------- VersaTerm-Link Mail Archive -------
X-Date: Fri, 25 Mar 94 12:44:28 EST
X-User: "Lance Fletcher" <lance@tigger.jvnc.net>
X-Mbox: Mailbox [aristotle]

-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 13:11:27 EST
Subject: The question of separation
From: "Lance Fletcher" <lance>

A few days ago Carol Poster proposed that we create separate lists for the
Categories thread and the Ethics thread.  I responded by requesting private
e-mail feedback.  This is a report on the results.

The majority opinion seems to be indifference expressed by silence.  I have
received something under a dozen messages on this subject.  I haven't
tabulated the vote exactly, but I believe that all the votes I have received
so far were for separation.  None for union.  I wonder how this group feels
about marriage.

All kidding aside, it's clear that the volume of traffic on the NE thread
exceeds my threshold for spinning off a separate list, so I will set the
administrative machinery for doing that in motion, and I will make an
announcement of the new list when it has been created.

The Categories thread has been less active, so that leaves me with a
question.  Should I leave it on the main Aristotle list until it picks up
speed, or spin it off, with the possibility that it might languish?

Here's another possibility to consider: Since there has already been talk
about going on to De Interpretatione,  how about a list for the Organon?

Lance Fletcher [lance@freelance.com]
The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019  
    for Internet access: gopher or anonymous ftp to: 
         world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 13:14:38 EST
Subject: Re: NE: Translation
From: "james schmidt" <jschmidt@acs.bu.edu>

R Taylor writes:> 
> Irwin's translation works well for undergrads but
> (1) it is highly interpretive via its extrapolations and dominating
> outline accompanying the translation in italics throughout; and
> (2) non-traditional rendering of certain key terms, e.g. "intelligence"
> for PHRONESIS.

While I found the Irwin fascinating to read (the notes alone are worth the 
price of the book), I found that my undergraduates were completely baffled
by it and by the curious choices of terms he uses.  The Martin Oswald 
translation (and old Bobbs-Merrill, now MacMillan) goes over better.  

Jim Schmidt
Boston University




-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 12:17:01 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Manson
From: BENTLECC@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu

        Speculation about whether or not Manson chose good or evil seems
to asume that he chose.  Can we take this for granted?  Perhaps this
is a stupid question; however, we may find that making choices (in terms
of Aristotlean ethics) is not a capacity that is simply given.  Perhaps
the case of Manson is not one in which we can say that he chose or aimed.
        Just a thought that may be worth keeping in mind.

C. Bentley                                      Bentlecc@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 12:20:20 CST
Subject: Re: NE: Ch. 1 (i)
From: "carol poster" <C594460@MIZZOU1.missouri.edu>

>From someone who aims at the good but is not a man:

Since there is nothing in the Greek in NE to indicate that Aristotle
is discussing men exclusively, as we examine this passage, would it
be possible to use a gender-neutral term like "people"?

Later in NE, as we translate, it would be a good idea to keep in mind the
Greek distinction between anthropos and aner.


         Carol Poster
         English Department
         University of Missouri


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 13:17 CST
Subject: 
From: TI0MAC1@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU

>From someone else who aims at the good who is not a man:

I am sick to death of the requirement that gender-neutral language
be used.  Don't be so sensitive--man is the proper term.  Interpret
it as it is intended, please.  :)

Margaret
Political Science Dept.
Northern Illinois University


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 19:34:35 GMT
Subject: Re: NE: Translation
From: "PHL5MG" <PHL5MG@arts-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk>

You seem to be familiar with the Irwin.  Do you happen to know how he 
translates 'diorthotikon'? Many have 'rectificatory' but even more 
translators use 'corrective'.  I'm writing something about this topic 
and it would be nice to know.  The other translator that has been 
mentioned is Thompson, I wonder if this is someone other than Thomson.
Thanks 
michael 





-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 14:20:44 -0600
Subject: Re: NE: Translation
From: "J. Guy Stalnaker" <jstalnak@students.wisc.edu>

In message <Pine.3.89.9403212324.A20664-0100000@comp>  writes:
> On Mon, 21 Mar 1994, BROWN PHILIP H wrote:
> 
> > Someone asked for a translation of the NE. Last year I took a course
> > in Aristotle in which we read the Penguin paperback edition translated
> > by J.A.K. Thompson, revised by Hugh Tredennick. I don't know how this 
> > translation stacks up against the rest, but the book has an excellent
> > introduction and bibliography by Jonathan Barnes. It costs $6.
> 
>       When I took a seminar on Aristotle's Ethics from J.O. Urmson I
> believe he said almost any translation would do but to stay away from the
> Penguin edition.  [Sad, since that is inexpensive and it was the edition I
> had read in college and had been so impressed with.] He didn't tell us in
> any detail what his objections were to the Thompson translation.  Perhaps
> they were too numerous to mention.  Perhaps it is too loose.  (Thompson,
> if I remember correctly, puts some text in footnotes and generally tries
> to make the work more accessible, perhaps at the cost of accuracy.)
>       Urmson ordered the Ostwald translation for us.  He's since gone 
> on to revise the Ross translation.  That revision appears in the Barnes 
> edition of the works of Aristotle.
>       For lots of notes look at Terry Irwin's translation, published by 
> Hackett (and so not too expensive).
>       That said, when I ask my students to buy a book so that we can 
> look a bit at what Aristotle says about happiness I may well end up 
> ordering the Penguin edition because of price (it is now at $8.95).
> 
> --
> 
> Dr. Richard Lee                         rlee@comp.uark.edu
> Department of Philosophy Old Main 318   rlee@uafsysb.BITNET
> University of Arkansas                  phone: 501-575-5826
> Fayetteville, AR 72701


For anyone with access to a Gopher outlet or ftp, you can "pick up" a copy of 
the Ethics for free from the American Philosophical Association gopher/ftp site.
I downloaded the entire text serveral days ago, and using a Macintosh product 
called SaveATree, printed the entire text out on my laser printer in 27 (!!) 
pages (that's four 'text' pages per printed page).  Granted the type is small 
and there are NO comments as to translator or source for the translation or 
about the translation itself.  But given the nature  of this list, I feel okay 
about it and look for opportunities to dispell any problems by recourse to our 
listmember's keen insights ;)

Guy S.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
J. Guy Stalnaker                       A convention in itself arbitrary may     
                                       acquire prestige through being long
jstalnak@students.wisc.edu             observed.            P. F. Strawson      
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 21:44:56 +0100
Subject: Re: The question of separation
From: "luc borot" <lb@alor.univ-montp3.fr>

        Though Lance has encouraged private e-mail on this question, I want
my opinion to be public, not out of polemic, but because I don't agree with
the political commonplace 'qui ne dit mot consent' (those who don't speak
approve); for people working on one of the founders of republican political
philosophy, I think we should be readier to speak for ourselves. I
understand why Lance feels overwhelmed, and as I've just organized a
conference, I know what it feels like to receive more than one can properly
deal with. I'm against separation for reasons I detail below, commenting on
what Lance tells us (and which is perfectly acceptable: I won't complain if
there's a split, but it's a pity)
Lance writes:
>All kidding aside, it's clear that the volume of traffic on the NE thread
>exceeds my threshold for spinning off a separate list, so I will set the
>administrative machinery for doing that in motion, and I will make an
>announcement of the new list when it has been created.
>
        I'm not too keen about having to re-subscribe to another group. I
can't slow-read 2 texts at the same pace (I do the Cat. though I seldom
write).

>The Categories thread has been less active, so that leaves me with a
>question.  Should I leave it on the main Aristotle list until it picks up
>speed, or spin it off, with the possibility that it might languish?
        By isolating it, I think we shan't enliven it, because it may be
stimulated by the discussion and the comparisons with NE, which is
certainly more popular--though not easier--because it touches on more
widespread fields of knowledge and practice.

>Here's another possibility to consider: Since there has already been talk
>about going on to De Interpretatione,  how about a list for the Organon?
        I think this would negate part of your slow-reading project, which
is that time should be taken by every one (FOR A CHANGE!!!!) to read
slowly. If we consider (or ambition to consider) the whole Organon, we
shall never keep at the same pace, some will be discussing prior analytics
while some will still be trudging on with Categories, and I think that
trudging along together is better than doing so on one's own. The desire
for slowness has naturally led us to discuss translations, which has bored
or irritated some of us, as any translator (I'm one of that evil crew) is
bored AND irritated by the work he or she is doing because it never is, has
been, or ever will be JUST what we've got in the original. Reading and
interpreting are the same, even without changing languages.
        Lance, I hope you won't take this as an attack on your policy:
you're the moderator, and a good one at that, if I compare with other lists
I'm on. Your task can't be easy, but I think that if we keep to the
discipline of having a Cat. or NE at the beginning of our messages, we are
clever enough to know what are our priorities.
        Sit back, relax and have a drink (philosophically so of course!)

