonyms ..." you are taking the Greek word "nominatively". But things aren't said TO BE homonyms (the `to be' must be supplied if you are taking the Greek word nominatively). If you say "things are said homonymously ..." (or, "things are named [or called] univocally ..."), you are taking it adverbially. But I think it is this latter that Mr. Diamond means, no? A quick hesitation about "are named" vs. "are called": the former calls to mind a sort of baptism, and I don't think that's what Aristotle has in mind. Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 1994 22:17:58 -0500 (EST) Subject: translation dispute From: "BROWN PHILIP H" Both sides in the Latinate vs. Greek dispute make good points. If we can't agree, why don't we postpone a decision and go on to discuss the meaning of the text? Perhaps we'll find something later on in the Categories that will persuade us to accept one translation over the other. Phil ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 16:30:34 +0100 Subject: RE: Things again From: gorazd.kocjancic@uni-lj.si ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 11:06:09 -0500 (EST) Subject: things vs. words From: "BROWN PHILIP H" A few people raised the question, in respect to the opening lines of the Categories, whether Aristotle is discussing words or things. I read in the Kneales' Development of Logic that this is a longstanding issue in the study of the Categories as a whole. It so happens that the Kneales think Aristotle is talking about things, but I don't think we can decide that for ourselves based on the opening passage. It's a question that we ought to keep open as we read on. Also, if he is talking about things, what sort of things? Phil Brown ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 12:24:01 EST Subject: Re: things vs. words From: "Sean A. Kelsey" Mr. Brown's suggestion to postpone the final resolution of whether Aristotle is talking about words or things until later is well taken. Perhaps we might agree that he is talking about naming things. This still leaves open WHY he is talking about naming things: is he concerned with things, or with names, or both in some way. The Greek commentators (esp. Simplicius) have some ideas about this, but we should go along ourselves for a bit and see what turns up. Sean ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 11:48:21 -0600 Subject: Re: Things again From: "Richard Diamond" Phil Brown writes: > It so happens that > the Kneales think Aristotle is talking about things, but I don't > think > we can decide that for ourselves based on the opening passage. We may not be able to decide definitively, but we can at least plug the options into the opening lines and see what we come up with, and perhaps draw out what is at stake in the question. Like so: (A) He's talking about THINGS. Things of which name alone is common are spoken of equivocally. So you have two things of two different definitions (logoi), and when you give these two different things the same name, you have spoken "equivocally." This option makes the most sense to me, and it makes the most sense of the text. I've been convinced that one ought to take homonuma adverbially, which helps out this reading. (B) He's talking about WORDS or NAMES. In this case, he isn't talking about naming things. Rather, he is describing names that have already been imposed. Names of which the name alone is common while the account of the substance corresponding to the name is different, are said to be equivocal, like the name "animal" which is both man and a drawing. One difficulty I find with this is that it is a secondary consideration. I.e., one has to name things before one can describe the names; hence, if Aristotle starts with (A) his logic is more complete. (C) He's talking about CONCEPTS or IDEAS. Someone else want to try this one? Sounds too Kantian for me. Richard DIamond diamond@acad.udallas.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 15:47:03 -0600 (CST) Subject: Re: Things again From: "Colin Anderson" Richard Diamond wrote earlier: > > (A) He's talking about THINGS. > > Things of which name alone is common are spoken of equivocally. So you > have two things of two different definitions (logoi), and when you give > these two different things the same name, you have spoken "equivocally." > This option makes the most sense to me, and it makes the most sense of the > text. I've been convinced that one ought to take homonuma adverbially, > which helps out this reading. Isn't there another interpretation here? If *things* are said to be homonomous, that is, those things which have a common name but whose logoi tEs ousiEs are different (to paraphrase a bit), then the things themselves are "equivocals" or "namesakes." These equivocal things are then denoted, or more simply named by the same name. You would not then be speaking equivocally but speaking about equivocals things. Is this a valid distinction? With respect to grammer, I don't see much trouble in "supplying" either the "things" or the "to be." One implication of this, if it is a viable possibility, would be to make any reservations about using terms in a technical sense less forceful. Since Aristotle's sense whether, we render his words with the greek or latin derivatives, would already be technical since we generally use both "synonym" and "equivocal" to refer to words and not primarily to things. Just a thought. Colin Anderson canders@orion.it.luc.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Feb 94 23:50:10 +0000 Subject: Re: Things again From: "Lance Fletcher" Leslie, >I have the distinct feeling that I am entering in the middle of a >well-developed conversaation. I s there a file available of previous >conversation on this list so one can see what has gone before? >signed, Leslie F. Goldstein > I am the list-host. Since yours is the second inquiry of this sort that I have received in the last few hours, I will answer publicly, in case there is anyone else to whom who has the same question: Actually, the conversation has only been going on for a few days--less than a week altogether. I will be archiving the messages and making them available via ftp and gopher, but I have not done so as yet. In the meantime, if you just recently joined the list and want to see the cumulative file of messages to date, please send a request by e-mail to me at aristotle-host@freelance.com. In your request, let me know what kind of computer you are using, and whether I can send you binhex or uuencoded files. Lance Fletcher The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher to: lance.jvnc.net or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Feb 94 19:02:56 CST Subject: Re: Disagreement on translation re: "equivocals" From: "carol poster" To avoid using the word "things", perhaps somewhat awkward English could work: "Having only names in common is called equivocality ..." ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 22:04:19 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Things again From: "Leslie Goldstein" I have the distinct feeling that I am entering in the middle of a well-developed conversaation. I s there a file available of previous conversation on this list so one can see what has gone before? signed, Leslie F. Goldstein ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 11 Feb 1994 00:36:04 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Disagreement on translation re: "equivocals" From: "Peter Orlowski" On Thu, 10 Feb 1994, carol poster wrote: > To avoid using the word "things", perhaps somewhat awkward English could work: > "Having only names in common is called equivocality ..." There have been so many translations proposed, and we are slowly coming to some concensus... I wonder whether any one who has been following the discussion closely would summarize our results by copying out our modifications to the original english text submitted. All this translation discussion has really helped me see some of the issues involved in this chapter. At one time, I actually agreed with St. Augustine when he says in the _Confessions_ that there was nothing too profound about Aristotle's _Praedictaments_. Boy were we wrong! /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 11 Feb 94 11:36:14 CST Subject: Same and Common From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com > I notice that in my last posts, I spoke of things having "the same name". > But looking over the greek text for the sections on homonymy and > synonymy, I notice that Aristotle always speaks of a *common*(=koinon) > name, whose opposite (which doesn't appear here) would be "akoinOnEtas". > However, when speaking of the logoi corresponding to the names, he > uses instead the pair same/different(=autos/heteros). > > Does anyone have any ideas on the significance of the difference > > Jeff Taylor Same means identical, equivalent, or equal. In its strictest sense, only one thing is involved: a thing is the same as itself only. In its broader sense, two things are the same if all of their attributes of interest are equivalent. If only some attributes of interest are equivalent, the two things are different but have some commmon attributes. Common means shared by two or more different things. The common part is the same, but describing it as common implies that it is only a part of different wholes. Assuming that these meanings hold with the Greek autos and koinon, Aristotle, when describing names as common instead of same, is implying that the name is part of a whole. An obvious candidate for the whole would be the combination of name and account of substance, but this might mean that the account of substance should be described as common also. Aristotle describes it as same. Either the account of substance is a more important part of the combination or the account of substance is the actual whole. I do not know which of these is Aristotle's position. o Tom Hayosh d:-)=;==| / ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 11 Feb 1994 19:55:03 -0500 (EST) Subject: Introduction From: EPHESUS@delphi.com Many thanks, Lance, for opening this new door. I am a history teacher in a small independent school near the Hudson River; philosophy is an avocation of mine, but I certainly am a rank amateur. I greatly appreciated your essay on "slow reading" and it prompts me to describe an experience I sometimes have when reading philosophy. Perhaps you or others in this group have had something similar. Occasionally I will take a passage of a philosopher and quietly go over it until one thought builds