------- VersaTerm-Link Mail Archive ------- X-Date: Wed, 23 Mar 94 19:16:38 EST X-User: "Lance Fletcher" X-Mbox: Mailbox [aristotle] ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 3 Mar 94 11:20:10 CST Subject: Cat. 2, combinations & tOn ontOn From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com Regarding the question of what Aristotle sees as combined/composite, within the context of Categories 2, I think we can rule out things, definitions, and probably even meanings. Aristotle might take the position that these are combined/composite in some other work. In the first section of Cat. 2, however, he is discussing expressions, things said, forms of speech. Unless these translations of "tOn legomenOn" are inaccurate, Aristotle is discussing words, phrases, clauses, etc. only. I don't see anything in this passage that indicates that by discussing combined expressions, Aristotle is implying that things, meanings, definitions, substances with accidents, etc. are combined. The second section of Cat. 2 begins "tOn ontOn", another genitive plural noun. Edghill translates this as "Of things themselves ..." and Cooke translates it as "But as for the things that are *meant* ..." Both of these translations imply that "tOn ontOn" exclude "tOn legomenOn", but "man" (anthrOpos) is used as an example of each. Is this homOnuma or does Aristotle view tOn legomenOn as included in tOn ontOn? In the first section, "tOn legomenOn ... ta d'aneu sumplokEs oion anthrOpos ..." - "Of expressions, ... some are said without combination, for example, man ..." In the second section, "tOn ontOn ta men kath' hupokeimenOu tinos legetai, en hupokeimenOn de oudeni estin, oion anthrOpos ..." - "Of things, some of/according to a subject *tinos* are said, but in a subject never are, for example, man ..." I don't know how to translate tinos. Man, in the second section, is being said in some way, specifically, "kath' hupokeimenOn tinos". So why is this an example of tOn ontOn and not tOn legomenOn? o Tom Hayosh d:-)=;==| / ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 7 Mar 94 14:55:54 CST Subject: Cat. 1 & Top. i 15 From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com In Topics i 15, Aristotle discusses how to determine if terms are ambiguous. Is the Greek word translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge homOnuma or some variant of homOnuma? Aristotle's discussion is not limited to the substance category. Most of the section addresses quality. I'm pretty sure that it also addresses action. I think it also touches briefly on a couple other categories. (I don't have my copy of Topics handy and it's been a little while since I read the section.) So, Aristotle's use of the term onoma in Cat. 1 might not indicate that he is speaking only of nouns or things or ousia. I'm close to convinced that ambiguously and unambiguously are the best translations for homOnuma and sunOnuma. They do not have to be used in any kind of unusual technical sense and I think they best capture what Aristotle is expressing. Does anyone have a good argument against ambiguously/unambiguously? o Tom Hayosh d:-)=;==| / ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 7 Mar 1994 13:50:03 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: Cat. 1 & Top. i 15 From: "Marc Cohen" On Mon, 7 Mar 1994 hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com wrote: > I'm close to convinced that ambiguously and unambiguously are the > best translations for homOnuma and sunOnuma. They do not have > to be used in any kind of unusual technical sense and I think > they best capture what Aristotle is expressing. Does anyone > have a good argument against ambiguously/unambiguously? > > o > > Tom Hayosh d:-)=;==| > / Yes. "Ambiguous" and "unambiguous" are one-predicates; but what Aristotle seems to have in mind by "homOnuma" and "sunOnuma" are (what we would call) relational predicates. E.g., he says that man and ox are sunOnuma. This clearly does not mean (as your reading would require) that "man" is unambiguous and "ox" is unambiguous, but rather that a man and an ox are sunOnuma OF ONE ANOTHER (i.e., they are things which have in common both a "name" and a definition corresponding to the name). By contrast, an animal and a drawing are homOnuma (of one another) since they share the name zOOn, but do not share any definition corresponding to that name. This is just an example of the befuddlement one can get oneself into if one insists on thinking of homOnumy and sunOnumy as properties of *expressions*. For Ar. thinks that "man and ox are sunOmuna" since they are both animals (1a8-10) and both share the same definition of animal. But how can you put this point if you try to say that "man" and "ox" are synonymous? They certainly don't mean the same thing. Each of them is unambiguous, of course, but that hardly makes them synOnuma of one another. I realize this harks back to the (earlier discussed) issue of whether it is words or things that Ar. is talking about here. But using translations like "ambiguous" and "unambiguous" seems to foreclose that issue (and to foreclose it the wrong way, it seems to me). ============================================================================ S. Marc Cohen | e-mail: smcohen@u.washington.edu Department of Philosophy DK-50 | voice: 206-543-6895 University of Washington | FAX: 206-685-8740 Seattle, WA 98195 | ============================================================================ ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 7 Mar 1994 13:53:06 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: Cat. 1 & Top. i 15 From: "Marc Cohen" Correction: I meant to say that "ambiguous" and "unambiguous" are one-PLACE predicates. SMC ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 7 Mar 1994 17:38:41 EST Subject: Re: Cat. 1 & Top. i 15 From: "Sean A. Kelsey" On Mar 7, 1:50pm, Marc Cohen wrote: } Subject: Re: Cat. 1 & Top. i 15 } } }On Mon, 7 Mar 1994 hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com wrote: } }> I'm close to convinced that ambiguously and unambiguously are the }> best translations for homOnuma and sunOnuma. They do not have }> to be used in any kind of