Luc

****************************************************
*Luc Borot <lb@crit.univ-montp3.fr>                *
*          <lb@alor.univ-montp3.fr>                *
*Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Elisabethaines   *
*Universite Paul Valery                            *
*Montpellier (France)                              *
****************************************************




-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 14:50:17 CST
Subject: 
From: "carol poster" <C594460@MIZZOU1.missouri.edu>

Margaret:
         Why is man the proper term for both men and women?  It seems to
reduce the options available in our language. If I use "person" to mean
either male or female, "man" to mean exclusively male, and "woman" to mean
exclusively female, I have three quite unambiguous terms at my disposal.
If I use "man" sometimes to mean either man or woman and sometimes to mean
exclusively male my terminology is far less precise -- and I think that when
discussing philosophical matters one should strive for the greatest possible
precision of language.
                      Carol Poster
                      English Department
                      University of Missouri


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 13:07:45 PST
Subject: Gender neutral language
From: "John Hamm" <a02846@giant.rsoft.bc.ca>

I think we all find change stressful.  Nevertheless civilization must
keep moving.  Gender-neutral language is politcally correct for a reason
and we must remain sensitive to that.

-- John

> 
> >From someone else who aims at the good who is not a man:
> 
> I am sick to death of the requirement that gender-neutral language
> be used.  Don't be so sensitive--man is the proper term.  Interpret
> it as it is intended, please.  :)
> 
> Margaret
> Political Science Dept.
> Northern Illinois University
> 



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 15:14 CST
Subject: man/woman/person
From: TI0MAC1@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU

Carol,

I respectfull disagree and believe to use "person" instead is to
be untrue to the work of Aristotle.

Margaret


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 15:24:46 CST
Subject: Hello
From: "Danney Ursery" <ursery@acad.stedwards.edu>

Greetings,

I signed on a couple of days ago and would like to introduce myself.  My 
interest in Aristotle peaked in grad. school in the late '70s when I 
chose him as my "great Philosopher" for one of my qualifying exams.  I 
have kept my interest in him primarily through my study of the _NE_ which 
is the reason I joined this group.  I tend to be more a lurker on these 
type groups than an activist so I looked forward to hearing what all of 
you have to say.

Danney Ursery
Associate Professor of Philosophy
St. Edward's University
Austin, Texas



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 13:25:28 -0800
Subject: Re: NE: Ch. 1 (i)
From: "Lindsey Thomas Martin" <lmartin@sfu.ca>

Richard Diamond writes:
>the "they" refers to philosophers or common men, I think I would
>say that because Aristotle does not throw in "all" (a very small
>word to throw in!) he is not referring to all men.  To repeat,
>all men do not "state" or "enunciate" things (enunciate is a better
>though more awkward way to render the Greek word). 
To take this a very little bit further, the notion of general opinion in
ancient greek is more commonly expressed with an impersonal like 'legetai'
and the verb here (1094a2-3), 'apefnvanto' [n=eta; by the bye, does the
list have an agreed system of transliteration] has a sense of authoritative
declaration. At least, LSJ suggests that this is so in Epic use but goes on
to say that in greek of the classic and later periods 'apofnmi' has a
negative meaning, i.e., ='deny'. I am not suggesting that we abandon the
whole tradition of reading it positively in this passage, but it is
curious. I have not been able to find anything in a commentary on this--has
anyone else noticed anything?

(Mr) Lindsey Thomas Martin (lmartin@sfu.ca)
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review (dialogue@sfu.ca)
        & Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science
(604) 291-4979; Fax: (604) 291-4443
EAA 2024, Simon Fraser University
Burnaby BC V5A 1S6 Canada.



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 16:47 EST
Subject: EN 1094a2
From: MPAKALUK@vax.clarku.edu


It is true that it was a truism in Aristotle's culture that everyone desires 
to do well (*eu prattein*) or to be happy.  See, e.g. Euthydemus 278e, where
Plato apologizes for even asking whether this is the case -- he considers
it so obvious, that his question might appear ridiculous.

Nonetheless, this can hardly clear Aristotle of the charge of "quantifier
reversal" fallacy at the opening of EN.  He does not restrict his claim
to persons: the good is what everything (*panta*, not *pantes*) desires.
This is a physical, or metaphysical, rather than a psychological claim.

I take him to have in mind the argument of Physics II.8 and also the 
Protrepticus.  Art imitates nature; so nature has to a fuller degree what
one finds in art; thus in nature as well, everything tends toward some
good or end.

I would add that the charge of a "quantifier reversal" fallacy depends, I think,
on a misappreciation of the force of *dio*, which is usually not well 
rendered as "thus".  *dio*, like *hothen*, is very often used when
Aristotle wishes to explain or account for a proverb or practice.
At 1094a2, it could be rendered: "which is the reason why" etc.
Understood in this sense, there is no inference, and hence no
fallacy.

(The *kalos* should enter in as: "which is the reason why it has
been declared, and correctly so, that the good" etc.)

Michael Pakaluk
Clark University


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 16:02 CST
Subject: 
From: TI0MAC1@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU

It most certainly isn't stressful to me.  I just think it is a
misguided request.  And, IMHO, adds nothing to a discussion of
the NE.

Margaret


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 17:19:24 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: NE: Ch. 1 (i)
From: "Peter Orlowski" <orlowski@cap.gwu.edu>

On Tue, 22 Mar 1994, carol poster wrote:

> Since there is nothing in the Greek in NE to indicate that Aristotle
> is discussing men exclusively, as we examine this passage, would it
> be possible to use a gender-neutral term like "people"?

The problem with using "people" is that I don't think Aristotle is
referring to nations or cultures or the like, but that he is referring to
individuals here.  Maybe in the _Politics_, he might talk about people
aiming at a good, but I think that NE will primarily be about the moral
action of man (in the sense of individual anthropos).  If your point is a
feminist one, however, then I think we should take man as a gender neutral
word for now.  Aristotle will oppose Plato later on the point of virtue
being the same for male and females, but until we get to that point in the
argument, and work out the implications of that, we had better leave open
the question of whether "man" excludes the feminine gender or not. 

           /~~~~\     "And therefore never flout at me for what I
          {    /a>--\   have said against it;  for man is a giddy
Peter     [     <===\)  thing, and this is my conclusion."
Orlowski  } , , , \ '                        -William Shakespeare







-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 16:25:11 CST
Subject: Cat. 2
From: hayosh@ukraine.corp.mot.com


I still don't know how to resolve Aristotle's use of "anthrOpos"
(man) as an example of both "tOn legomenOn" (expressions) and
"tOn ontOn" (beings).  I am approaching it right now by assuming
that tOn ontOn includes tOn legomenOn.  Does anyone have any
good arguments or counter-arguments for this position?

I've been thinking about tOn ontOn which are said of a subject and
present in a subject.  It seems to me that any instance must be
ambiguous/equivocal/homonymous.  Aristotle's example is knowledge
which is present in the mind and is said of grammar.  The universal
"knowledge" is said of grammar and thus of particular points of
grammatical knowledge, but it is particular items of knowledge
which are in the mind.  This of course assumes that the universal
is form which exists not in the mind, but in the particular thing.
If the universal here is a secondary substance, I'm not sure
where it would be located.

                 o

Tom Hayosh  d:-)=;==|
                /


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 17:26:48 EST
Subject: Re: NE: Translation
From: KIRBY@VM.CC.PURDUE.EDU

I can't be sure what the objection was to the Penguin edition of NE, but
I wouldn't be surprised to learn that it had to do, NOT with the translation
per se, but with Barnes' notes -- particularly on the place of
contemplation in the good life. His ideas on this topic are hotly contested
but that doesn't vitiate the edition -- I would just draw students'
attention to the issue and alert them to the possibility of other
interpretations. Certainly Barnes is one of the towering Aristotle scholars
of our day -- it's not as if he were some know-nothing.

John Kirby
Purdue University


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 17:27:45 EST
Subject: 
From: "Sean A. Kelsey" <sakelsey@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>

Would the plural of `person' be `persons', then, and not `people'.
Also, sometimes `man' picks out someone, say Xanthippe, considered as the kind
of thing she is (as opposed to being a horse).  But `person' picks out someone,
say Xanthippe, considered as an individual (as opposed to considered merely
as the kind of thing she is).  There's some stuff in Aquinas, e.g., when he
talks about the Trinity, which makes much of a distinction between `person'
and `nature'.  So perhaps `person' is not as philosophically accurate as could
be.