clearly to the next. Perhaps it is only one short speech or paragraph, but if I come back to it over several days, quietly re-building it (I often have to go back to the text to check myself), such a simple series of thoughts will stir something inside me during the course of my day. It is not that I remember the thoughts per se, but the activity of building them up--and the feelings associated with this process--gives me a certain inner strength. Actually, I'm not sure strength is the word--it more resembles a certain barely perceptible assurance that there is, after all, something deeper in the world than what I ordinarily perceive (and perhaps something deeper in myself). As we take up various passages, I would be interested in just how others work with them. What is the _process_ of doing philosophy? What are the results within your life? If I have really worked with a particular text, for instance, I sometimes will have the feeling as I go through my hectic daily activities, that the events I meet and encounters I have with others take on a slightly different cast, as if certain words or actions bring me back to the passage itself. It is as if a form of inner dialogue begins to arise between what I build up inwardly at home and what comes to meet me in the world. Again, it is a delicate process for which it is hard to find words. I join the Aristotle list in the hope that we will focus on a section at a time and, as you suggest, share our thoughts as if our readers, while willing to think actively, are novices when it comes to Aristotle; I place myself in the novice category myself. I would love to take up De Anima or the Nicomachean Ethics, but any text would be of interest, so long as we deal with manageable portions of it. ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 12 Feb 94 13:29:36 EST Subject: Re: ftp sites? From: "Lance Fletcher" > >Can anyone tell me of any anonymous ftp sites containing Aristotle and >other philosophy texts? David, Do you have access to a gopher client? If so try gopher.nd.edu. That's the Notre Dame library and information service gopher server. They may be accessible via anonymous ftp, but gopher is probably easier. There are a couple of other sources as well. I will try to find them, but others are welcome to do so first if they have the info. Lance Fletcher -- lance@freelance.com The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 12 Feb 94 13:38:20 CST Subject: Re: ftp sites? From: "carol poster" Dear Lance I tried to use gopher to connect to nd.edu, but was told that it didn't have a gopher hole. For ftp, if you logon as "guest" what is the correct password? Thanks, Carol ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 12 Feb 1994 20:55:01 +0100 Subject: Re: ftp sites? From: "luc borot" >> >>Can anyone tell me of any anonymous ftp sites containing Aristotle and >>other philosophy texts? > >David, > >Do you have access to a gopher client? If so try gopher.nd.edu. That's the >Notre Dame library and information service gopher server. They may be >accessible via anonymous ftp, but gopher is probably easier. There are a >couple of other sources as well. I will try to find them, but others are >welcome to do so first if they have the info. > >Lance Fletcher You also have gopher.vt.edu, which is faster from Southern Europe than gopher.nd.edu, according to my recent experience, if you're on the Continent. But there may be something wrong with the speed of my university's network... Luc **************************************************** *Luc Borot * *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Elisabethaines * *Universite Paul Valery * *Montpellier (France) * **************************************************** ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 12 Feb 94 16:14:41 EST Subject: Re: ftp sites? From: "Lance Fletcher" >Dear Lance > I tried to use gopher to connect to nd.edu, but was told that it >didn't have a gopher hole. > For ftp, if you logon as "guest" what is the correct password? Carol, The gopher address I have used in the past is "gopher.nd.edu". I have connected in the past without difficulty. Today, for some reason, I could not connect. I tried anonymous ftp also, but access was denied. Another excellent gopher site, however, is the University of Valdosta, Georgia, which is part of what is charmingly called "Peachnet." If you use Turbogopher or something similar, aim your gopher to: catfish.valdosta.peachnet.edu. Putting 1/ccr/subjv/phi on the selector line will put you into the philosophy menu. Otherwise, from the entrance menu select "subject tree," then "philosophy", then you can select "texts," which will give you a long list of philosophy-related e-text resources. If you select "Aristotle," you will be able to download the complete works of Aristotle in English translation (make sure to have a large bucket on your end). I think they also have all of Plato in the Jowett translation, and all of Plotinus. No Spinoza, unfortunately. Lance Fletcher -- lance@freelance.com The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 13 Feb 1994 11:43:57 -0600 (CST) Subject: Categories ch.1 From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu Well, my electricity has been off for nigh on 60 hours now, and according to the electric company, it may yet be Monday before it is restored. Thank goodness for relatives in the same city, who also have computers. (1)Firstly, thanks to Bill Barnes for reminding us that "ousia" is a participle of the verb "to be", and thus retains, at some level, a verbal sense--just as the english "being" (or the german "wesen"), which, to emphasize its verbal aspect, may be written "be-ing". We should keep this possibility in mind as we read on. (2)As to the names/things issue: it's pretty clear that both names and things are at issue in some way here. The question is then: in which ways are each at issue, and how are they related? As I suggested earlier, the "things" here would have the same sense as "ousia", whatever that may be. Thus, "thing"=whatever is (or has) ousia. I take this to be justified by the examples Aristotle uses here: a human being, a picture, an ox, animal. Now one ousia can correspond to many names, and an ousia can also have many logoi; but any such logos corresponds with only one name. (I'm not sure of this, but I take this to be the import of the fact that Aristotle here lists no classification for things whose logos is the same but whose names are not in common; what would he have called them--perhaps "heteronuma"? And why didn't he list such a classification here? Is it because: if there is no name in common, there can never be a sameness of logos *according to the name*? Thus according to the schema here there can be no such thing as a heteronym.) Thus the logos of a human being qua animal is the same as the logos of an ox qua animal. Since the genus "animal" can also be said to be an ousia, we can say that the logos of animal qua genus is the same as any other genus. The connection between things and names would proceed by the following schema: ousia(="thing") ho logos tEs ouisas (=the logos/rendering of what it is to be [of] the thing) ho kata tounoma logos tEs ousias (=the according to the name logos of the thing) ho kata tounoma logos(=the according to the name logos) onoma(=name) And so the question now is: is Aristotle talking about things or names? I think neither, in isolation: he is talking rather about the relation between the two. This relation occurs in/as logos. There can be no question of homOnuma, etc., unless some name is said of/addressed to (="legetai", which is etymologically related to "logos") some thing, *and* some saying (logos) is rendered or given as to what it is to be that thing. Neither things nor names by themselves can be said to be equivocal, homonymous, etc. This is my take on the issue for the moment. (3)One last whack at the issue of latin vs. greek cognates for homOnuma &etc. First, in reply to Orlowski, technical meanings for words need not be esoteric or arcane, and do not necessarily "require that anyone who wants to participate in the discussion first be trained in the theory and lingo." All anyone has to do in this case is to read their definitions. As for the "technical history" of the latin cognates: this history is partly what I was trying to avoid in advocating greek cognates. I guess this suspicion of things latin is my heideggerian influence showing thru. Secondly, in reply to Kelsey: according to the OED, "homonymously" is in fact an english word, although I'll have to concede that it doesn't list "paronymously". I entirely agree that no translation is perfect, especially from greek, and especially from an inflected language to a non-inflected one. And I admit that I think leaving key words untranslated is the best course to take in a reading like this. I'm a little confused, though, for I thought I *did* take your proposals for "ho kata tounoma [etc.]" to be about what this phrase means, and not how to translate it. [I am assuming you had me in mind with your comments of 9 Feb.] What I was trying to argue was that "logos tEs ousias" means an account of what it is to *be* an X, and *not* an account of why we *call* it X (which the phrase "in virtue of which" seems to suggest.) So I would rewrite your account like so: "when we address things by a common name, and are asked 'what do you mean by calling each thing an X', we will give either the same or a different account in each case: we will say what it is to be the thing, qua the name by which we have called it [not: in virtue of which we call it this name]." That was my only point. How logoi get attached to certain names is not, I think, at issue here. All we have is a vague "kata"(=according to, corresponding to). Jeff Taylor ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 13 Feb 94 23:41:41 -0500 Subject: Intro From: johntom@MIT.EDU ========================================================================== Hi, I just finished reading the "archived" messages from Lance. Thank you for organizing this group and for the various introductions. As for me, I am John Thomas doing my doctorate in engineering at Mass. Inst of Tech. I have ploughed thru less than 10% of Aristotle's corpus (Poetics, Organon, and On Memory). I, unfortunately do not have a formal education in Aristotle and found the going tough. What I would like to achieve, thru these discussions, and working on my own, is an overall grasp of his philosophy--to raise myself up inch-by-inch if need be (slow reading, personal annotations, writing, discussions...), to his rigour and elegance of thought. Thank you for this opportunity. There is a question I had in mind regarding the liberal dose of Ancient Greek phrases in the recent Categories posts. Perhaps some of you could help me out. Is is possible to perhaps autodidactically achieve a good working knowledge of Ancient Greek? What might be some of the good references/aids to get there? I feel that if I could master this, I might be able to echo Colin Anderson when he writes: >When I return to the greek I find Aristotle less staid and >less dry, than the Aristotle which has been conveyed to us through the >"latinized" tradition. Thx. __John ========================================================================== ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 05:31:28 -0800 (PST) Subject: self-intro From: "Robert Groover" A bit of self-introduction, as requested: I am NOT an academic, but (fatebor enim) a lawyer. I took a degree in Classics twenty-some years ago, and have maintained my Greek just sufficiently for checking points of difficulty (but not, alas, for extended reading). I studied far more literature than philosophy in college, but now find myself driven back to Classical philosophy - partly from my interest in the early development of Christianity. I am likely to be a listener rather than a talker here, at least at first. ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 15:05:30 EST Subject: Re: Categories ch.1 From: "Sean A. Kelsey" My apologies to Mr. Taylor; I was a little defensive about your commentabout my proposal for logos tEs ousias. I think I can accept your emendation with respect to `logos tEs ousias': you say that it means `what it is to be the thing', as opposed to `what it is in virtue of which we call it this name'. I still have two questions: 1. I'm not quite sure what you mean by `qua the name by which we have called it' in `we will say what it is to be the thing, qua the name by which we have called it'; I'm not sure we're in disagreement, because I'm not sure I understand exactly what it is you mean. 2. My proposal was for `ho kat'onoma logos tEs ousias' rather than just for `logos tEs ousias'. That's why I think the "name-heaviness" of my proposal was justified. But I don 't think, finally, we're in much disagreement here. Cordially, Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 15 Feb 1994 07:15:05 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Introduction From: "Leslie Goldstein" this is a reply to David Reed's vote for De Anima or Nic. Ethics. If we're still taking votes, I go for the Politics. But Im willing to go with either of his selections too. ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 15 Feb 94 08:54:10 EST Subject: Re: Introduction From: "Lance Fletcher" Leslie, >this is a reply to David Reed's vote for De Anima or Nic. Ethics. If >we're still taking votes, I go for the Politics. But Im willing to go >with either of his selections too. > The question is, are you willing to lead? In this election, volunteer leaders have extra votes. Lance Fletcher The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher to: lance.jvnc.net or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 15 Feb 1994 12:17:02 -0700 (MST) Subject: Re: Introduction From: "David Reed" On Tue, 15 Feb 1994, Leslie Goldstein wrote: > this is a reply to David Reed's vote for De Anima or Nic. Ethics. If > we're still taking votes, I go for the Politics. But Im willing to go > with either of his selections too. Hey, I'm David Reed and I didn't vote yet. Is there another David Reed out there? I'll second the other David Reed's vote just in case it's my soul mate or something. David Reed ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 16 Feb 1994 04:12:54 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: Introduction From: "Robert Groover" > On Tue, 15 Feb 1994, Leslie Goldstein wrote: > > this is a reply to David Reed's vote for De Anima or Nic. Ethics. If > > we're still taking votes, I go for the Politics. But Im willing to go > > with either of his selections too. > Hey, I'm David Reed and I didn't vote yet. Is there another David Reed out > there? I'll second the other David Reed's vote just in case it's my soul > mate or something. I would vote for Ethics or Metaphysics or ANYTHING BUT De Anima. De Anima is important for what it leads to rather than what it says, I would claim. Also, to some extent De Anima is merely obsolete science, and as such uninteresting. ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 16 Feb 94 09:21:20 EST Subject: Re: Introduction From: "Lance Fletcher" Robert, >I would vote for Ethics or Metaphysics or ANYTHING BUT De Anima. >De Anima is important for what it leads to rather than what it says, I >would claim. Also, to some extent De Anima is merely obsolete science, >and as such uninteresting. Your words are very revealing. I am reminded of that anecdote in one of Freud's works in which he says one of his patients reported that he had had a dream the previous night but couldn't remember it. "All I know," the patient said, "is that it was not about my mother." To which Freud wrote, "So it WAS about his mother." In your case, if I had the power to force you to participate in a slow reading, it would be a slow reading of De Anima, since it is clear that that is where the greatest discoveries are awaiting you. Lance Fletcher The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher to: lance.jvnc.net or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 16 Feb 1994 09:42:25 -0600 (CST) Subject: Re: Theory of Ideas: Not From: "harry ide" Bill Barnes notes that Felix Grayeff argues that Aristotle didn't write at least some of the works standardly ascribed to him: > I haven't seen any > responses to > Grayeff's work: has anyone else? I'm sure he's overstated his case, > but.... I haven't, but I've read parts of Grayeff's work very carefully, and concluded his arguments (at least about _Metaphysics_ 9) are based on misinterpretations of the text. He finds contradictions in places where there are clearly no contradictions. Harry A. Ide hide@unlinfo.unl.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Feb 1994 11:24:09 +1100 (EST) Subject: Re: Introduction From: "Kevin Korb" > > Robert, > > >I would vote for Ethics or Metaphysics or ANYTHING BUT De Anima. > >De Anima is important for what it leads to rather than what it says, I > >would claim. Also, to some extent De Anima is merely obsolete science, > >and as such uninteresting. > > Your words are very revealing. I agree. Be that as it may, I want to vote for reading De Anima at some point reasonably soon. Learning something about Aristotle's views on mind and intellect is a major reason for my having signed up here. On the other hand, my vote is admittedly much attenuated by my unreadiness to `lead' any discussion. Regards, Kevin ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 16 Feb 1994 22:08:21 -0500 (EST) Subject: De Anima revealed From: EPHESUS@delphi.com I believe that I, rather than David Reed, am the source of the suggestion of De Anima or Nic. Ethics. The confusion undoubtedly arose from my absent-minded failure to put my name at the conclusion of my self-introduction. How David's name got attached is still a mystery, unless we actually _are_ soul mates. Anything is possible, I suppose! My suggestion of working "On The Soul" stems from an interest in taking up basic questions of the nature of perception, thinking, imagination, and the forming of mental images, much as he does in Book Three. My own reading of it is still on a superficial level, but he does provoke me to look at my own soul processes in a fresh way. How quickly, as I turn my eyes on something, do I drift from sensation to fixed concept, without asking myself just _how_ the perception turns into image and how that image becomes combined with all those concepts I have gathered over the years. And where is this soul experience taking place, anyway? When I think, do I really "perceive" something, as he seems to suggest in III,4? And if so, from where? What is my own experience of the processes he describes? Reading Aristotle stirs up more questions than answers for me; I would greatly appreciate working with others "line-by-line" on such a text sometime in the future. I know, Lance, that you are politely nudging people to "take the ball and run with it," but I am such a novice in Aristotelian thought that I look forward to working under a moderator with more knowledge in the subject, if, in fact, this text is ever chosen. Karl Fredrickson Spring Valley, NY Ephesus@Delphi.com ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Feb 1994 00:58:30 -0500 (EST) Subject: what to read From: "BROWN PHILIP H" I take it from recent posts that people are still voting on what to read in the Aristotle corpus. Seeing as we have begun reading the Categories, I would like to read all of the Organon. I suppose it would be too much to read all of both Analytics, but we could limit our discussion to the parts most relevant to logic. ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Feb 94 01:37:00 CST Subject: Re: what to read From: "carol poster" Could we concentrate on finishing Categories, and then consider what to read next? We may, in our reading of the Categories, find some concensus concerning future directions. Carol Poster c594460@mizzou1.bitnet ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Feb 1994 13:08:06 -0500 (EST) Subject: Categories: Chapter 2 From: "Peter Orlowski" CATEGORIES CHAPTER 2 Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'. Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject. By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject. Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything. Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar. There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject. /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 09:23:07 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Introduction From: "Leslie Goldstein" On Tue, 15 Feb 1994, Lance Fletcher wrote: > Leslie, > > >this is a reply to David Reed's vote for De Anima or Nic. Ethics. If > >we're still taking votes, I go for the Politics. But Im willing to go > >with either of his selections too. > > > > The question is, are you willing to lead? In this election, volunteer > leaders have extra votes. > > > > Lance Fletcher > The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 > for Internet access: gopher to: lance.jvnc.net > or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance **********> someday maybe, but not in the immediate future. So I guess that makes me a follower for now. Leslie Goldstein ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 09:27:50 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Introduction From: "Leslie Goldstein" On Wed, 16 Feb 1994, Robert Groover wrote: > I would vote for Ethics or Metaphysics or ANYTHING BUT De Anima. > De Anima is important for what it leads to rather than what it says, I > would claim. Also, to some extent De Anima is merely obsolete science, > and as such uninteresting. >********** I wonder if the last sentence Groover wrote is not in tension with the spirit of (no pun intended ) this file? I'm not trying to censor anyone, but it strikes me that there are some philosophers out there who believe De Anima is not merely obsolete anything. LFG (I speak in the abstract, having never read it) ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 18 Feb 94 10:34:15 EST Subject: Re: Introduction From: "Lance Fletcher" Robert, > Are you implicitly denying my point about obsolete science? If >so, please explain. > > > I would also suggest that psychological interpretation of >comments made here may lead us away from the texts, and can easily lead to >degradation of the heat/light ratio! First, please accept my apology if what I said offended you. That was not at all my intention. I was attempting, perhaps in a somewhat smartass way, to make a Socratic point. Please don't take it personally. It was not meant personally, and it certainly was not meant as an attack. And the reason I posted it publicly was that I thought it applied to everybody. What you have done is to provide us all an opportunity to learn something about how we tend to approach learning, and I thank you for having the courage to make that contribution. Do you remember my observation in the essay on slow reading, which I distributed with the original announcement, that people tend to avoid the pain of discovering their own ignorance by blaming the author in cases where the confusion is their own? I invite you to look at the possibility that the present interaction is an instance of that. I don't insist that I am right in the matter. But just try to look at the situation from another person's point of view for a moment. Here is some of the "evidence" that I was dealing with (and obviously I am, unavoidably, giving you MY interpretation of that evidence): 1. You expressed a judgement about the meaning and importance of this text which implies a claim to KNOW -- i.e. a claim to have knowledge of the text itself and also knowledge, acquired independently, concerning that whereof the text speaks. 2. In this judgement of the text you find fault with the the author's understanding ["to some extent De Anima is merely obsolete science"], implicitly claiming (via the word "obsolete") that BECAUSE you live later than Aristotle you are in a position to know certain things BETTER than Aristotle. 3. You inform us also that you are sure this text has nothing to teach you [i.e. you tell us that it is not important in itself, but only for what it leads to (whatever that means), and because of its "obsolete science" it is "uninteresting."] Then, in your response to my original comment, you add another claim: 4. You inform us that you already know what slow reading is, and that you have done that with this text. ["part of the reason I do not want to do a slow reading of De Anima is that I took a semester to do exactly that, in a Greek course in college."] (Obviously I have no problem with your preferring to devote your efforts to a different text. In fact I have no problem with anything you have said. I am simply making note of the fact that you think you already know what I mean by slow reading when, from over here, that looks doubtful.) Again, Robert, I know that I am saying things that you might find offensive. Please bear with me. Essentially I am using you as a subject for a demonstration. There is nothing psychological about it. I think my purposes are entirely philosophical. But since I have not asked your permission in advance to be used in this way, I suppose you have a right to be angry with me. I ask that you forgive me, and also I ask you to be aware that my decision to risk using you in this way was a sign of respect: I would not have done it if I had not been confident, based on what you have already posted, that your commitment to learning is stronger than your commitment to appearing as one who already knows. In this whole exchange I am taking an enormous risk, the risk of looking crazy in the context of how we usually approach the study of texts. Because I am the list owner, it is a little easier for me to take that risk than it might be otherwise, but it is still a risk. The result might well be a flood of "unsubscribe" messages. But I am committed to shaking up the unconscious assumptions that get in the way of our really learning from Aristotle, et al. If doing that means upsetting a few people, or even diminishing our numbers along the way, that is a risk I am willing to take. And again I thank you for your considerable contribution. Now, as for your question, about whether I deny that De Anima contains "obsolete science," it would help me to know more specifically what you are referring to. I read De Anima as a work of philosophy, not as a work of empirical science. If I wanted to learn about the operation of the organs of sensation in human beings or animals, De Anima is probably not the first book I would turn to. Nor would I recommend it to anybody who wanted to learn about human psychology. As my teacher Seth Benardete said in his article on De Anima, III.3-5 [Review of Metaphysics, June 1975], "Aristotle's de anima is not a treatise on the human soul. It is as silent about the virtues as it is about memory and empeiria. The soul is mainly considered apart from time and the awareness of time. All emphasis falls on the now, in which the soul, wiped clean of whatever state it was in before, is always new and most admits of definition." Lance Fletcher [lance@freelance.com] The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 10:07:59 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: Obsolete science From: "Robert Groover" > > De Anima is important for what it leads to rather than what it says, I > > would claim. Also, to some extent De Anima is merely obsolete science, > > and as such uninteresting. > >********** > I wonder if the last sentence Groover wrote is not in tension with the > spirit of (no pun intended ) this file? I'm not trying to censor anyone, > but it strikes me that there are some philosophers out there who believe > De Anima is not merely obsolete anything. LFG (I speak in the abstract, > having never read it) > I see that I omitted a "more" after the word "important," and I apologize for any misunderstanding caused thereby. However, you will note that I did say "to some extent" in the last sentence, and I meant it: I do NOT claim that there is no content in De Anima, merely that the content is diluted by obsolete science. I would also claim (perhaps more controversially) that philosphers have sometimes erred in discussing topics to which modern science is relevant (e.g. Aristotle's theory of sensory perception), while ignoring the contributions of modern science (e.g. improved knowledge of brain organization, and theoretical developments regarding cellular automata and neural nets). One who loves truth must be ready to recognize her under any departmental affiliation! ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 10:38:14 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: Introduction From: "Robert Groover" > > I would also suggest that psychological interpretation of > >comments made here may lead us away from the texts, and can easily lead to > >degradation of the heat/light ratio! > First, please accept my apology if what I said offended you. That was not at all Accepted, thanks. > 3. You inform us also that you are sure this text has nothing to teach you > [i.e. you tell us that it is not important in itself, but only for what it leads > to (whatever that means), and because of its "obsolete science" it is > "uninteresting."] I see I left out a key word: I claim that De Anima is important MORE for what it leads to than for itself. I do not claim that De Anima has nothing to offer in itself. What it "leads to" (through Aquinas' commentary, I believe) is at least some portions of the standard Renaissance understanding of psychology. We may well claim Aristotle as an ancestor of modern cognitive science (and of many other sciences), but that does not imply we should ignore the edifice of knowledge which he helped to found. ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 19 Feb 1994 13:42:06 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Obsolete science From: "Leslie Goldstein" On Fri, 18 Feb 1994, Robert Groover wrote: > I see that I omitted a "more" after the word "important," and I apologize > for any misunderstanding caused thereby. However, you will note that I > did say "to some extent" in the last sentence, and I meant it: I do NOT > claim that there is no content in De Anima, merely that the content is > diluted by obsolete science. > > I would also claim (perhaps more controversially) that philosphers have > sometimes erred in discussing topics to which modern science is relevant > (e.g. Aristotle's theory of sensory perception), while ignoring the > contributions of modern science (e.g. improved knowledge of brain > organization, and theoretical developments regarding cellular automata and > neural nets). One who loves truth must be ready to recognize her under > any departmental affiliation! > >Ok, as to first Para. and I agree as to second. LFG ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 19 Feb 1994 21:48:39 -0600 Subject: Categories, Latin text Ch. 2 From: "Richard Diamond" The Categories discussion seems to have died a bit, so how about moving on to Chapter two? If there's a move for a second, parallel discussion, I'm all for a reading of the Ethics. Here's Boethius' translation. Apologies in advance for the inevitable typos. Caput II Eorum quae dicuntur, alia quidem secundem complexionem dicuntur, alia vero sine complexione; et ea quae secundum complexionem dicuntur sunt ut _homo currit, homo vincit_ ; ea vero quae sine complexione dicuntur sunt ut _homo, bos, currit, vincit._ Eorum quae sunt, alia de subjecto quodam dicuntur, in subjecto vero nullo sunt, ut homo de subjecto quidem dicitur aliquo homine, in subjecto autem nullo est. Alia in subjecto quidem sunt, de subjecto autem nullo dicuntur. In subjecto autem esse dico quod cum in aliquo non sicut quaedam pars sit, impossibile est sine eo esse in quo est, ut quaedam grammatica in subjecto quidem est in anima, de subjecto autem nullo dicitur, et quoddam album in subjecto est corpore (omnis enim color in corpore est), de subjecto autem nullo dicitur. Alia et de subjecto quodam dicuntur, et in subjecto sunt, ut scientia in subjecto quidem est in anima, de subjecto autem dicitur, ut de grammatica. Alia ut aliquis homo, vel aliquis equus; nullum enim horum neque in subjecto est neque de subjecto dicitur. Simpliciter autem quae sunt individua et numero singularia de nullo subjecto dicuntur; in subjecto autem nihil prohibet horum aliqua esse; quaedam enim grammatica in subjecto est, de subjecto autem nullo dicitur. -- Richard Diamond ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 19 Feb 1994 23:50:07 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories: Chapter 2 From: "BROWN PHILIP H" > CHAPTER 2 > > Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the > latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the > former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'. His two examples of composite terms involve a noun and a verb; they are sentences. Into which category would Aristotle place phrases such as "the green table" or "running swiftly"? Phil Brown pb6755@albany.csc.