unusual technical sense and I think }> they best capture what Aristotle is expressing. Does anyone }> have a good argument against ambiguously/unambiguously? }> }> o }> }> Tom Hayosh d:-)=;==| }> / }Yes. "Ambiguous" and "unambiguous" are one-predicates; but what }Aristotle seems to have in mind by "homOnuma" and "sunOnuma" are (what we }would call) relational predicates. E.g., he says that man and ox are }sunOnuma. This clearly does not mean (as your reading would require) }that "man" is unambiguous and "ox" is unambiguous, but rather that a man }and an ox are sunOnuma OF ONE ANOTHER (i.e., they are things which have in }common both a "name" and a definition corresponding to the name). By }contrast, an animal and a drawing are homOnuma (of one another) since }they share the name zOOn, but do not share any definition corresponding }to that name. } }This is just an example of the befuddlement one can get oneself into if }one insists on thinking of homOnumy and sunOnumy as properties of }*expressions*. For Ar. thinks that "man and ox are sunOmuna" since they }are both animals (1a8-10) and both share the same definition of animal. }But how can you put this point if you try to say that "man" and "ox" are }synonymous? They certainly don't mean the same thing. Each of them is }unambiguous, of course, but that hardly makes them synOnuma of one another. } }I realize this harks back to the (earlier discussed) issue of whether it }is words or things that Ar. is talking about here. But using }translations like "ambiguous" and "unambiguous" seems to foreclose that }issue (and to foreclose it the wrong way, it seems to me). } }============================================================================ }S. Marc Cohen | e-mail: smcohen@u.washington.edu }Department of Philosophy DK-50 | voice: 206-543-6895 }University of Washington | FAX: 206-685-8740 }Seattle, WA 98195 | }============================================================================ } }-- End of excerpt from Marc Cohen Does Aristotle say that `man' and `ox' are sunOnuma are that they are called (or said or named ....) sunOnuma? In other words, the question still remains open (I think) as to whether or not these words are to be used adverbially for describing ways of calling (or saying or naming ...) something or as names for the things so called (or said or named ...), or, as names for the words or thoughts or what have you by which or by virtue of which the things are so called (or said or named ...). In the above I use `things' to include anything anyone might like. Sean Kelsey , ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 08 Mar 1994 00:39:07 -0600 (CST) Subject: Categories ch.2: 1a20-1b From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu (1)A question: why, at the beginning of ch.2, does A. write of "legomena" rather than "logoi"? This might perhaps be an important distinction we would need to keep in mind. (2)Perhaps it is now time to plunge into the section concerning "things" [=ta onta, which more explicitly means "things" than anything in ch.1]. "Things" here are apparently distinguished from the "expressions" mentioned in the first 2 sentences; but what is their relation, if any? For there is a curious parallel between the passages, to the following extent: both (some) expressions and (some) things are "said according to"[=legetai kata] something--"combination"[or "composition", "intertwining" perhaps; =sumplokE] in the case of expressions, and "some subject" [=hupokeimenon tinos] in the case of things. (All the English translations I have obscure this parallel.) This "saying according to" is contrasted, in the case of expressions, simply with "without combination", whereas in the case of things there is a second positive element, "in a subject", which makes the taxonomy of things much more involved, with the four possible combinations of the two elements and their respective negations. So here are some topics we will want to address: (a)What does it mean that A. writes that things "are said"? Doesn't this indicate that what is at issue here are not things simply (haplOs, as A. might have said), but things in relation to how they are addressed or not addressed? (b)What is a "subject"[=hupokeimenon; literally, something lying under], and what does it mean to be said according to one, and to be in one? (c)What does it mean for things to be capable or incapable of existing apart from the subject? ********************************** * Jeff Taylor * * Vanderbilt University * * taylorjb@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu * ********************************** ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Mar 1994 09:22:42 EST Subject: Re: Categories ch.2: 1a20-1b From: "Sean A. Kelsey" On Mar 8, 12:39am, TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu wrote: } Subject: Categories ch.2: 1a20-1b }(1)A question: why, at the beginning of ch.2, does A. write }of "legomena" rather than "logoi"? This might perhaps be an }important distinction we would need to keep in mind. } }(2)Perhaps it is now time to plunge into the section concerning }"things" [=ta onta, which more explicitly means "things" than }anything in ch.1]. "Things" here are apparently distinguished }from the "expressions" mentioned in the first 2 sentences; but }what is their relation, if any? For there is a curious parallel }between the passages, to the following extent: both (some) }expressions and (some) things are "said according to"[=legetai }kata] something--"combination"[or "composition", "intertwining" }perhaps; =sumplokE] in the case of expressions, and "some subject" }[=hupokeimenon tinos] in the case of things. (All the English }translations I have obscure this parallel.) This "saying according }to" is contrasted, in the case of expressions, simply with "without }combination", whereas in the case of things there is a second }positive element, "in a subject", which makes the taxonomy of }things much more involved, with the four possible combinations }of the two elements and their respective negations. } }So here are some topics we will want to address: }(a)What does it mean that A. writes that things "are said"? }Doesn't this indicate that what is at issue here are not things }simply (haplOs, as A. might have said), but things in relation }to how they are addressed or not addressed? }(b)What is a "subject"[=hupokeimenon; literally, something lying }under], and what does it mean to be said according to one, and to }be in one? }(c)What does it mean for things to be capable or incapable of }existing apart from the subject? } }********************************** }* Jeff Taylor * }* Vanderbilt University * }* taylorjb@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu * }********************************** }-- End of excerpt from TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu Might we make (b) more precise? Might we ask if `hupokeimenon', `subject', is here: 1. a logical subject (E.g., `man' in `Man is animal'.) 