Sean Kelsey


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 14:29:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Aristotle list
From: "Marc Cohen" <smcohen@u.washington.edu>

Lance:

        Here's my vote in favor of "spinning off" the NE reading group 
from the rest of the Ar. list.  It appears to have generated a huge 
initial interest, but it will probably generate too much mail for people 
(like Carol Poster and me) who prefer the Cats. discussion (and related 
topics).

============================================================================
S. Marc Cohen                        |    e-mail: smcohen@u.washington.edu
Department of Philosophy DK-50       |    voice:  206-543-6895  
University of Washington             |    FAX:    206-685-8740
Seattle, WA 98195                    |
============================================================================



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 16:40:41 CST
Subject: Re: man/woman/person
From: "carol poster" <C594460@MIZZOU1.missouri.edu>

Margaret,
         I'm not quite sure what Greek word you're interpreting as "man" in
Aristotle.  A quite literal translation would be person for anthropos and man
for aner. In the passages we're discussing, the constructions are entirely
impersonal, discussing the nature of pasa technE kai pasa methodos. When we
move to I:ii:8  Aristotle uses pronouns rather than gendered terms.  Could you
perhaps indicate what passages you are using to support the use of the term
"man"?
            Carol


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 17:44:57 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: your mail
From: PHIWILLI@ACS.EKU.EDU

Nussbaum's book: THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: Luck and Ethics in Greek 
Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1986).  Indeed, a wonderful book, 
though with very idiosyncratic (and fascinating) interpretations of 
Plato, Aristotle, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides.  Her line of 
interpretation is continued in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE, and there applied to, 
inter alia, Henry James and Charles Dickens.  

She is, by the way, this year's (or maybe last year's) Gifford Lecturer.

Frank Williams   PHIWILLI@ACS.EKU.EDU
Eastern Kentucky University



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 17:52:09 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: NE: Ch. 1 (i)
From: "Peter Orlowski" <orlowski@cap.gwu.edu>

On Tue, 22 Mar 1994, Lindsey Thomas Martin wrote:

> and the verb here (1094a2-3), 'apefnvanto' [n=eta; by the bye, does the
> list have an agreed system of transliteration] has a sense of authoritative

I think this is the rule: use latin letters with the similar pronunciation
for greek letters, so that alpha becomes a, theta becomes th, nu (not eta)
becomes n, pi (not rho) becomes p and phi becomes ph. As for omicron and
omega, use a little o for o-micron and a big O for o-mega.  For example,
in the categories we have been writing "homOnuma".

Also, always give something of a translation so that non-greek readers may
participate.  If some people say "state (hexis)" and others say "habit
(hexis)" then everyone benefits - the non-greek readers because they can
follow the discussion and the greek readers because they get some hint on how
the writer is interpreting (or misinterpreting) the meaning of the text.

           /~~~~\     "And therefore never flout at me for what I
          {    /a>--\   have said against it;  for man is a giddy
Peter     [     <===\)  thing, and this is my conclusion."
Orlowski  } , , , \ '                        -William Shakespeare






-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 16:52:10 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Re: Gender neutral language
From: "schwarze steven jon" <schwarze@umaxc.weeg.uiowa.edu>


On Tue, 22 Mar 1994, John Hamm wrote:

> I think we all find change stressful.  Nevertheless civilization must
> keep moving.  Gender-neutral language is politcally correct for a reason
> and we must remain sensitive to that.
> 
> -- John
> 
> > 
> > >From someone else who aims at the good who is not a man:
> > 
> > I am sick to death of the requirement that gender-neutral language
> > be used.  Don't be so sensitive--man is the proper term.  Interpret
> > it as it is intended, please.  :)
> > 
> > Margaret
> > Political Science Dept.
> > Northern Illinois University
> > 

I thought Margaret's first post (above) was right on the money--but for
different reasons than those suggested by various respondents (and,
perhaps, by herself).  As John points out, civilization needs to
keep moving.  And as Carol points out, we do need to be precise (although
'philosophy' gets attacked 'precisely' on the basis of the pretensions to
'precision' that it cannot maintain (for an interesting take on
this question and the "man"liness of philosophy, check out Michele Le Doeuff's
"Hipparchia's Choice")).  Yet, does not 'precision' require/demand that we
be 'faithful' to the text? I'd be interested in what our translator has to
say about that.  (Sidenote:  how might an "updating" of
Aristotle compare to, say, the "updating" of the Bible? Respond in private
if you like.) 

I say faithful to the text rather than "to Aristotle's intentions" to
suggest that his intentions might not be of primary importance--I wonder
whether the big A (does anyone have a short, clever nickname for our Greek
friend?) "intended" anything at all by his use of the word man?  In my
view, the question that's important for us as a group of scholars is not
"should we be sensitive?" nor "should we be precise?" nor "should we
interpret as intended?"--though all are important in some way.  Instead,
we might want to keep this in the back (front?middle?) of our heads as we
proceed, 
        To what extent does the patriarchal, hierarchical culture "write"
the Ethics?  To what kinds of problems, experiences, and dilemmas is
Aristotle's theory blind?  

By asking the first question, for example, we move away from the
question of "what did Aristotle intend"--and toward a different set of
answers.

I don't "intend" to turn the discussion into "A Feminist Critique of
NE", for a variety of reasons.  But (as Peter just suggested a few minutes
ago!) I think we do need to keep the gender question a live one--even in
passages less explicitly about gender than those on virtue.

Keep up the lively discussion, all--I must say, this is more exciting than
the Derrida board.

sjs

Steve Schwarze
Dept. of Communication Studies
University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA  52242




-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 17:52:14 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Goldstein on Diamond on Manson
From: PHIWILLI@ACS.EKU.EDU

Looking ahead a bit, and assuming Leslie G. was right about Charles 
Manson, does that mean that Manson was intemperate, and hence incurable 
(NE 1150b29+)?  Perhaps we'll have to put this on hold until we get to 
Book 7.

Frank Williams   PHIWILLI@ACS.EKU.EDU
Eastern Kentucky University



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 18:05:44 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: your mail
From: "Peter Orlowski" <orlowski@cap.gwu.edu>



----------------------------Original message----------------------------
On Tue, 22 Mar 1994, carol poster wrote:

>          Why is man the proper term for both men and women?  It seems to
> reduce the options available in our language. If I use "person" to mean
> either male or female, "man" to mean exclusively male, and "woman" to mean
> exclusively female, I have three quite unambiguous terms at my disposal.

Okay, I posting my last message before reading this posting.  So the point
is obviously a feminist one.  I am not sure it is a good idea to impose a
feminist ideology on the text from the outset.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter,
     I am not sure why you need to introduce "feminist ideology" as a polemical
term to respond to a post about precise use of terms in translation of
specific passages from Aristotle.  Trying to clarify terminology is a fairly
standard practice in philosophical discourse (cf. the homonym and synonym
posts  in  the   Categories reading list) -- I do not see why one this must
descend to name calling (PC, feminist ideology, etc.)
      Your message continues:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, you trade an ambiguity for a confusion.  "Man" may be gender
ambiguious, but "person" is philosophically loaded.  Our notion of
"person" is very different from Aristotle's notion of "anthropos", while
our notion of "man", when taken gender neutral, is much closer to
Aristotle's "anthropos".

I wonder whether you might not consent to using "man" for the sake of
avoiding philosophical imprecision, and put the gender issues aside.  I
for one could not use "person" in this context.  It makes me think of
Trinitarian theology, Kantian ethics and so many non-Hellenic
ideas.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On these two paragraphs, I'm quite confused.  What precisely is the difference
in conotation between "gender-neutral man" (a construction that I suspect
could only be applied accurately to someone like Origen) and "person"? Why does
the word "person" make you think of Trinitarian theology and Kantian ethics
and why does man not do so? Also, in the early parts of NE, if your concern is
really faithfulness to the Greek, we need to use pronouns like "one" or "all"
rather than "man" or even "person" because that is precisely what Aristotle
does. Another literal feature of Greek which you seem unwilling to discuss is
the aner/anthropos distinction -- which I am attempting to preserve in English
as man/person. Don't you think that we should attempt to remain aware of the
nature of the Greek language rather than imposing an anti-feminist ideology
on Aristotle at the expense of fidelity to the actual words of the Greek text?
             Carol


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 18:05:44 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: your mail
From: "Peter Orlowski" <orlowski@cap.gwu.edu>

On Tue, 22 Mar 1994, carol poster wrote:

>          Why is man the proper term for both men and women?  It seems to
> reduce the options available in our language. If I use "person" to mean
> either male or female, "man" to mean exclusively male, and "woman" to mean
> exclusively female, I have three quite unambiguous terms at my disposal.