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 20 Feb 1994 00:12:50 -0600 (CST) Subject: Categories Ch.1: apparently ending From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu Sorry to be gone so long, but my electricity was out for a solid week. Things are gradually returning to normal. Have we just about run out of things to say on Categories ch.1? (1)On the issue of how exactly things and names are at issue here: is everyone provisionally satisfied on this issue? I notice that Ackrill, in the notes to his translation, states confidently that it is *things* which are homonymous, etc., while Apostle seems not quite as certain. (2)I still think we should retain the Greek cognates for homonym, etc. I am further emboldened in this claim by the fact that Ackrill uses them in his translation, and several secondary sources which utilize Ackrill's translation also seem to accept this rendering. (In addition, I have also found another Latin translation which uses Greek cognates: chapter 1 is entitled "De homonymis, synomynis et paronymis".) Also, if it is anything besides names which are homonymous etc., then the English meanings of "equivocal" etc. do not exactly match Aristotle's meaning, either, and thus (as has been pointed out) we would have to rest content with technical meanings anyway. And in any case, when in English we define "synonym" as "different words which mean the same thing", does "different" mean different *types*, or can it *also* mean different *tokens* of the same word? And is it so certain that what we mean by "means the same thing" is the same as what Aristotle means by "logos tEs ousias ho autos"? (3)On the significance of the use of "koinos" and "autos/heteros". As I have mentioned, Aristotle uses "koinos"[=common] when names are at issue, and "autos/heteros(& idion)"[=same/different(& proper)] when logos is at issue. Might this possibly indicate or be a symptom of the difference in the way of being of the two (names & logos)? "Names" being vocal sounds, something physical as we would say today, in short, something *sensible* which can be held in common as an object or piece or *real* estate; whereas logos is not physical, but rather *intelligible*, noetic, having an ideal identity and thus a certain sameness whenever & wherever it is repeated, and a certain *propriety* as the intelligibilty of or according to some name. This would add another dimension of significance to the chain of relations connecting ousia-logos-onoma, which would be another schema for the age-old problem of the relation of the real and the ideal, the sensible and the intelligible. [Thanks to Tom Hayosh for also addressing this issue] (4)In answer to Kelsey: I think you're right that we're not in much (if any) disagreement. I'll see if I can further elucidate the following phrase: "we will say what it is to be the thing, qua the name by which we have called it." We can restate the last phrase thus: "as the thing we have called it". E.g., we say what it is for some thing to be an animal (if that's what we have called it), and not a human being or Socrates, even though the thing "is" all three. (5)We haven't said very much about paronyms. Does anyone have anything to say about them? How precisely should we desribe their principle of unity? Strictly speaking, they don't even have names in common, or at least not *simply* in common. (6)No one has commented on my proposal that the sense of "things" here is the same as whatever is meant by "ousia". (In this connection, I have no trouble accepting that "logos tEs ousias" means "definition"; I just think that "definition" tells us a lot less than "account of the substance".) Does this seem adequate? Jeff Taylor ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 20 Feb 1994 00:33:05 -0600 (CST) Subject: Categories translations From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu Some notes on translations of the Categories: I have 4 English translations, by H.G. Apostle, H.P.Cooke, J.L. Ackrill, & E.M. Edghill. Apostle's and Ackrill's are the most literal, Edghill's seems to be closest to the traditional rendering, while Cooke's (which is in the Loeb edition) is extremely paraphrastic. Are there any others? Ackrill speaks highly of Tricot's French translation. I know at least one person out there is using this one. What is your general impression? Anyone have any German translations? I have found three Latin translations: by Boethius, by William of Moerbeke, and a third whose creator I have not yet been able to identify (my poor Latin has not allowed me to decipher the preface to this one). There are some interesting variations in these translations, which I will point out when relevant and when they differ from Boethius, whose translation has been posted. Jeff Taylor ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 20 Feb 1994 10:50:59 -0500 (EST) Subject: Categories Ch.1: apparently ending From: "Peter Orlowski" On Sun, 20 Feb 1994 TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu wrote: > I still think we should retain the Greek cognates for homonym, > etc. I am further emboldened in this claim by the fact that Ackrill > uses them in his translation, and several secondary sources which > utilize Ackrill's translation also seem to accept this rendering. > (In addition, I have also found another Latin translation which > uses Greek cognates: chapter 1 is entitled "De homonymis, synomynis > et paronymis".) Also, if it is anything besides names which are > homonymous etc., then the English meanings of "equivocal" etc. > do not exactly match Aristotle's meaning, either, and thus (as has > been pointed out) we would have to rest content with technical > meanings anyway. And in any case, when in English we define "synonym" > as "different words which mean the same thing", does "different" > mean different *types*, or can it *also* mean different *tokens* > of the same word? And is it so certain that what we mean by "means > the same thing" is the same as what Aristotle means by "logos tEs > ousias ho autos"? I am still surprised that this contraversy will not die. I cannot help but think that there is some other reason for this insistance on homonym, synonym, and paronym. Is there a prejudice against english, or is it against latin and the english words it engendered or is it some Pythogorean tendency to have our own private lingo, or what? If we were not reading the Categories, but were just discussing grammar and the meaning of the english words synonym and homonym, what would we say about these words? Probably, we would go with the standard and accepted definitions given by grammarians and reflected in common usage. homonym - one of two or more words spelled an pronounced alike but different in meaning. homonymous - ambiguous. synonym - one of two or more words or expressions of the same language that have the same or nearly the same meaning in some or all senses. synonymous - alike in meaning or significance. These english words all came into use in the 16th and 17th century, not from Greek, but from Latin (homonymum, synonymum) which latin words did not have the meaning of Aristotle either. I cannot imagine why anyone would try to give these english words almost the exact opposite meanings. It is almost as if a latin translator were to see the greek homOnumos (and Aristotle's example of the man and the ox) and translate it "man-noun" because "homo" is means "man". What we are proposing is not to use english cognates for the greek, but false cognates. I must say that this seems obvious to me and I wish I could see what the attraction is to these false cognates. I really am particular about butchering our own language to try to understand thoughts written in another. It seems to make the project all the harder. ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 20 Feb 1994 11:46:27 -0500 (EST) Subject: Categories Ch.1: paronyms From: "Peter Orlowski" > (5)We haven't said very much about paronyms. Does anyone have anything > to say about them? How precisely should we desribe their principle > of unity? Strictly speaking, they don't even have names in common, or > at least not *simply* in common. > > Jeff Taylor I think that we have something quite different here with parOnumos. The equivocal and univocal names both had something in common, that is, the sound (and spelling?) of the word. With these, we are talking about two words which are both equivocal or univocal. With parOnumos, we are talking about one word which is parOnumos, and another which is not (or at least not with respect to the first word.) In the examples that Arist. gives, only grammarian and courageous are parOnumos. The others in the pairs, viz. grammar and courage, are the sources from which the paronyms are derived. Thus, no one word is common, though parts (syllables) are. So answer this:is the grammarian parOnumos, or is his name parOnumos? Here are some possibilities to also consider: Grammarian the man derives his name from grammar the science. Grammarian the man derives his name from 'grammar' the word. 