2. a grammatical subject 3. a `metaphysical' subject (i.e., the subject of various accidents) But perhaps breaking (b) into these 3 alternatives prejudices the question in some way? At any rate, when Aristotle talks about things said of a subject (does he use `legetai' or `katEgoreitai', I can't remember?), I am inclined to think he means subject in the sense of (1). But when he says "exists in a subject" (`huparchein', or some derivative, no?) I am inclined to think he means (3). But since he uses both in the same breath, it is unlikely he is simply switching around between the two. This question has bearing on how we consider the Categories as a whole: is it a "logical" treatise or a "metaphysical" treatise (or a "grammatical" treatise). I don't know that we can answer these questions yet; it may be that the distinctions are for us clearer than they were for Aristotle; or it may be that logical distinctions have a role in a metaphysical inquiry, or vice versa. There is a passage in the Metaphysics (I'll try and dig up the precise reference) where Aristotle speaks explicitly of two senses of one thing being "said of" a subject. Roughly, sometimes `A is said of B' is referring to the relation between predicate and subject, sometimes to that between "actuality" and "potency" or something like that. I'll try to dig up the exact reference. In short, I've proposed three alternatives for what he means by `subject'. Are there others? If not, which do we think he means and why? Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 8 Mar 1994 11:55:49 EST Subject: homOnuma From: "Sean A. Kelsey" In Metaphysics Z (VII), ch. 10 Aristotle says: hmOnumOs gar legetai kuklos ho te haplOs legomenos kai ho kath hekaston dia to mE einai idion onoma tois kath hekaston. For the circle said simply and the individual circle are said homonomously (or equivocally or ambiguously) because there is no private name for the individual ones. Here Aristotle uses what is explicitly the adverbial form: homOnumOs. I don't think this text is conclusive for the adverbially/ nominatively discussion. Perhaps homOnuma is reserved for the nominative use, perhaps homOnuma and homOnumOs are used interchangeably. But I throw out the text for those who are interested. It seems that in this text Aristotle is talking about ways of speaking about (or naming, or calling, or addressing) things (taken real broadly). The exact reference is: 1035b1-3. Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Mar 94 11:46:44 CST Subject: Re: Cat. 1 & Top. i 15 From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com Marc Cohen wrote: > Yes. "Ambiguous" and "unambiguous" are one-predicates; but what > Aristotle seems to have in mind by "homOnuma" and "sunOnuma" are (what we > would call) relational predicates. E.g., he says that man and ox are > sunOnuma. This clearly does not mean (as your reading would require) > that "man" is unambiguous and "ox" is unambiguous, but rather that a man > and an ox are sunOnuma OF ONE ANOTHER It would not be "man" and "ox" which were unambiguous. "Animal" would be unambiguous when addressed to a man and an ox. It would be ambiguous when addressed to a man and a picture. If Aristotle is talking about words, I think homOnuma and sunOnuma must be unary instead of relational. When we call this "man" and we call that "picture", homOnuma is not an issue; we have to call them both "zOion". When we call this "man" and we call that "ox", sunOnuma is not an issue; we have to call them both "animal" (or "zOion"). If Aristotle is talking about things, homOnuma and sunOnuma must be relational. It seems that the nature of these terms (unary or relational) is another issue that must be secondary to the question of whether Aristotle is discussing things or words. One difficulty I have with the view that things are at issue is that "homOnuma *legetai*". This seems to imply that words or expressions are involved in some way. Regarding the passage from Met. Z 10 posted by Sean Kelsey, here are three other translations of homOnumOs at 1035b1: Ross - "... 'circle' is used ambiguously ..." Hope - "... 'circle' is equivocal ..." Tredennick - "... we use the same name ..." Can anyone confirm that the Greek word translated by Pickard- Cambridge in Topics i 15 as "ambiguous" is homOnuma, homOnumOs, or some other variant? o Tom Hayosh d:-)=;==| / ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Mar 94 15:04:59 CST Subject: Re: Categories ch.2: 1a20-1b From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com Jeff Taylor wrote: > (1)A question: why, at the beginning of ch.2, does A. write > of "legomena" rather than "logoi"? This might perhaps be an > important distinction we would need to keep in mind. Given my very limited knowledge of Greek, I have no idea what the distinction is between these two terms. Could someone indicate what each of them means? Thanks. o Tom Hayosh d:-)=;==| / ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 10 Mar 1994 13:35:03 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: Cat. 1 & Top. i 15 From: "Marc Cohen" Tom Hayosh is quite right that homOnuma and sunOnuma will be unary if they apply to expressions, and relational if they apply to things. Hence, if sunOnuma applies to the expression "zOion" (as "zOion" is predicated of both man and ox) it is a unary predicate meaning, roughly, "unambiguous"; and