Okay, I posting my last message before reading this posting.  So the point
is obviously a feminist one.  I am not sure it is a good idea to impose a
feminist ideology on the text from the outset.  This might be
anachronistic, to say the least.

Further, you trade an ambiguity for a confusion.  "Man" may be gender
ambiguious, but "person" is philosophically loaded.  Our notion of
"person" is very different from Aristotle's notion of "anthropos", while
our notion of "man", when taken gender neutral, is much closer to
Aristotle's "anthropos".

I wonder whether you might not consent to using "man" for the sake of
avoiding philosophical imprecision, and put the gender issues aside.  I
for one could not use "person" in this context.  It makes me think of
Trinitarian theology, Kantian ethics and so many non-Hellenic
ideas.

           /~~~~\     "And therefore never flout at me for what I
          {    /a>--\   have said against it;  for man is a giddy
Peter     [     <===\)  thing, and this is my conclusion."
Orlowski  } , , , \ '                        -William Shakespeare




-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 17:41:06 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Re: NE: "they"
From: "schwarze steven jon" <schwarze@umaxc.weeg.uiowa.edu>

On Mon, 21 Mar 1994, CRAIG WALTON wrote:

> - though he does not end with these starting points.  Second, just around the
> corner in our slow reading comes NE I/3, 1094b12-1095a12, in which Aristotle
> invokes just this distinction -- he says a well-educated person requires only
> and no more than that precision appropriate to the subject matter. In math and
> algebra we expect precision -- it would be uneducated to be satisfied with a 
> bank statement saying, at the bottom, 'you have some money left over'. They 
> should be able to do better than that. But also, in ethics (as well as in
> poetics, politics, rhetoric, economics and other studies  of things which
> change by nature), we look, not for precision (for it would be false, here),
> but for the most well-founded guidance we  can obtain without losing track of
> what it is we are studying. So, Aristotle starts NE, as he does a number of
> works (even the Metaphysics) with considering what the conventional wisdom, or
> people in general who agree on an opinion, as the appropriate starting points.

good points here--don't want to speed up our delightfully slow reading,
but I'm left wondering:  to what extent can NE be called a work of
'philosophy', given that ethics, like rhetoric et al, starts with "endoxa"
(I recall at least one of our colleagues saying s/he was interested in
"endoxa", so I hope this isn't too far afield).  
My own take on this stems from a desire to rethink the
relationship between rhetoric and ethics--rather than try to "make
rhetoric ethical" I want to suggest how ethical theorizin' is itself
rhetorical.  Not a bold claim, but one that gets the Platonic monkey off
rhetoric's back.  

If anyone has a better way of framing the rhetoric/ethics problematic,
drop me a private e-memo.

sjs

Steve Schwarze
Dept. of Communication Studies
University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA  52242





-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 18:41:35 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: man/woman/person
From: "David Westbrook" <west@epas.utoronto.ca>

> 
> Carol,
> 
> I respectfull disagree and believe to use "person" instead is to
> be untrue to the work of Aristotle.
> 
> Margaret
> 

I'm a little curious why you think this is the case. If anything I
would think that 'person' and 'man' (exclusive sense) would be much
the same thing for Aristotle. =:-)

Either way, I doubt that Aristotle's supposed limitation of ethical
discourse to men needs to restrict our own application to everyone,
regardless of gender.


David Westbrook
Social & Political Thought
York University



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 18:51:01 -0500 (EST)
Subject: NE: gender
From: PHIWILLI@ACS.EKU.EDU

Concerning Margaret and Carol's posts:

Seems to me that when Ari says "man" it's very dubious that he intended 
it as a generic term, given that he pretty well indicates that he thinks 
women are less than fully rational.  On the other hand, given that we 
know better now, whagree agree, for purposes of our reading of NE, to 
take it as a generic term?

Martha Nussbaum's comments on this issue in FRAGILITY are interesting.  
She says (more or less, p. 371 and note) that had Ari devoted half the 
attention to obvious facts about women that he devoted to studying 
shellfish, HE would have known better.

Frank Williams   PHIWILLI@ACS.EKU.EDU
Eastern Kentucky University



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 17:55 CST
Subject: man/woman/person
From: TI0MAC1@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU

Carol,

Before I had a chance to read your question, it was already answered
for me.  Please refer to the post from Peter Orlowski.  "man" can
be, and should be in this case, interpreted as being gender-neutral
and thus there is no reason to change to "person".  There is
certainly a time and place to replace old language with gender-
neutral language, but this is NOT one of them.  Just my opinion.

Margaret


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 19:18:28 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: NE: gender
From: "Phillip Sipiora (LAN)" <sipiora@chuma.cas.usf.edu>

We might remember that in his RHETORIC Aristotle places women in the same 
class as slaves.

.............................................
Phillip Sipiora (sipiora@chuma.cas.usf.edu) 
Department of English
University of South Florida





-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 16:32:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: NE:Some questions
From: "Emory Menefee" <em@crl.com>


On Tue, 22 Mar 1994, Leslie Goldstein wrote:
> ...  Even Charles Manson is covered.  He chose that which others 
> view as evil because he found it choiceworthy --i.e. good.  Perhaps he 
> felt it showed courage to defy conventions about goodness, or that it 
> in some way distinguished him as above ordinary mortals.  In knowingly 
> choosing the act Manson was implicitly and inevitably saying "For me  
> this is good." Or to put it another way, ahead of time, Manson did not 
> believe he would regret his choice--that meant in his eyes his choice was 
> good.  (again, though he knew, and perhaps even relished the idea, that 
> others would find it evil)
> Leslie Goldstein 
> 
   In the opening sentence of NE, A uses the term "good" in such a way 
that a reader is expected to somehow put upon it the same meaning that A 
had (at that moment).  Later, of course, he states that there are many 
meanings to "good," and (in my opinion) never succeeds in pinning down 
its meaning, except anecdotally.  And for "good" reason: the main problem 
with the word seems to be tied up with polarity -- the belief that one 
can make two columns and put "good" things in one, and "evil" things in 
another.  Realistically, we need a near-infinity of columns, grading from 
one extreme to the other to cope with such an abstraction.  This is why 
Goldstein's sentence seems so interesting: "He chose that which others 
view as evil because he found it choiceworthy -- ie, good." I like this; 
it has a functionality to it lacking in other approaches.  It says that 
no matter what we decide, it is "good," because it is (presumably) the 
"best" decision for us at the moment, or so we think [People do what they 
want to do].  Then the retrospective decision of whether it is good/evil 
to the rest of us depends only on the consequences, when we can assign it
to one of its many slots, according to current law or "morality."  -- 
Emory Menefee 




-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 19:51:33 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Re: The question of separation
From: "Michael Garrett" <GARRETT@ns.rhodes.edu>

Hello.

I am behind. I am trying to get back into the Categories discussion, but 
find that my email is filling up with NE correspondence. My particular 
interest is in Aristotelian logic, so a separate list on the Organon
would suit me well.

thanks for all the work.

michael garrett    rhodes college     memphis, tn   garrett@rhodes.edu


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 19:51:33 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Man Kind?
From: GOZUMM@JEFLIN.TJU.EDU

<<
If I use "man" sometimes to mean either man or woman and sometimes to mean
exclusively male my terminology is far less precise -- and I think that when
discussing philosophical matters one should strive for the greatest possible
precision of language.
                      Carol Poster
                      English Department
                      University of Missouri
<<
Knowing the limits of language here, I believe her point was to refer to
mankind or humanity, but for the sake of brevity, resolved to "man".
A question of semantics.  I'm sitting in the sidelines quietly
observing the discussion.

I believe a lot of classical literature simply state "man" as in
"mankind" to collectively refer to  both sexes and the discussion
of the proper usage detracts from further discussion on NE.

--------------------------------------------------------------------
Marvin E. Gozum, M.D.
Chief, Medical Informatics, Division of Internal Medicine.
Chief, Medical Consults at Wills Eye Hospital.
Department of Medicine, Jefferson Medical College.
Thomas Jefferson University.
1025 Walnut St. Philadelphia, PA 19107
Voice: 215-955-8907.  Fax:215-923-6939
Internet: gozumm@jeflin.tju.edu



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 20:01:52 -0500 (EST)
Subject: RE: Gender neutral language
From: GOZUMM@JEFLIN.TJU.EDU

<<<
I think we all find change stressful.  Nevertheless civilization must
keep moving.  Gender-neutral language is politcally correct for a reason
and we must remain sensitive to that.
<<

Not to add to this discussion and digress into semantics, but to
those who have read (not myself) Aristotle in the original greek
and the word translates to "man", it would be appropriate in this
discussion were proper translation is vital, to maintain accuracy
in the translation, if "man" rather than "person", then so be it.