'Grammarian' the word is derived itself from grammar the science. 'Grammarian' the word is derived itself from 'grammar' the word. Grammarian the man is derived himself from grammar the science. Grammarian the man is derived himself from 'grammar' the word. Which sentence describes what parOnumos is about? Some of these obviously do not fit the text, but which one does? /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 20 Feb 94 11:48:02 CST Subject: Re: Keywords From: "carol poster" Just as a personal preference, I'd like to stay withe the Greek terms (not English cognates) for important concepts. (1) I'm trying to follow the text in Greek (2) If we just use Greek terms, we won't need to argue about the best translation, but concentrate instead on Aristotle's words. (Perhaps we could settle this issue with a vote?) ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 20 Feb 94 11:52:36 CST Subject: Re: Categories Ch.1: paronyms From: "carol poster" for paronyms: I think what Aristotle is talkingh about is purely linguistic -- the English triad "photographer/photography/photograph" would also be an example. One important feature of paronyms is that Greek roots tend to be extrodinarily productive compared to English ones -- especially when you consider the flexibilty of the verbal system ... ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 20 Feb 1994 20:55:49 +0100 Subject: Re: Keywords From: "luc borot" >Just as a personal preference, I'd like to stay withe the Greek terms (not >English cognates) for important concepts. (1) I'm trying to follow the text >in Greek (2) If we just use Greek terms, we won't need to argue about the >best translation, but concentrate instead on Aristotle's words. > >(Perhaps we could settle this issue with a vote?) As a non-Hellenist participant, I cannot agree with this proposal, and as a non-English-speaker I have to use the French, Latin and English translations and the annotations of the French translation. I fully enjoy these discussions on the texts and the words, and I would like the Hellenists among us to state a translation after references to Greek, just to help. It has never been a problem so far and the discussion will remain interesting if it is not restricted to Greek scholars. I would also like to know what are the e-mail equivalents you use for your Greek letters: when you use an E instead of an e, is it an epsilon or an eta? is an O an omega or an omicron? I can recognize the letters of ancient Greek but no more, and I presume it is the same for others. I am fully convinced that serious (i.e. slow) reading is best done on original texts (which is why I am caught in a contradiction as a philosophical translator: I want my translations of Hobbes to be bought and read, but I don't think serious philosophy can be done from them!) but I need to improve my knowledge of Aristotle to become a better seventeenth-century scholar. At the age of 35, I find it hard to learn Italian, which is very close to French my native tongue, and won't find it much easier to start learning ancient Greek. That is why I very much like the methods of this list, though I may not intervene very often. I do read the Categories (French version, I own) very closely, pencil in hand and paper nearby to write my questions and nonplussings (sorry if it's a coinage). So far they have been the same as those of others on the list, but wait till I'm more puzzled than you all and I start shouting for help. I also look into the Metaphysics and Physics or Rhetoric when my editor (the late J.Tricot) refers to them for the definitions. As Tricot did most of the works of Aristotle for the same publisher (also mine but that's another question), there is an intentional consistency in his job as translator. He is even one of the models for French philosophical translators, for his notes and indexes. He didn't do the Physics and Rhetoric, but they are available as Greek and French parallel texts from Les Belles Lettres, collection Guillaume Budi. I didn't write this to display my incompetence, but to explain how I work and how many non-professional (but not non-philosophical) free-lancers must be doing. Access to philosophy in the centuries I write on (16 & 17) must have been of the same ilk: through Latin versions, garbled, English translations or epitomes (like the English epitome of the Rhetorica by Hobbes which I'm translating, which was first a Latin pedagogical epitome for his pupil the future 3rd earl of Devonshire, which I'm deciphering too, and which were all preceded by a double edition, Greek and Latin!). We all received a very entertaining and philosophical essay on slow reading, and I think we should also, from time to time, present a few words on the practice thereof, which I perceived as one of the axes of the original intent... or was I wrong? A la vttre, et ` bienttt (to annoy non-French-speaking Hellenists if there are any!) Luc **************************************************** *Luc Borot * * * *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Elisabethaines * *Universite Paul Valery * *Montpellier (France) * **************************************************** ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 20 Feb 94 14:59:13 CST Subject: Re: Keywords From: "carol poster" (1) On transliteration for internet communications -- the convention I've seen used most frequently is capital letters for long vowels (eta, omega) ... (2) I do think that long discussions/definitions of Greek terms are useful -- I was answering a post re: the issue of whether, in our discussions, we should use Latin or Greek English cognates of keywords, and suggesting that we stick with the Greek where there are no clear equivalents. This methodology of Greek keywords with definition/glosses appended is actually gaining favour in the rhetorical community, even among writers with little, if any, background in classical languages. (For example, see George Kennedy's new translation of Aristotle's Rhetoric, or the use of Greek terms like kairos, pistis, ethos, logos, pathos even in undergraduate rhetoric texts or books clearly intended for generalists (by e.g. Richard Enos, Kathleen Welch, Jasper Neel, Susan Jarratt, etc.) (3) Like Socrates in Plato's Gorgias, I tend to prefer short messages in dialogues, and perhaps that results in unnecessarily cryptic posts. If that is the case, I apologize. ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 21 Feb 1994 01:08:16 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories Ch.1: paronyms From: "Karen R. Schnakenberg" a question from igorance: Are the Greekl words "extraordinarily productive" in comparison with English because of the range and subtley of their original meanings or because of the range of diversity and meanings that have since evolved. Karen Schnakenberg ks3c@andrew.cmu.ed ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 21 Feb 1994 17:15:45 EST Subject: Re: Categories translations From: "Sean A. Kelsey" Could you say where you found the Moerbeke, I'd be interested in looking at it . Thanks, Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 21 Feb 1994 16:35:20 -0600 Subject: Re:Categories Ch.1: apparently ending From: "Richard Diamond" I'm glad to see the Ch.1 discussion hasn't died. I'd like to comment on the following: LB> (6)No one has commented on my proposal that the sense of "things" LB> here is the same as whatever is meant by "ousia". (In this LB> connection, I have no trouble accepting that "logos tEs ousias" LB> means "definition"; I just think that "definition" tells us a lot LB> less than "account of the substance".) Does this seem adequate? "things" and ousia are _not_ coextensive. Accidents, for example, can be equivocal. When I say that "Stalin is red" and "This book is red" I am using the same word but what it means to be red is different in both cases. I was going to respond to your original posting, but it seemed to me your account avoided the difficulty. As for "logos tes ousias", I think definition is too restrictive a term for what Aristotle intends. If he wanted to say definition (oros) he could have. Rather, logos serves as a more general term that can account for things hard to define or things which simply can't be defined. I think that's in agreement with what you are saying. Richard Diamond ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 21 Feb 1994 18:51:38 -0600 (CST) Subject: Re: Categories translations From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu Moerbeke's translation is in _Aristoteles Latinus I: Categoriae vel Praedicamenta_ ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello. Bruges-Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1961. This volume also contains Boethius' translation, and an "Editio composita" which appears to be a slight revision of Boethius. Jeff Taylor ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 21 Feb 1994 20:51:41 -0600 (CST) Subject: definition From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu Regarding "logos tEs ousias": there is some question that perhaps "tEs ousias" was added later in an attempt to disambiguate "logos", and make it clearer that it does mean "definition". There are apparently some manuscripts which have "horismos" (instead of "logos tEs ousias") which does more literally mean "definition". But I never quite know what to do with information of this sort. Jeff Taylo ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 21 Feb 1994 22:44:58 -0500 (EST) Subject: On the Soul From: EPHESUS@delphi.com Lance: You gave us a most intriguing quotation the other day concerning De Anima, in which your teacher had made a comment to the effect that, while it may deal with many subjects, it does not actually deal with the soul itself. Please explain further. There are several words used by Aristotle and other Greeks which have to do with our inner lives: psyche, nous, thumos, anima. As a historian with only a superficial grasp of these concepts, I hope to study the relevant texts with others to further my understanding. I would, in fact, appreciate sources which could take me further in this regard. But I would very much like to understand what your quotation actually means. What aspect of soul experience is missing in Aristotle's discussion? The "eternal" soul, perhaps? I have always assumed that "soul" to the Greeks simply referred to one's inner experience of the world, that in us which perceives, visualizes, thinks, holds memories, etc. Your teacher argues