if sunOnyma applies to the species man and ox, it is a relational predicate meaning, roughly, "have a logos tHs ousias in common". But I find the objection to the "thing" interpretation unpersuasive. To be sure, since Ar. says "homOnuma legetai" there must be words involved. But if he is giving us conditions for when things are to be called homOnuma (or sunOnuma), the words involved will be "homOnuma" and "sunOnuma". The issue is when some THINGS are to be CALLED by one of these names. On the other hand, a complexity for the "word" interpretation is that Ar. can hardly have a single answer to the question "Is zOion ambiguous?" For when it is predicated of both Socrates and a picture it is ambiguous, but when it is predicated of both an ox and a man it is unambiguous. So it is really not words, but uses of words considered pairwise, that are homOnumon or sunOnumon, according to this interpretation. Re Topics I.15: at 106a22 where Pickard-Cambridge translates "...fine is an ambiguous term" the Gk. has homOnumon. But throughout the rest of the chapter Ar. uses pollachOs legetai -- "said in many ways". --Marc Cohen ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 11 Mar 1994 07:58:57 -0600 (CST) Subject: legomena/logos From: TAYLORJB@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu Regarding my earlier query about why A. speaks at the beginning of ch.2 of "tOn legomenOn" rather than "tOn logOn": (1)What is the correct plural nominative form for "tOn legomenOn"--is it ta legomena, hoi legomenoi, or hai legomenai? My middle Liddell doesn't list this noun. (2)As I understand it, or as it has been translated, legomenoi(?) are "things said", "expressions", "sayings" or something similar. "Logos" has many meanings, but it seems that a logos need not actually be spoken (or written) in order to be a logos, even though one of its meanings is something like "speech" or even "language". (3)So, I was wondering if, by using one rather than the other, A. might have intended to restrict his considerations to things actually said or spoken, which would not necessarily extend to the other, "deeper" meanings of logos; or perhaps this distinction has another significance, or none at all. ********************************** * Jeff Taylor * * Vanderbilt University * * taylorjb@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu * ********************************** ------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 11 Mar 1994 12:35:23 EST Subject: Re: legomena/logos From: "Sean A. Kelsey" `legomenos, E, on' is a participle. So, its plural nominative form would depend on what it was modifying. If it is not modifying anything, but taken as a substantive (as it has been when we 've taken it as, e.g., "things said"), the correct plural nominative form would be the neuter, `ta legomena '. Mr. Taylor suggested that by using a form of `legomenon' rather than logos Aristotle might be restricting his consideration to things actually said or spoken, which would not necessarily extend to the other, "deeper" meanings of logos. I'm afraid I don't know Greek well enough to know if this point can be made on the basis of this distinction between legomenon and logos. But I think its a nice point anyway. It strikes me that a reasonable way of proceeding would be to assume (to begin with) that Aristotle doesn't mean something particularly deep or heavy every time he uses words like `logos', `ousia', etc. For one thing, if his works have a beginning, middle, and end, it would be strange for him to be making substantial claims in the very beginning of his work (and, because they occur in the beginning, they'd be unsubstantiated). Further, even if he is invoking some deep metaphysical meaning of a term, we're not in a position in the beginning to come to some conclusions as to what he does mean, because we just haven't enough information. I'm not saying: suppose Aristotle never means anything out of the ordinary. Nor am I saying: suppose Aristotle means what you and I would probably mean. But I am suggestion: suspend for the moment the supposition that Aristotle is making some deep metaphysical claim. We should try to get a sense of what the progress of a chapter is, and if our metaphysical flashers go off every time we bump into `logos' or `ousia' or `eidos', I think we're making it more difficult than it has to be. So, I think Mr. Taylor's suggestion is a good one, though I don't know Greek well enough to know if it can be supported by the distinction between logos and legomenon. Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 12 Mar 1994 15:41:05 +0100 Subject: RE: legomena/logos From: gorazd.kocjancic@uni-lj.si 1. PLural nominative form of tOn legomenOn is ta legomena. 2. To legomenon viz. ta legomena is not a noun, but a present participle (neut. gen.) of verb lego in passive voice. Hope it helps Gorazd Kocijancic, Ljubljana, Slovenia. ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 12 Mar 1994 10:52:20 -0500 (EST) Subject: Reading or Translating From: "David Westbrook" I don't wish to come across like I'm maligning the very informative (to me anyway) discussion of ancient greek linguistics, but this list doesn't seem to be moving through the text at hand. Are we bogged down in disagreements about basic issues? Maybe we can come to some decision on these questions and get on with it: Is Aristotle writing about words, things and/or the relation between them? In what sense (if any) is he doing any of these things? I'm just worried that this is turning into a "slow translating" group, and I doubt that this will ever be accomplished by such a large committee. David Westbrook Social & Political Thought York University ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 12 Mar 94 12:08:29 EST Subject: Re: Reading or Translating From: "Lance Fletcher" David Westbrook wrote: >I don't wish to come across like I'm maligning the very informative >(to me anyway) discussion of ancient greek linguistics, but this list >doesn't seem to be moving through the text at hand. Are we bogged down >in disagreements about basic issues? Maybe we can come to some >decision on these questions and get on with it: > >Is