It has been discussed that to be politically correct in medicine,
we must begin to consider dead people as "metabolically different"
or "metabolically senescent".  Such terminologies leave much to be
desired.

--------------------------------------------------------------------
Marvin E. Gozum, M.D.
Chief, Medical Informatics, Division of Internal Medicine.
Chief, Medical Consults at Wills Eye Hospital.
Department of Medicine, Jefferson Medical College.
Thomas Jefferson University.
1025 Walnut St. Philadelphia, PA 19107
Voice: 215-955-8907.  Fax:215-923-6939
Internet: gozumm@jeflin.tju.edu



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 20:29:15 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Gender neutral language
From: HALL@wvsvax.wvnet.edu

It is English that has changed, not Greek or Aristotle.
"Man" now means "male", so if A didn't mean "male" our
translator should find a gender neutral term.
I think it is up to the translator to tell us what
he or she is doing.
Bob Hall,  West Virginia State College


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 19:36:27 -0600 (CST)
Subject: First chap. of NE
From: "William Kooi" <KOOIW@baylor.edu>

I've just signed on to this list, and I missed the posting of the first
chapter.  Would someone be kind enough to send it to me directly, or
to repost?  I'd appreciate it.
William Kooi
kooiw@baylor.edu


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 20:37:41 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Technical Help  with the List
From: GOZUMM@JEFLIN.TJU.EDU

My apologies, but I cannot find a source  to help me with two 
things:

1. Is there a digest option for this listing ?

2. What address may I use to request a helpfile or index
of control commands for the list ?

Much thanks in advance.


Marvin Gozum


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 20:52:36 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Gender neutral language
From: "Peter Orlowski" <orlowski@cap.gwu.edu>

I think we are assuming that the Stagerite is god here.  Steve's question
(what is Aristotle blind to) assumes that Aristotle *is* blind.  In the
spirit of this slow-read, I want to assume this god is right, and that it
is we who are blind.  So I would turn your question around and say "What
does Aristotle see that we don't?  What are we missing when we interpret
the text in ways which create these problems which we claim the text
cannot answer?"

I am purposely avoiding feminist ideology here because I want to turn this
late-20th-century concern of ours into an opportunity for us to see the
text on Aristotle's wavelength.  Are our concerns his concerns?  Are our
categories his categories?  If Aristotle is not concerned with certain
categories or issues in the same way we are, what might we discover by
shelving some of our notions and taking up the discussion on his terms? 
Since we are not on this list to settle questions of feminist ideology, or
to teach one another how to use "inclusive" language, but since we are
here to discuss the text as if the author were a god with something to
teach us at every turn, I propose that we leave gender issues out of the
discussion until the text brings them up, and that when the text does
bring them up, we assume that the author is correct for as long as it
takes to "get on his wavelength" and comprehend his argument.

           /~~~~\     "And therefore never flout at me for what I
          {    /a>--\   have said against it;  for man is a giddy
Peter     [     <===\)  thing, and this is my conclusion."
Orlowski  } , , , \ '                        -William Shakespeare








-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 20:53:21 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: NE: gender
From: "Peter Orlowski" <orlowski@cap.gwu.edu>



On Tue, 22 Mar 1994, Phillip Sipiora (LAN) wrote:

> We might remember that in his RHETORIC Aristotle places women in the same 
> class as slaves.

On Tue, 22 Mar 1994 PHIWILLI@ACS.EKU.EDU wrote:

> Concerning Margaret and Carol's posts:
> 
> Seems to me that when Ari says "man" it's very dubious that he intended 

> She says (more or less, p. 371 and note) that had Ari devoted half the 
> attention to obvious facts about women that he devoted to studying 
> shellfish, HE would have known better.

Maybe if we spent half as much attention to reading the text as we do
shelling out accusations, WE would know better.

The opinions proposed in the rhetoric about things other than rhetoric are not
the final word of Aristotle.  In the Rhetoric, he assumes many common
opinions he does not himself hold.  After all, Ar. talks
about the coming-into-being of the cosmos, but we know from his scientific
consideration of it that he thinks the world is really eternal.

Aristotle's opinion on women biologically would be found in his treatment
of the sexes in his biological works, and his position on women
politically would be found in his Politics.  His Politics does not put
women on the level of slaves.  Some feminists say that Ar. thought men and
women were in fact equal, but that they were treated unequally and
unjustly in the Athenian city.  (I cannot remember who, but a woman
recently wrote a book on the Politics where she claims such things. 
Consider, for example, the poets statement that "silence becomes a woman."
Ar. seems to quote this line of the play Ajax, because Ajax who says this
comes to a bad end for not listening to his wife.) This may or may not be
true, but I think it is premature to rule on this issue at book 1 of NE.

Can we simply take "anthropos" without refrence to gender (much as I am sure
Shakespeare meant it in the passage I quote from "Much Ado about Nothing")
until we see Aristotle making some distinction between the sexes?  We are
still at the level of repudiable-opinion (endoxa) here, and I think we
make much ado about nothing when we start engaging in disputes on gender
when the text has said ne'er a word about it.

           /~~~~\     "And therefore never flout at me for what I
          {    /a>--\   have said against it;  for man is a giddy
Peter     [     <===\)  thing, and this is my conclusion."
Orlowski  } , , , \ '                        -William Shakespeare

or

                       "And therefore never flout at me for what I
                        have said against it;  for person is a giddy
                        thing, and this is my conclusion?"

                        I think not!





-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 21:33:13 est
Subject: Re: NE: gender
From: "John Ransom" <RANSOM@dickinson.edu>

Phillip Sipiora writes:

> We might remember that in his RHETORIC Aristotle places women in the
> same class as slaves.

The same kind of thing can be said of Aristotle's _Politics_. Early on
in Book I when he's tracing the development of the state he notes that
the family is the first "natural" union among human beings which
immediately introduces the notion of servitude as the woman is
subordinate to the male. What Aristotle "observes" is natural, and what
is natural is just. Plato the rationalist is much better on the woman
question. He can see no reason to bar women from serving as guardians,
and thus possibly as rulers.



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 21:43:02 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Man/person
From: "Peter Orlowski" <orlowski@cap.gwu.edu>


On Tue, 22 Mar 1994, Poster wrote:

> Peter,
>      I am not sure why you need to introduce "feminist ideology" as a polemical
> term to respond to a post about precise use of terms in translation of
> specific passages from Aristotle.  Trying to clarify terminology is a fairly
> standard practice in philosophical discourse (cf. the homonym and synonym
> posts  in  the   Categories reading list) -- I do not see why one this must
> descend to name calling (PC, feminist ideology, etc.)

I apologize.  I did not mean this in a derogitory way, and if that is how
it is taken, I retract my statement.  My point is that the distinction
being make (man, woman, person) is not faithful to the thought of the
text, and shows a concern for issues which are not of concern to the
author.  This is a philosophical point: just as some thinkers frequently
make the distinction between mind and body, or "is" and "ought", or
"object" and "thing-in-itself" etc. those distinction might be an
inappropriate ones for some philosophers.  They concern modern obsessions
which were not problems for ancient thinkers.  My point is then that we
should not import our own obsessions into the text.

> On these two paragraphs, I'm quite confused.  What precisely is the difference
> in conotation between "gender-neutral man" (a construction that I suspect
> could only be applied accurately to someone like Origen)

We must be speaking different dialects.  I am not an academic, so I was
not aware that the meaning of man that I am using was lost.  "Man" has two
meanings.  One is the one that you are familar with, which includes
masculine gender determinations.  The other meaning of "man" is equivalent
to "anthropos" in greek or "homo" in latin, and it implies gender (so it
does not mean eunich or neutered) but it does not determine which gender. 
In this sense, all individuals with a human nature are men.  I seem to
remember you were an english professor?  Look this usage of "man" up in
the OED.  Maybe you think this second meaning is archeic?  Where I live,
howver, it is still widely used.  (Granted, I am not an academic and that
is my disadvantage but then for that matter, my associates and I are not
forced to live by a speech code and that has its advantages too.) 


> and "person"? Why does
> the word "person" make you think of Trinitarian theology and Kantian ethics
> and why does man not do so? 

"Person" has a meaning of its own.  It had this meaning long before the
gender-neutral language initiative came along.  This meaning is not
equivalent to "anthropos" or the latin "homo".  "Person" signifies a
certain way of looking at the individual man.  Originally, a person was a
player.  The reason I think of Trinitarian theology is because this word
carries certain christian connotations since it was given its present
meaning through doctrines regarding the irreducible terms of the relations
in God between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  This Christian notion of
man as person, signifying something of man's dignity, as well as something
of his relation to others, was used by Immanual Kant, for one, for his
doctrine that persons are to be related to each other as ends and not
means. 