that, in De Anima, "The soul is considered apart from time and the awareness of time." Why does this lead to the conclusion that it is not the soul as such which is being considered? Is it a failure to take up questions pertaining to what in Plotinus (about whom my knowledge is equally superficial) is the "higher" soul? Please elucidate. Naively yours, Karl Fredrickson Ephesus@Delphi.com ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 1994 00:15:22 -0600 (CST) Subject: Categories Ch.2 From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu Perhaps it's about time to move on to Ch.2. Any last thoughts on Ch.1, paronyms, etc.? For Ch.2, we should probably dwell briefly on fly on the first, small section on "expressions" or "things said", before moving on to the longer and much more involved section on "things". ********************************** * Jeff Taylor * * Vanderbilt University * * taylorjb@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu * ********************************** ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 1994 00:16:31 -0600 (CST) Subject: Categories 2, 1a16-19 From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu Initial comments on first section of Ch.2: (1)The Greek begins: "tOn legomenOn", which is a genitive plural noun, and which is translated variously as: "Of things that are said..." (Ackrill) "Of the expressions..." (Apostle) "Eorum quae dicuntur..." (all 3 Latin trans.) Edghill's translation loses the sense of the genitive. (2)This is followed by a distinction: "ta men kata sumplokEn legetai, ta d'aneu sumplokEs." (2a) The key word here, "sumplokE", translates variously as "composite", "combination", "complexionem", "conjunctionem". Liddell & Scott list "an intertwining, complication", and the associated verb (sumplekein) as "to twine or plait together". As the verb "plekein" means almost the same thing, it seems possible that sum-(=with) is functioning as an intensifier of sorts, or to emphasize that there is more than one thing being "twisted" together (as opposed to something which can be said to be one, e.g. a lock of hair [=plokos]). (2b)The distinction is that some are said (=legetai, again) "kata sumplokEn" (=according to [or by] combination), while others are said "aneu sumplokEs" (=without combination). (2c)None of the English translations I have are entirely literal here, so we might read this phrase provisionally as: "some are said by combination, some without combination." Edghill's trans. may be misleading in that there is no positive word here for "simple", but rather a negation of "combination". (2d)The third Latin trans. reads: "alia per conjunctionem dicuntur, alia sine conjunctione." Moerbeke renders it as: "hec quidem secundum complexionem dicuntur, hec autem sine complexione." (3)Next come examples of those combined and those without combination. As Brown points out, the combined expressions are combinations of a noun and verb. I don't know what Aristotle would say about phrases like "the green table". Any ideas ********************************** * Jeff Taylor * * Vanderbilt University * * taylorjb@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu * ********************************** ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 94 04:10:39 EST Subject: Re: On the Soul From: "Lance Fletcher" >Lance: You gave us a most intriguing quotation the other day concerning De >Anima, in which your teacher had made a comment to the effect that, while it >may deal with many subjects, it does not actually deal with the soul itself. Karl, The first line of the quote from Seth Benardete was, "Aristotle's de anima is not a treatise on the human soul." Benardete did not mean by that to say that de anima does not deal with the soul itself. He meant that the soul, as it is dealt with in de anima, is not specifically the soul of a human being, but, as you put it, the soul as such. Lance Fletcher [lance@freelance.com] The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 1994 08:27:38 EST Subject: Re: Categories translations From: "Sean A. Kelsey" Thanks a lot for the reference on Moerbeke s translation. Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 1994 08:37:44 EST Subject: Re: On the Soul From: "Sean A. Kelsey" Just a brief note on the soul. Doesn't Aristotle say in De Anima I.1 what he takes the word soul to mean: that by which living things live, or something like that? And doesn't he spend the rest of Book I discussing what his predecessors thought this thing turned out to be, and then doesn't he in Book II turn to answer in his own name the question `what IS that by which living things live? What is it?'. I think that too much concentration on De Anima III.4 & 5 can lead to confusion about what Aristotle means by `soul'. Admittedly, he says some strange things in III.4 and 5. But he begins with a fairly straightforward under-standing of what `soul' means, and III.4and 5 is the culmination of what starts out as a perfectly reasonable investigation about what is that thing in virtue of which living things live? (Understanding `thing' here real loosely; after all, some people thought it was a harmony (cf. De Anima I)). In short, I think we should understand the cryptic remarks in III.4-5 in the context of the general project of which they form a part, viz., in the context of the investigation of what the soul is, i.e., what that principle in virtue of which living things live is. Further, we ought to understand the project of the De Anima itself in the context of Aristotle's conception of natural science. If the physics is concerned with being qua mobile, and if the De Caelo is concerned with being qua mobile with respect to place, and if On Generation and Corruption is, broadly, concerned with being qua alterable, and if the biological works are concerned with being qua living, how does the De Anima, the consideration of the soul, fit into this scheme? Or does it? Clearly the De Anima is neither mathematics nor, except possibly in its culmination, metaphysics. Natural sciece seems to be the only choice left. BUt then why begin the study of living beings with the study of the soul, which is only a principle of living things? He doesn't do the corresponding thing for the other branches of natural science. Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 1994 08:41:33 EST Subject: De Anima From: "Sean A. Kelsey" Mr. Fletcher, My apologies. My most recent posting on the De Anima appears to be redundant, in light of your explanation of Seth Benardete's remark about the De Anima. If my tone sounded somewhat polemical, my apologies. Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 94 11:01:58 CST Subject: Ch. 1, de legetai From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com I picked up a copy of the Loeb edition the other day, so I now have the Greek text. I noticed that the three sections begin "homonuma legetai", "sunonuma de legetai", and "paronuma de legetai". I am curious as to why the last two have "de" and the first does not. In this edition, Cooke writes in a footnote that those who are unfamiliar with the terms equivocal and univocal could read them as ambiguous and unambiguous instead. I'm not sure that these are the best terms to use for translating homonuma and sunonuma, but I am in favor of exploring terms which are not very technical. Also, I think the disagreement on translation has to be secondary to the question of what the "hon" or "ousia" are. I suspect that what Aristotle is talking about in chapter 1 will be much clearer after we have read and discussed chapter 5 (on substance). For those who don't have the Greek text, the Loeb edition is a very nice little book. I bought it at a Barnes & Noble in Illinois - one of the sections in the bookstore was the Loeb library. When I was visting the Twin Cities, I was in another B&N that had the same thing, so this edition is probably not too hard to find and get your hands on quickly. The book cost $15.50 and has Categories, On Interpretation, and Prior Analytics. If you're looking for a different work of Aristotle's they might have it too - it just depends on which particular volumes of the Loeb library they have in stock. Some of the longer works span two volumes. It wouldn't surprise me if Borders has them too, but I don't know if they do. o Tom Hayosh d:-)=;==| / ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 94 13:16:49 CST Subject: Re: Ch. 1, de legetai From: "carol poster" re: de The use of de has to do with coordination and parallelism -- it expresses some degree of contrast with the preceding one or two items in a list -- and thus couldn't be inserted in the first part of a sequence (in fact, "men" would be what one might express in the first position.) For more info on "de", you might want to look at Dennison, Greek Particles. Carol Poster c594460@mizzou1.missouri.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 1994 15:18:09 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Categories: Chapter 2 From: "BROWN PHILIP H" Since we now are moving on to Chapter 2 of the Categories, I'll repost my query from a few days ago. > > CHAPTER 2 > > > > Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the > > latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the > > former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'. > His two examples of composite terms involve a noun and a verb; they are sentences. Into which category would Aristotle place phrases such as "the green table" or "running swiftly"? Phil Brown pb6755@albany.csc.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 1994 16:11:39 EST Subject: Re: Ch. 1, de legetai From: "Sean A. Kelsey" The first one doesn't have `de' because `de' is a connecting particle and since the first one occurs in the first sentence of the book there's nothing before it for it to connect with. Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 94 16:39:59 CST Subject: Re: Categories: Chapter 2 From: "carol poster" In the case of "the green table", Aristotle would say it is composite, because green is an accident of table (and he might well argue that "esti" [is] could be placed in the sentence but has been omitted). In a case like "the flat table" the problem would be more complicated because it could be argued that the notion of flatness inheres in our notion of "table" (is essential rather than accidental). Does this connect back with the logos of the ousia issue we discussed earlier? Carol Poster c594460@mizzou1.missouri.