Aristotle writing about words, things and/or the relation between >them? In what sense (if any) is he doing any of these things? > >I'm just worried that this is turning into a "slow translating" group, >and I doubt that this will ever be accomplished by such a large >committee. David, I am VERY sympathetic with what you are saying here. And, like you, I intend no criticism of what has been said so far, where seems interesting and useful. Let me respond in part with the answer that I customarily give to anyone who voices a complaint or criticism of a project that I am leading, which is to invite the person who points out the problem to take the lead in correcting it. I mean that quite seriously. The best way to help us get past whatever is stopping us is to post something expressing what you think Aristotle is trying to say in this text. But the second part of my response goes back to the question of what text to read. In establishing this list, I had hoped that we would read more than one text of Aristotle, and I confess that I was hoping that we would read one or more of MY favorites, which happen to be the Nichomachean Ethics, the Metaphysics, De Anima and the Politics. Just so we can move the discussion along, let me put on my hat as titular chairman of this group and make a proposal: Let's have a consensus for a slow reading of the Nichomachean Ethics as our next project. Let the reading of the Categories continue and prosper. Most important of all: The floor is now open for volunteers to lead the reading. Before we are all overwhelmed with silence, let me try to reduce the scale of this request. I am requesting that somebody volunteer to lead us in a reading of the beginning of the Nichomachean Ethics, perhaps the first two or three chapters of Book I. If you have some inclination, but are feeling held back by reservations, please send me private e-mail, and we can discuss your reservations. Lance Fletcher [lance@freelance.com] The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 12 Mar 1994 13:54:17 -0500 (EST) Subject: Categories: Chapter 2 From: "Peter Orlowski" After discussing the way words which sound alike are related to each other, Aristotle continues in Chapter 2 to discuss the way words are conjoined to other words and related to things. "Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'." >From Aristotle's examples, it appears as if simples be one word, a single unit of meaning (as opposed to a single insignificant syllable.) Now would the word "information" be simple? I think it would be, for even though "in" and "formation" are significant, they are so accidentally. When these syllables are conjoined, they take on a different meaning. Since greek ran its words together, it is easier to see how a single expression like "manruns" can be considered as a compound. All Aristotle's examples of compounds are of subject and predicate. Would "blackbird" or "cowboy" or "corncob" be a simple or complex? I would guess that if "blackbird" included an implicit copulative, "Bird is black" then it would be compound. If it did not, then the syllables would not be significant expect accidentally, and thus I would conclude that the word was simple. Thus, "cowboy" and "corncob" are obviously simple. The meaning of the whole is not fully explainable in terms of the meanings of its syllables. For the next section, consider the following statements: 1a- Man is said of Socrates. 1b- Man is not present in Socrates. 2a- This scientific premiss is not said of Socrates. 2b- This scientific premiss is present in Socrates. 2c- This white is not said of Socrates. 2d- This white is present in Socrates. 3a- Science is said of grammar. 3b- Science is present in the mind. 4a- This particular man Socrates is not said of man or horse or anything. 4b- This particular man Socrates is not present in man or horse or anything. 4c- This horse Man o' War is not said of anything or present in anything. To be predicated I take to be equivalent to be said of something. Thus, if A is predicated of B, it is true to say that A is said of B. "A is predicated of B" , however, is not equivalent to "B is A." The first does implies the second, however, so that from 1a above, we can say that Socrates is man. Nevertheless, "B is A" does not always imply the "A is a predicate of B". For example, "This man is Socrates" does not mean that "Socrates is predicated of this man." This is because the first expression is an identity or a naming. The "is" signifies that this man is identical to, one in the same as, Socrates. The opposite conversion only works then when the copulative does not signify naming, or an identity between what comes before and after the verb "to be". That is why we do say "This horse is Man o' War" but we cannot then say "Man o' War is predicated of this horse." Thus example 4b and c above. "Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject." Consider examples 1a and b above. "By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject." Consider examples 2b and d. "Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject;" Consider examples 2a and b. "or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything." Consider examples 2c and d. "Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar." Consider examples 3a and b. "There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse." Consider examples 3a, b and c. "But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject." Consider examples 2a, 2c, 4a, 4b, and 4c. Since all of these concern a 'this', that is, an individual and unitary thing, none of them can be predicated of anything. "Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject." (Example 2b.) Equivocally yours, /~~~~\ "And therefore never flout at me for what I { /a>--\ have said against it; for man is a giddy Peter [ <===\) thing, and this is my conclusion." Orlowski } , , , \ ' -William Shakespeare ------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 12 Mar 1994 20:51:59 -0800 (PST) Subject: Introduction From: "Emory Menefee" I am Emory Menefee, a new subscriber to the Aristotle slow reading list. Aside from some cursory reading years ago (amid slogging away to