All this theological and philosophical baggage which is so intimate to the
very meaning of the word "person" is quite foreign to Aristotle.

> Also, in the early parts of NE, if your concern is
> really faithfulness to the Greek, we need to use pronouns like "one" or "all"
> rather than "man" or even "person" because that is precisely what Aristotle
> does. Another literal feature of Greek which you seem unwilling to discuss is
> the aner/anthropos distinction -- which I am attempting to preserve in English
> as man/person. 

Man/person is not the same distinction as aner/anthropos.  I am not sure
greek has a word for person, so let me use the latin, vir/homo/persona. 
Latin has three distinct words.  Persona does not mean homo.  You are
right (I agree with you, you see) that we must distinguish between vir and
homo, but man/person is not the RIGHT distinction.  The problem is that
english does not have two distinct words for vir and homo.  What are we to do?

> Don't you think that we should attempt to remain aware of the
> nature of the Greek language rather than imposing an anti-feminist ideology
> on Aristotle at the expense of fidelity to the actual words of the Greek text?
>              Carol

Please no flames.  I am not anti-feminist.  If I asked that we not use
Hegelian terminology for understanding Plato, would that mean I was
anti-Hegelian?  I simply want to avoid inaccuracy and avoidable
anachronisms.  So let me be as Arsitotlean as I can.  What would Aristotle
do if he had two related ideas which did not have distinct word, as
english does not have distinct words for homo/vir/persona.

Aristotle has this problem.  He often talks about things which have the
same name for the genus and one of the species.  What does he do?  He simply
notes the ambiguity rather than invent a word, or impose the wrong
word for one of the senses.  I think you have already alerted us to
the ambiguity in the word "man".  Henceforth, whenever I translate
anthropos as "man" I will mentally note that I am not excluding either gender,
nor am I specifying either gender.  I will remember that in english, the
homo/vir/persona distinction is a man/man/person distinction and that
man/man is ambigious and that I must therefore be careful to make the
distinction in the referent.  I have learned the lesson of Categories I.1
well.  I hope everyone keeps this distinction in mind so as not to misread
the text.

I REALLY do appreciate your pointing out the ambiguity.  My only quarrel
is over your method of eliminating it.

           /~~~~\     "And therefore never flout at me for what I
          {    /a>--\   have said against it;  for man is a giddy
Peter     [     <===\)  thing, and this is my conclusion."
Orlowski  } , , , \ '                        -William Shakespeare






-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 22:48:05 -0500 (EST)
Subject: NE:Ends and purposes
From: "Peter Orlowski" <orlowski@cap.gwu.edu>

Some have posted interpretations of end which seem to confuse them with
purposes.  I would like to point out that I think Aristotle does not make
this confusion.

The first eight lines posted by Diamond seem to imply that ends are not
"up for grabs."  Each art has a determined end.  As Ar. says, the end of
the physician as such is health, and the shipbuilders end is the ship. 
This does not mean that a doctor cannot be in medicine for the sake of
making money, or even, as in the Kevorkian case, for poisoning people. 
But that is not the end of medicine.  The physicians purpose, then, might
not be the same as his end.  His purpose is something he chooses himself,
but his end as a physician is determined by the art of medicine.

What if a Cossack general made his own bridle?  What would be his end? 
Well, as a bridle-maker, his end is the construction of the bridle, but as a
horseman, his end is horsemenship, and as a general, his end is victory
and he uses his horsemanship for the military art.  He may use the
military art for some purpose inconsistent or accidental to victory, but
that would not change the end of the art.

           /~~~~\     "And therefore never flout at me for what I
          {    /a>--\   have said against it;  for man is a giddy
Peter     [     <===\)  thing, and this is my conclusion."
Orlowski  } , , , \ '                        -William Shakespeare




-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 22:52:26 -0500 (EST)
Subject: NE: Ostwald text, I.1
From: EPHESUS@delphi.com

Since the Ostwald translation has been mentioned a few times, allow me to
give the first section, using the numbering which corresponds to Richard
Diamond's translation.
---------

Martin Ostwald:
NE: Chapter I (1)

1. Every art or applied science [techne] and every systematic investigation,
and similarly every action and choice [proairesis], seem to aim at some
good;
2. the good, therefore, has been well defined as that at which all things
aim.
3. But it is clear that there is a difference in the ends at which they aim:
in some cases the activity [energeia] is the end, in o4hers the end is some
product [ergon] beyond the activity.
4. In cases where the end lies beyond the action the product is naturally
superior to the activity.

5. Since there are many activities, arts and sciences [episteme], the number
of ends is correspondingly large: of medicine the end is health, of
shipbuilding a vessel, of strategy, victory, and of household management,
wealth.
6. In many instances several such pursuits are grouped together under a
single capacity [dynamis]: the art of bridle-making, for example, and
everything else pertaining to the equipment of a horse are grouped together
under horsemanship; horsemanship in turn, along with every other military
action, is grouped together under strategy; and other pursuits are grouped
togetther under other capacities.
7. In all these cases the ends of the master sciences are preferable to the
ends of the subordinate sciences, since the latter are pursued for the sake
of the former.
8. This is true whether the ends of the actions lie in the activities
themselves or, as is the case in the disciplines just mentioned, in
something beyond the activities.

----------

Ostwald provides in footnotes a few of the Greek words; I have inserted them
in the text.  

I hope this is of some help to the discussion. Perhaps some of you could
assist us, for instance, in coming to grips with the subtleties of the third
and fourth sentences.

Karl Fredrickson


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 05:34:51 +0100
Subject: RE: NE: Ch. 1 (i)
From: schumach@uni2a.unige.ch

Greetings.
My name is Jorg Schumacher. I teach Chinese at the University of Geneva,
Switzerland. I am preparing the second volume of a study on Mengzi
(Mencius), a contemporary of Platon and Aristotle and one of the very great
thinkers, like them. I am glad to be able to participate in this lecture of
Aristotle. I never had any formal training in Western philosophy, and
listening to the list (or do we call that lurking now?) seems a good way to
get a taste of philosophical reflection. Personally I am less interested in
far reaching implications, from Aquinas to Heidegger and back, than in
unadorned proceedings, where professional concerns dominate. I am also
conscious of the handicap of doing research on a non Western culture
without knowing Greek and grateful to those of you who give English
equivalents they use technical language.
I would like to add a thought or two about NE I, 1.
"1. Every art and every inquiry, likewise [every] action and choice, seems
to aim at some good."
One might well imagine that Aristotle pronounced this opening sentence with
a smiling eye. If we ignore for the moment the subtleties which might be
hidden behind that strange quadruplet of art-inquiry-action-choice, and
think of it just as of "things", including humans (even females and slaves)
then what is being said seems nearly too obvious. How could things be
things at all, if they did not somehow strive to act out of a concern for
themselves? Unwilling to accept a simple "good" we might ask directively
"good for whom." Clearly any inherent tendency or artificial scheme that is
profitable to its originator can be called "good". Everybody knows it, and
Aristotle knows that everybody knows it, so when he offers praise to
"them", he is offering praise to everybody.
But then he proceeds to that "conclusion", which really is a completely new
thought, and where praising stops and thinking starts:
2. "... the good is that at which all things aim."
All of a sudden the goods are gone and the Good has taken their place.
Nobody knows where it came from, there is no more simple statement to be
made, and no more deceptive praising to be offered. That each and any thing
has its specific aims and appetites, is easy enough to grasp. But why
should there be one Good, if common experience shows, that so often the
good of one is to the detriment of the other? Or to put it in different
way: If at any given moment the good and bad of individual actions would
have the same chances, wouldn't the world fall apart? The notion of a
general Good then might point to the forces that make things stick
together. Good and bad, from such a point of view, would not be symmetrical
positions and this can indeed be found to be an opinion of NE:
"For men are good in but one way, but bad in many." (II, 6)
It is not difficult to produce further evidence on how the question of good
and bad In th NE is intervowen with the problem of parts and their whole.
Let me just cite one of them which I found particularly striking. In a
passage, that must have helped shaping one of the less enlightened western
believes, the master warns us of the pitfalls of the near-to-animal fifth
sense: the touching. Touching, according to him, is essentially brutish,
and he who takes to it is prone to licentiousness. One exception is,
curiously, granted: "the most refined pleasures of the touch" as we might
experience it "in the sport centers through the means of heat and massage".
But here comes the fascinating final line (end of III,10): "because for the
licentious person touch is concerned only with certain parts of the body,
not with the whole."
Evil starts always with the particular, when the binding forces of the
relevant relationship break up: "Those who are friends for the sake of
utility part when the advantage is at an end; for they were lovers not of
each other but of profit." (VIII,4).