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 24 Feb 94 16:03:41 CST Subject: Cat. 2, the green table From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com Regarding "the green table," here are two translations of On Interpretation, Ch. 2, 16a23-6: It is necessary to notice, however, that simple nouns differ from composite. While in the case of the former, the parts have no meaning at all, in the latter they have a certain meaning but not as apart from the whole. (Cooke) Yet there is a difference between simple and composite nouns; for in the former the part is in no way significant, in the latter it contributes to the meaning of the whole, although it has not an independent meaning. (Edghill) My best guess as to the untranslated Greek text is: on men oud osper en tois aplois onomasin, outos echei kai en tois sumpeplegmenois en ekeinois men gar to meros oudamos semantikon, en de toutois bouletai men all oudenos kechorismenon If the simple/composite distinction here is the same as in Cat. 2, then in Aristotle's view, noun phrases can be composite (or can be said by combination). Is sumpeplegmenois related to sumploke? For more elaboration on Aristotle's views on the distinction between accidental and essential properties raised by Carol Poster, see Topics, Chs. 4 and 5. I haven't found anything that specifically address verb phrases. They are not discussed in chapter 3 of On Interpretation. I would guess that the same principle of the parts contributing to the meaning of the whole would apply to verb phrases and that they could be composite or said by combination. I don't know that this is Aristotle's position, however. o Tom Hayosh d:-)=;==| / ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 08:41:05 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Cat. 2, the green table From: "David Westbrook" With regard to the simple/composite distinction, is there any reason to assume Aristotle would be classifying expressions at this point in terms of nouns and verbs? Since he immediately goes on to classify things in terms of subjects and predicates (those things "said of" and/or "present in" a subject) it makes more sense, I think, to consider simple and composite expressions as something more akin to subject-predicate language than noun-verb distinctions. Thus subjects (linguistic) on their own (i.e., "man", "ox") and predicates (i.e., "runs", "wins") are simple, while subject-predicate expressions (i.e., "the man runs", "the man wins", or "the table is green", etc.) are composite. David Westbrook Social & Political Thought York University ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 25 Feb 1994 11:13:10 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Cat. 2, the green table From: "BROWN PHILIP H" > > > Regarding "the green table," here are two translations of On > Interpretation, Ch. 2, 16a23-6: > > It is necessary to notice, however, that simple nouns differ from > composite. While in the case of the former, the parts have no > meaning at all, in the latter they have a certain meaning but not > as apart from the whole. (Cooke) > > Yet there is a difference between simple and composite nouns; for > in the former the part is in no way significant, in the latter it > contributes to the meaning of the whole, although it has not an > independent meaning. (Edghill) > [deletion] > If the simple/composite distinction here is the same as in Cat. 2, > then in Aristotle's view, noun phrases can be composite (or can > be said by combination). Chapter 20 of the Poetics also might shed some light on the distinction between simple and composite terms: "A unified utterance is a composite significant sound, some parts of which have independent meaning. Not every such utterance is a combination of nouns and verbs; it can exist without verbs, as, for example, the definition of man. However, it will always include a member having independent meaning, as Cleon in Cleon walks." And in Chapter 21 he says: "Words of two kinds, simple words -- those like ge (earth) that are not compounds of significant parts -- and double words. The latter are compounds consisting of either of a significant and a nonsignificant part (though in the compound these are not recognized as significant or nonsignificant), or of two parts both of which have meaning." What this suggests to me is that when Aristotle speaks in the Categories of terms involving combination, he means a combination of meanings, not terms. In Chapter 20 of the Poetics he classifies nouns and verbs as "significant sounds" and particles and articles as "nonsignificant sounds." I'm not sure where this leaves adjectives. If "green" has independent meaning, then "green table" would be a composite expression. Similarly, if "swiftly" has independent meaning, then "running swiftly" would be a composite expression. In order to classify these expressions, we would need to know how Aristotle determines whether a word has independent meaning, i.e. is a "significant sound." Phil Brown pb6755@csc.albany.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 25 Feb 94 12:58:01 CST Subject: Re: Cat. 2, the green table From: "carol poster" Would another type of simple/composite be the difference between words like "swiftly" where -ly has no meaning on its own and "homebound" where both "home" and "bound" mean something. In the case of verbs, isn't this complicated by the question of where you place the augment in verbs that are constructed of a preposition followed by a root (the ones that augment before the preposition would be simple, the ones that augment between preposition and root complex?) A general interpretive question that's come up earlier is the degree to which we read this as a commentary on Greek grammar vs. the degree to which it discusses things ... Is it the nature of the things (accident vs. essence) that are compound, the words (morphology), the definitions? Carol Poster c594460@mizzou1.missouri.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 26 Feb 1994 11:19:20 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Cat. 2, the green table From: "BROWN PHILIP H" > What this suggests to me is that when Aristotle speaks in the Categories > of terms involving combination, he means a combination of meanings, not > terms. In Chapter 20 of the Poetics he classifies nouns and verbs as > "significant sounds" and particles and articles as "nonsignificant > sounds." I'm not sure where this leaves adjectives. If "green" has > independent meaning, then "green table" would be a composite expression. > Similarly, if "swiftly" has independent meaning, then "running swiftly" > would be a composite expression. In order to classify these expressions, > we would need to know how Aristotle determines whether a word has > independent meaning, i.e. is a "significant sound." I had some second thoughts about this. Aristotle in the Poetics says that a combination of a significant sound and an insignificant sound is a composite word or expression. Therefore, both "green table" and "running swiftly" would be composite, whether or not Aristotle regards adverbs and adjectives as having independent meaning -- that is, if the passages in the Poetics (and On Interpretation cited earlier) reflect his intention in the Categories. This suggests an interesting question about meaning. In grade school, we learned that a sentence is a complete thought -- in a sense, the basic unit of meaning. But we, like Aristotle, also attribute meaning to single words (as when we ask, "What is the meaning of 'substance'?"). How does the meaning of a word differ from that of a sentence? Phil Brown pb6755@csc.albany.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 26 Feb 1994 11:32:03 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Cat. 2, the green table From: "BROWN PHILIP H" > > Would another type of simple/composite be the difference between words > like "swiftly" where -ly has no meaning on its own and "homebound" where > both "home" and "bound" mean something. > > In the case of verbs, isn't this complicated by the question of where you > place the augment in verbs that are constructed of a preposition followed > by a root (the ones that augment before the preposition would be simple, > the ones that augment between preposition and root complex?) > I don't know if this will help, but in the Poetics (Chapt. 20) Aristotle classifies prepositions as "connective particles" (my translater says the Greek text is faulty). Aristotle there says that one definition of a connective particle is that "it is a nonsignificant sound, such as *amphi, peri,* etc., which functions to make one significant sound out of two or more significant sounds." > A general interpretive question that's come up earlier is the degree to which > we read this as a commentary on Greek grammar vs. the degree to which it > discusses things ... Is it the nature of the things (accident vs. essence) > that are compound, the words (morphology), the definitions? > Carol Poster > c594460@mizzou1.missouri.edu > Phil Brown pb6755@csc.albany.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 16:49:04 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Cat. 2, the green table From: "Peter Orlowski" On Sat, 26 Feb 1994, BROWN PHILIP H wrote: > we learned that a sentence is a complete thought -- in a sense, the > basic unit of meaning. But we, like Aristotle, also attribute meaning > to single words (as when we ask, "What is the meaning of 'substance'?"). > How does the meaning of a word differ from that of a sentence? Maybe this is what we shall find out after reading the Categories and De Interpre. Aristotle seems to be saving sentences for De Interpr. while he here explores the significance of words or things (taken widely enough to include attributes.) /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ ' ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 28 Feb 1994 16:49:04 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Cat. 2, the green table From: "Peter Orlowski" On Sat, 26 Feb 1994, BROWN PHILIP H wrote: > we learned that a sentence is a complete thought -- in a sense, the > basic unit of meaning. But we, like Aristotle, also attribute meaning > to single words (as when we ask, "What is the meaning of 'substance'?"). > How does the meaning of a word differ from that of a sentence? Maybe this is what we shall find out after reading the Categories and De Interpre. Aristotle seems to be saving sentences for De Interpr. while he here explores the significance of words or things (taken widely enough to include attributes.) /~~~~\ { /a>--\ Peter [ <===\) Orlowski } , , , \ '