become a physical chemist), my main interest in Aristotle came from getting involved with general semantics, a smallish group that calls itself 'non-Aristotelian,' the idea being not to belittle the man but to call attention to somewhat simplistic contemporary use of Aristotelian notions, e.g., the 'laws of thought.' I have read a fair part of the McKeon abridgement, with at least partial understanding of what he was saying, and with modest disagreement with some of it. I would have no intention of pushing a negative viewpoint in this list, though I do think we should make ourselves aware of points of divergence with modern thought. I suppose I would like to read Metaphysics, and perhaps On Interpretation in detail, though I don't exactly know why these two more than some others. At this time, I would like to see how the land lies before suggesting myself as a 'leader' (or even whether I should stay in the list at all). This is partly because of some other demands on my time, but also because I don't have any idea what a leader in this situation would do. ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 13 Mar 94 14:22:52 CST Subject: Re: Reading or Translating From: "carol poster" I have been lurking in the Categories discussion, but would want to say that I find the close analysis of the Greek text solid, rigourous, and informative. The Categories is one of the works in which Aristotle is inventing a language of philosophical Greek -- and terminological questions are of utmost importance in trying to understand what he is saying about language. Unlike the Ethics, where often it is possible to read "through" the language, in Categories, how each word is mobilized is extremely informative about the theory of language under discussion. For a next work, I would like to continue on to On Interpretation -- which seems a logical sequel to Categories. Carol Poster c594460@mizzou1.missouri.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 13 Mar 94 14:33:32 CST Subject: Re: Categories: Chapter 2 From: "carol poster" The neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle often interpret this issue in terms of the hierarchy of being -- with the more general higher in the hierarchy than the specific. Although I don't think Aristotle considered his Categories as a chain ascending to the divine, a reading of this passage as trying to say that the more general can be predicated of the more specific (or the more abstract of the more concrete) but not the other way around does not seem unreasonable. John of Salisbury's Metalogicon (medieval speculative grammar) says that we can talk about a sad person but not about a patronymic horse because of this rule. ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 13 Mar 94 14:40:11 CST Subject: Re: things or words From: "carol poster" We might want to consider that the distinction between things and words might not appear a clear to the Greeks as it does to us. (And by this, I don't mean that we now know them to be different and that the Greeks got it wrong, but merely that our habits of thinking are quite removed from the Greek ones.) Parmenides, for example, talks about the existence of the same things for thinking and being, and Plato's treatment of non-being (sophist, Parmenides) again indicates that language and being were not considered entirely separaqwte before Aristotle. Within the culture as a whole, prayers and curses were considered efficacious -- language could effect being. Lysias' argument in the Murder of Eratosthenes that the seducer is worse than the rapist also indicates a sense that language is as real as being in a legal context (remarkably similar to McKinnon and post-modern feminism.) So with Aristotle, do we need to see language/being as either/or or as overlapping? Carol Poster c594460@mizzou1.missouri.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 13 Mar 1994 18:05:23 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: Reading or Translating From: "Marc Cohen" I want to second Carol Poster's characterization of the reading of the Cats. -- Marc Cohen On Sun, 13 Mar 1994, carol poster wrote: > I have been lurking in the Categories discussion, but would want to say that > I find the close analysis of the Greek text solid, rigourous, and informative. > > The Categories is one of the works in which Aristotle is inventing a language > of philosophical Greek -- and terminological questions are of utmost > importance in trying to understand what he is saying about language. Unlike > the Ethics, where often it is possible to read "through" the language, in > Categories, how each word is mobilized is extremely informative about the > theory of language under discussion. > > For a next work, I would like to continue on to On Interpretation -- which > seems a logical sequel to Categories. > Carol Poster > c594460@mizzou1.missouri.edu > ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 13 Mar 1994 21:37:22 -0500 (EST) Subject: Next work From: "BROWN PHILIP H" > For a next work, I would like to continue on to On Interpretation -- which > seems a logical sequel to Categories. > Carol Poster > c594460@mizzou1.missouri.edu > I second this motion. But I'm not sure why Lance wants us to come to agreement on what text we will read next when we have hardly begun to read the Categories. Phil Brown pb6755@csc.albany.edu ------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 13 Mar 94 23:09:55 EST Subject: Re: Next work From: "Lance Fletcher" Phil Brown wrote: >But I'm not sure why Lance wants us to come to >agreement on what text we will read next when we have hardly begun to >read the Categories. Phil, I see that in my note to David Westbrook I failed to say exactly what I meant. I had intended to say that we should have readings of more than one text of Aristotle AT THE SAME TIME. So I did not at all mean to suggest that we read the N.E. after finishing the Categories, much less that we suspend the reading of the Categories and go on to something else. Please forgive me if that is what my message appeared to mean. Lance Fletcher [lance@freelance.com] The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019 for Internet