-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 00:34:16 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: man/woman/person
From: "Whit Blauvelt" <whitfb@dorsai.dorsai.org>

> "man" can
> be, and should be in this case, interpreted as being gender-neutral
> and thus there is no reason to change to "person".  There is
> certainly a time and place to replace old language with gender-
> neutral language, but this is NOT one of them.  Just my opinion.

The whole question of this use of "man" has always struck me as off-base. 
After all, "woman" comes from "wombed man." Perhaps we should prefer 
"man" as the general case and "unwombed man" for the male, "woman" for 
the female? In any case the very term "woman" presupposes that we are 
talking about a type of man--indeed picks out that type as, arguably, 
being advantaged and augmented by its unique endowment.

Whit



-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 23:34:18 -0600
Subject: NE: Gender - STOP IT!
From: "Richard Diamond" <diamond@acad.udallas.edu>




I was hoping my role as "leader" of this discussion would be(.e a pretended 
one and that things would roll along by a sort of invisible hand, but 
apparently not.
 
First, I must insist that until this list is spun off, put "NE" in the 
title of an Ethics post so that those who want to read only the Categories 
can do so in peace.
 
Second, and more importantly, this is a slow reading of the Nicomachean 
Ethics.  We are going to proceed line by line in (I hope) excruciating 
detail.  Let us not stray off into the nebulous world of what people THINK
that Aristotle, e.g., considers the status of women to be.  We are _slow 
reading_ the Ethics and not generalizing about the whole of Aristotle's 
corpus.  Neither the word "anthropos" nor "aner" is anywhere near what 
we are discussing!  In my quick eyeballing of the Greek text, I can't 
even find the first time it comes up (1094b7 is always rendered "human").
At the very, very least we should wait till the term appears before 
discussing it.
 
In any case, the subject has been aired thoroughly enough (20 some messages 
worth in a day!)  Let it rest.  If the reason for objecting to "man" is one 
of political correctness, take your complaint to feminist-l (that's another 
listserv that discusses this sort of thing).  If the complaint is one of 
accuracy of language, understand that English and Greek very often use the
same word to express the genus and the species.  That is a simple 
grammatical fact.  Deal with it.  
 
Please do not take this post as a personal attack on anyone -- I in no way 
intend it to be one!  In fact, the discussion has been in some respects 
interesting to me personally, but it is interfering entirely with the 
standard of slow reading that I agreed to (pretend to) lead this discussion 
according to.  The discussion of the first few lines of the Nicomachean 
Ethics are blurred under an avalanche of posts **ENTIRELY** unrelated to 
those lines.  Let us return to our task, Ok?
 
Apologies as this will surely offend some, but if you want me to (pretend 
to) lead I am going to adhere rigorously and mercilessly to the concept of
"slow reading."
 
Richard Diamond
diamond@acad.udallas.edu

p.s. note that although digressions are inevitable, some are of so great a
     magnitude and "emotionally charged" nature that they are out of place.


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 94 00:36:32 EST
Subject: Re: NE: gender
From: "Lance Fletcher" <lance>

I hope that none will be offended if I observe (a) that this now protracted
discussion has moved rather far from the text that gave birth to it, and (b)
that we may have been remiss in failing to apply the practice of slow
reading to one another's messages.

I confess that when Margaret posted her initial response to Carol's first
message on the subject of gender neutrality, my first reaction was one of
silent agreement, mixed with alarm at the possible eruption of a "flame"
that I would need to quell.  I wouldn't call the ensuing discussion a flame.
I think everybody has been commendably polite, good natured, even, at times,
scholarly.  So my main concern was, and is, that the discussion has gone on
too long and threatens to distract us from the reading of the Nicomachean
Ethics.

I was about to write to Carol to ask her help in refocusing the discussion,
so I pulled up her original message to get her address from the message
header, but then I reread the message, and noticed something interesting.
What I noticed was that I didn't quite understand what Carol was talking
about.  That led me to reread the message that she was replying to, and that
led back to an even earlier message.  By the time I reached the third
message back, I saw something that made me suspect that Carol's comment was
based on a misinterpretation of what Richard Diamond was saying.

Here is Carol's message:

>Date:         Tue, 22 Mar 94 12:20:20 CST
>From: carol poster <C594460@MIZZOU1.missouri.edu>
>Subject:      Re: NE: Ch. 1 (i)
>To: aristotle@world.std.com
>In-Reply-To:  Message of Tue, 22 Mar 1994 11:20:41 -0600 (CST) from
> <diamond@acad.udallas.edu>
>Sender: aristotle-approval@world.std.com
>Reply-To: aristotle@world.std.com
>
>>From someone who aims at the good but is not a man:
>
>Since there is nothing in the Greek in NE to indicate that Aristotle
>is discussing men exclusively, as we examine this passage, would it
>be possible to use a gender-neutral term like "people"?
>
>Later in NE, as we translate, it would be a good idea to keep in mind the
>Greek distinction between anthropos and aner.
>
>
>         Carol Poster
>         English Department
>         University of Missouri

Normally I wouldn't quote the message header, but I did it this time for a
reason.  As I said, I noticed when I reread Carol's message was that I
didn't quite understand what she was talking about.  I mean, I understood
the last sentence, but I wan't quite clear about what she was referring to,
so I looked at the header and saw she was replying to: 

>Message of Tue, 22 Mar 1994 11:20:41 -0600 (CST) from
>> <diamond@acad.udallas.edu

So then I pulled up that message by Richard Diamond:

>Leslie Goldstein writes:
> 
>> I think the answer to this one is obvious--Aristotle disagrees 
>> with Plato's claim that there is a unified thing, "THE good."  
>> One does not have to guess at this.  He does so explicitly 
>> and at some length.
> 
>I meant to say "some good" and certainly not "THE" good in the 
>Platonic sense.  My intent was to discover why Aristotle would 
>proceed by referring to what philosophers think (or what everyone
>thinks, if that's the case) and not just say, "this is the way it 
>is."
> 
>Craig Walton suggests an answer.  The subject matter of Ethics is
>not always something that cannot be otherwise.  That is, when 
>matters of Ethics are contingent, strict demonstration is not 
>appropriate.  Hence, he refers to the opinions of philosophers and
>common men instead of laying things out demonstratively -- at
>least to begin with.
> 
>As for whether in text 2 of Aristotle:
>"2. Thus they have stated nobly that the good is that at which  
>all things aim." 
>the "they" refers to philosophers or common men, I think I would
>say that because Aristotle does not throw in "all" (a very small
>word to throw in!) he is not referring to all men.  To repeat,
>all men do not "state" or "enunciate" things (enunciate is a better
>though more awkward way to render the Greek word).  It is the case
>that Plato in his dialogues makes this very enunciation as well,
>and does not seem to be the case that all men speak in such a way.
>Hence, I take his "they" as referring to a smaller group of men.
> 
>Richard Diamond
>diamond@acad.udallas.edu 
>

This message, in turn, refers to an earlier one.  When Richard says, "To
repeat..." he is referring to his Mar. 20 reply to Reg, in which he wrote
[in part]:

>Reg writes in response to the opening post, and Aristotle's line 2:
> 
>> A they is implied. I take this to mean that 
>> Aristotle is referring to the population at large. Isn't 
>> this a generally accepted view or feeling about one's own 
>> action? That they are aimed at some good?
> 
>It seems to me that the "they" does not refer to the general populace 
>(especially their feelings) because most people don't "enunciate" 
>anything.  I think rather that Aristotle is referring to the statements of 
>philosophers.  Philosophers enunciate things.  Aristotle brings us to ask
>here which philosophers he is speaking of.  Is it true that most people 
>think people desire some good?  Actually, I think most people view evil 
>men like Manson as desiring evil for the sake of evil.  Plato (perhaps who 
>Aristotle is referring to) offers in his dialogues the distinction between 
>real and apparent good that Reg brings up to solve that part of the 
>difficulty.
> 

Now, here is my point:

If Richard Diamond is correct when he tells us that in this passage which he
cites as line 2 of NE, "Aristotle is referring to the statements of
philosophers," then Richard would have reason to disagree with Carol when
she asserts that "...there is nothing in the Greek in NE to indicate that
Aristotle is discussing men exclusively..."  In fact Carol here seems to be
re-asserting exactly the opinion expressed by Reg that Richard was at pains
to deny, namely that the "they" refers to the population in general.

On the contrary, Richard apparently believes that Aristotle in this passage
is citing the expressed views of some particular group of philosophers.  And
there is certainly some scholarly support for this.  Both Ross and Ostwald
cite 1172b9 (Book 10, ch.2 of NE in Ross) where essentially this view is
attributed to Eudoxus, and Ostwald also cites Plato.