access: gopher or anonymous ftp to: world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 14 Mar 1994 14:33:30 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Reading or Translating From: "Leslie Goldstein" I recommend to all readers of this list an interesting example of slow (which I take to mean careful and thoughtful) reading of Aristotle . It appeared in this month's American Political Science Review. I forget the author's name. It's about Aristotle's Politics. ------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 14 Mar 1994 14:46:18 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: homOnuma From: "Leslie Goldstein" Sean Kelsey 's quotation of the Metaphysics passage in Greek made me realize that I object to treating "homonumously" as meaning equivocally or ambiguously. Why isn't it best translated as meaning simply with-the-same-name (which would produce certain kinds of ambigutiy sometimes, but isn't really the same meaning as ambiguous)? Leslie Goldstein ------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 15 Mar 1994 09:55:25 EST Subject: Re: homOnuma From: "Sean A. Kelsey" On Mar 14, 2:46pm, Leslie Goldstein wrote: } Subject: Re: homOnuma }Sean Kelsey 's quotation of the Metaphysics passage in Greek made me }realize that I object to treating "homonumously" as meaning equivocally }or ambiguously. Why isn't it best translated as meaning simply }with-the-same-name (which would produce certain kinds of ambigutiy }sometimes, but isn't really the same meaning as ambiguous)? }Leslie Goldstein }-- End of excerpt from Leslie Goldstein One problem with translating `homonomously' as meaning simply "with-the- same-name" is that this translation does not serve to distinguish it from `sunOnoma'. I call Socrates and Plato by the same name, `man', and I call Socrates and Michaelangelo's David by the same name, `man'. We need a translation that will distinguish between these two cases. I thought `equivocally ' did this, because I do not mean the same thing by `man' when I call Socrates and David `man' (i.e., I call them `man' equivocally), whereas I do mean the same thing by `man' when I call Socrates and Plato `man' (i.e., I call them `man' univocally). Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 16 Mar 1994 16:58:24 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: homOnuma From: "Leslie Goldstein" On Tue, 15 Mar 1994, Sean A. Kelsey wrote: > On Mar 14, 2:46pm, Leslie Goldstein wrote: > } Subject: Re: homOnuma > }Sean Kelsey 's quotation of the Metaphysics passage in Greek made me > }realize that I object to treating "homonumously" as meaning equivocally > }or ambiguously. Why isn't it best translated as meaning simply > }with-the-same-name (which would produce certain kinds of ambigutiy > }sometimes, but isn't really the same meaning as ambiguous)? > }Leslie Goldstein > }-- End of excerpt from Leslie Goldstein > > > > One problem with translating `homonomously' as meaning simply "with-the- > same-name" is that this translation does not serve to distinguish it from > `sunOnoma'. I call Socrates and Plato by the same name, `man', and I call > Socrates and Michaelangelo's David by the same name, `man'. We need a > translation that will distinguish between these two cases. > I thought `equivocally > ' did this, because I do not mean the same thing by `man' when I call > Socrates and David `man' (i.e., I call them `man' equivocally), whereas > I do mean the same thing by `man' when I call Socrates and Plato `man' > (i.e., I call them `man' univocally). > > Sean Kelsey >** Sean, your answer caused me to reflect that perhaps the ambiguity is in the word onoma--it seems to mean both 'meaning' and 'name,' so that homonomous means with-the-same-name while sunOnomous means with-the-same-meaning. What do you think of that? ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 09:21:44 EST Subject: Re: homOnuma From: "Sean A. Kelsey" Leslie, I'm not sure I agree the ambiguity is in `onoma'. Roughly, `homonomous' means same-name-different-meaning, whereas `sunonomous' means same-name-same-meaning. To give a crude etymology, the `onoma' part of each word gives you the same-name bit, and the different prefixes give you same- or different-meaning. So, we have names used of different things. If one name, when used of different things, has the same meaning, it is used univocally; if one name, when used of different things, has a different meaning, it is used equivocally. Does this seem right? Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 09:23:16 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: homOnuma From: "Leslie Goldstein" On Wed, 16 Mar 1994, Marc Cohen wrote: > > > > > One problem with translating `homonomously' as meaning simply "with-the- > > > same-name" is that this translation does not serve to distinguish it from > > > `sunOnoma'. I call Socrates and Plato by the same name, `man', and I call > > > Socrates and Michaelangelo's David by the same name, `man'. We need a > > > translation that will distinguish between these two cases. > > > I thought `equivocally > > > ' did this, because I do not mean the same thing by `man' when I call > > > Socrates and David `man' (i.e., I call them `man' equivocally), whereas > > > I do mean the same thing by `man' when I call Socrates and Plato `man' > > > (i.e., I call them `man' univocally). > > > > > > Sean Kelsey > > >** > > Sean, your answer caused me to reflect that perhaps the ambiguity is in > > the word onoma--it seems to mean both 'meaning' and 'name,' so that > > homonomous means with-the-same-name while sunOnomous means > > with-the-same-meaning. What do you think of that? > > > Rather than appeal to an ambiguity in onoma (possible, but unlikely, in > Aristotle) I would appeal to the difference between the prefixes homo- > and sun-. "Homo" means "the same"; so things that are homOnumous have > *the same name (but not the same definition)*. "Sun" means "together > with"; so things that are sunOnumous have *together with the (same) name, > (also the same definition)*. > > Thus Ammonius in Cat. 15,24: "Now if they have both in common, they are > called synonyms, since they share with one another a definition > (horismos) together with their name, as it were." > > (I'm quoting from the Cohen-Matthews translation of Ammonius, > Duckworth/Cornell, 1991). > > --Marc Cohen >%%%%% This makes very good sens e to me---why don't we translate sunOmous as meaning same-named-with-same-meaning? I know it's awkward in English but so what--the goal would seem to be to capture Aristotle's most exact meaning not to make his work"flow" in a language he nevr heard of, right? Leslie Goldstein ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 16:35:29 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: homOnuma & sunOnuma From: "Peter Orlowski" Could someone please send me the greek for the very first sentence of Categories 1? /~~~~\ "And therefore never flout at me for what I { /a>--\ have said against it; for man is a giddy Peter [ <===\) thing, and this is my conclusion." Orlowski } , , , \ ' -William Shakespeare ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 16:11:26 -0600 (CST) Subject: Re: homOnuma From: "schwarze steven jon" I'm new to the list and have received just a few posts about this topic, so let me know if I'm covering old ground (and, could someone tell me [privately] what texts we're working with and/or how I might access old posts to get in the swing of things? Thanks!). On Thu, 17 Mar 1994, Sean A. Kelsey wrote: > Leslie, > I'm not sure I agree the ambiguity is in `onoma'. Roughly, > `homonomous' means same-name-different-meaning, whereas `sunonomous' > means same-name-same-meaning. To give a crude etymology, the `onoma' part of each word gives you the same-name bit, and the different prefixes give you > same- or different-meaning. > So, we have names used of different things. If one name, when used of > different things, has the same meaning, it is used univocally; if one name, > when used of different things, has a different meaning, it is used equivocally. > > Does this seem right? > > Sean Kelsey Sounds reasonable to me. My question would be, though, what are the other options? I'm in a seminar on the ethics of Aristotle and Aquinas, and yesterday we got into a discussion of how Aquinas uses the word "virtue" rather loosely in some of passages. I'll try not to delve too far into the Aquinas stuff, but the point raised applies directly to the question we're discussing. It was: can the "same name," when referring to different things, have BOTH the same and a different meaning? Seems like a contradiction, but perhaps not. Perhaps it raises the questions of analogy, of metaphor, that complicate our conceptions of 'homonomous' and 'sunonomous.' In this example, our question was how Thomas could refer to both the supernatural or "infused" moral virtues and natural or "acquired" moral virtues as virtues. On the one hand, the two categories are of a fundmentally different order (making the use of "virtue" *equivocal*), yet they also share some significant similarities (making the use of "virtue" *univocal*). Might analogy, or something else, help us understand this kind of phenomenon? I'll dig back in the Rhetoric (when I'm not working on three papers during the upcoming spring break!) to see what A has to say on this. I'd be interested in others' opinions on this, and in guidance to other texts where A might talk about such phenomenon. sjs Steve Schwarze Department of Communication Studies University of Iowa Iowa City, IA 52242 ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 17:53:02 -0500 (EST) Subject: Named together with and named one and the same. From: "Peter Orlowski" Doesn't sunOnuma mean "named together" in sound but apart in meaning, while homOnoma means "named one and the same"? I think your mix-up in the reading proves my point that there exists a dangerous confusion with the english meanings of synonym and homonym. (Taken "hom-" to mean "one and the same" and "sun-" to mean "together with") The "sun-" seems to indicate a superficial likeness or some sort of looser unity, while the "hom-" seems to indicate a deeper unity. I thing "Onuma" indicates more than vocal sound, but carries with it "something of" the thing named by the vocal utterance; so that when the names only sound the same BUT ARE NOT REALLY THE SAME, then it is only that one thing is "named together with" (sunOmuna) the OTHER. But when the names of things ARE REALLY THE SAME, then the things are "named ONE AND THE SAME" (homOnuma). /~~~~\ "And therefore never flout at me for what I { /a>--\ have said against it; for man is a giddy Peter [ <===\) thing, and this is my conclusion." Orlowski } , , , \ ' -William Shakespeare On Thu, 17 Mar 1994, Sean A. Kelsey wrote: > Leslie, > I'm not sure I agree the ambiguity is in `onoma'. Roughly, > `homonomous' means same-name-different-meaning, whereas `sunonomous' > means same-name-same-meaning. To give a crude etymology, the `onoma' part of each word gives you the same-name bit, and the different prefixes give you > same- or different-meaning. > So, we have names used of different things. If one name, when used of > different things, has the same meaning, it is used univocally; if one name, > when used of different things, has a different meaning, it is used equivocally. > > Does this seem right? > > Sean Kelsey ------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 16:58:04 -0600 (CST) Subject: From: "schwarze steven jon" just to follow up with the "formal introduction." I'm a second-year grad student and instructor at Iowa with an interest in the big A's theories of rhetoric and ethics. Presently I'm trying to get a paper going on A's concept of moral responsibility. Not quite sure where it's headed--right now it's just at the "map it out" stage. If there are any especially great secondary sources that address A's notions of free will/agency/ self-sufficiency, I'd love to hear from you. Mostly I'm interested in "hearing" what people have to say about texts other than the ones I'm familiar with (Rhetoric, Politics, Nich. Ethics); if the occasion arises, or if things are quiet, I'll perhaps toss out a some ideas or questions related to my responsibility stuff. Thanks, sjs Steve Schwarze Dept. of Communication Studies University of Iowa Iowa City, IA 52240