While Carol may be correct in saying that the language of this passage is
not gender-specific, if Aristotle was referring to eminent philosophers of
his time, it is probably safe to say that he was referring to men and not to
women.  And, therefore, while I, for one, am disposed to agree with Carol
that, "Later in NE, as we translate, it would be a good idea to keep in mind
the Greek distinction between anthropos and aner," in this particular
passage I think the substitution of gender-neutral terms might be misleading
and imprecise.






Lance Fletcher [lance@freelance.com]
The Free Lance Academy (a Platonic BBS) 201-963-6019  
    for Internet access: gopher or anonymous ftp to: 
         world.std.com /ftp/pub/freelance


-------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 23:42:45 CST
Subject: RE: NE: Ch. 1 (i)
From: "carol poster" <C594460@MIZZOU1.missouri.edu>

Is there any chance  that Aristotle  is starting from  notions of the
form of the good that would have been known to all students of the Platonic
academy, and possibly outsiders as well (cf. Gaiser's 1980 (?) article in
Phronesis on Plato's lecture on the Good).

I don't think Aristotle will particularly argree with Plato, but he often
does start his works with summary and critique of previous philosophers.

                           Carol Poster


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 00:55:18 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: NE: Gender - STOP IT!
From: "Peter Orlowski" <orlowski@cap.gwu.edu>

As one of the major offenders in this regard, I agree to cease and desist
for the sake of the slow-reading.  In my next post, I will return to the
text at hand.

           /~~~~\     "And therefore never flout at me for what I
          {    /a>--\   have said against it;  for man is a giddy
Peter     [     <===\)  thing, and this is my conclusion."
Orlowski  } , , , \ '                        -William Shakespeare




-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 01:00:48 -0500 (EST)
Subject: NE: Endoxa
From: "Peter Orlowski" <orlowski@cap.gwu.edu>

 In the first three lines, Aristotle says "seems" and "they have stated"
and "there appears". 

>   1. Every art and every inquiry, likewise [every] action and 
> choice, seems to aim at some good.
>    2. Thus they have stated nobly that the good is that at which 
> all things aim.
>    3. But there appears to be some difference among the ends: for 
> some [ends] are activities and others are works  apart from 
> them.

This indicates to me that Aristotle is beginning his inquiry with
reputable-opinions (endoxa).

Several people have suggested that Ethics, since it employs
reputable-opinions (endoxa) in its arguments, that it is rhetorical, or
somehow, not philosophical. 

I would like to counter this.  It seems to be Aristotle's common method to
begin his scientific inquiries into the principles of the science.  The
principles, however, must be distilled from the reputable opinions.
(Psychology, which Arsitotle thinks is highly certain, begins with endoxa
as well.) I think that what Aristotle does in the beginning of NE is to
attempt to draw from these commonly held opinions some principle that he
can use in laying out the foundations of Ethics.  Now I admit that the
subject matter of Ethics may not be as open to certainty as say
Psychology, but would it not be premature for us to conclude from these
opening lines that Aristotle will not propose any demonstrations at all,
or that he does not think demonstration is possible in Ethics?

           /~~~~\     "And therefore never flout at me for what I
          {    /a>--\   have said against it;  for man is a giddy
Peter     [     <===\)  thing, and this is my conclusion."
Orlowski  } , , , \ '                        -William Shakespeare






-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 01:30:31 -0500 (EST)
Subject: usage of word man
From: "Richard E Heft" <reheft@world.std.com>

Here's a thought that might interest all of you:

     In keeping with my usual practice---I generally work off line---I
downloaded 109,000 bytes of mail from the Aristotle mail list this evening.
Of that, I estimate that at least 75,000 related to this gender problem we
are hearing so much about.  To satisfy my curiosity I re-read (slowly, mind
you) chapter 1 of NE.  I read both my own copy and Richard Diamond's
translation.

     In my copy, the word `man' never appears.  In Dick's translation it
appears only in the form of horseMEN and horseMANship, and you might
include MANager if you want to stretch a point :-).  It comes to me that
whether you used the word `man', or `person', or `people' you would not
change my understanding of chapter 1 one little bit.  In other words, I
wasted some computer time, a lot of paper, and two hours of slow, somewhat
dull reading to no purpose.

     Do you suppose we could get back to the discussion of ethics?

     Regards,
     Dick Heft


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 8:57:25 +200
Subject: (NE) 
From: "Ian Jennings" <JENNINGS%NEWARTS_PMB@gate.cc.unp.ac.za>

>I wonder whether the big A (does anyone have a short, clever
>nickname for our Greek friend?) 

How about Ari?  It reminds me of a local souvlaki tavern, the
proprietor of which is no doubt really named Aristotle.

Ian


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 94 01:49 CST
Subject: ethical discourse limited?
From: TI0MAC1@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU

David (if I may),

I don't think Aristotle necessarily intended to limit his ethical
discourse to men.  He does say that men and women have different
roles and functions, but I don't think he suspected that women
were not capable of ethical conduct and wouldn't benefit from
ethical teaching.  I think.

Margaret


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 94 01:58 CST
Subject: gender neutral
From: TI0MAC1@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU

To Bob Hall,

No, English has not changed.  "Man" still is an appropriate word
to signify mankind, in general.  It is the overly sensitive in this
country who are attempting to redefine the English language for
all of us.  Biology and anthropology, I believe, still use "man"
to refer to the species.  You don't see them finding evidence of
early "persons".  C'mon, please.

Margaret


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 08:00:28 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: NE:Ends and purposes
From: HALL@wvsvax.wvnet.edu

I am interested in Peter Orlowski's distinction between purposes and 
ends.  It seems that to him (to A also?) people have purposes
but activities (techne) arts, ets have ends.  If we accept A at face value here
will we be on the road to implying intentionality to activities
regardless of the intentions of the people engaged in them?  It seems
to me that if activities have ends, this is only by social
convention or agreement 9( a social construct).  So at the very least
I would emphasize that if activities have ends, those ends can 
change as social practice changes.  I am afraid that A will get
the ends of various activities so fixed in mind that they will
become "objective facts" out of which one can build an ethical
empire.
Bob Hall, West Virginia State College


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 08:22:50 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Re: The question of separation
From: "Richard C. Taylor" <6297TAYLORR@vmsf.csd.mu.edu>

Please separate off the various works. I woke with 45 new email messages
and am overwhelmed. Better to do a little well, seems to be the
motto of slowreaders, so please do set up different addresses/lists
for different works we are slowereading.
R. Taylor, MArquette U.


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 09:34:03 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: ethical discourse limited?
From: "David Westbrook" <west@epas.utoronto.ca>

> 
> David (if I may),
> 
> I don't think Aristotle necessarily intended to limit his ethical
> discourse to men.  He does say that men and women have different
> roles and functions, but I don't think he suspected that women
> were not capable of ethical conduct and wouldn't benefit from
> ethical teaching.  I think.
> 
> Margaret
> 

At this point in the reading I entirely concur. If Aristotle gets
around to limiting ethical conduct to men [aner] then we will also be
entitled to limit our discourse on Aristotelian ethics. Until that
point we must remember that 'anthropos' is a gender-neutral term that
is NOT adequately translated by the still ambiguous English word
'man', but is better served by derivatives from the Latin (which
also retains the distinction between 'vir' and 'homo') - namely,
'human' and 'humanity'.

David Westbrook
Social & Political Thought
York University



-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 08:34:05 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Sexist, of course.
From: "Richard C. Taylor" <6297TAYLORR@vmsf.csd.mu.edu>

Do we need to get into the question of the all-permeating sexism of
Aristotle and his culture? Plato was teh radical for his proposals in
the REPUBLIC about equality. A's  ethics was for aristocratic males.
Teh question of whether it has values which can be transformed and
remade for today is an inquiry into contemporary virtue ethics and
different from what the slowreading seems to be about. But perhaps
I'm wrong on this latter point.
R. Taylor


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 94 09:37:56 EST
Subject: FTP/Gopher translation
From: rich_beaudry@smtplink.infores.com


     >For anyone with access to a Gopher outlet or ftp, you can "pick up" a 
     >copy of the Ethics for free from the American Philosophical 
     >Association gopher/ftp site. I downloaded the entire text serveral 
     >days ago
     
     What's the gopher/ftp address??
     
     Rich


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 08:50:11 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Re: Gender neutral language
From: "Richard C. Taylor" <6297TAYLORR@vmsf.csd.mu.edu>

Pardon, MArvin, but a small but important precision. There are no dead
human beings since by definition human beings are living animals.
I'm not trying to be a wiseguy. There really are important considerations
which hang on this precision. (Now to be a wiseguy:) But they don't believe
this in Chicago because there they claim that the dead are human beings
and have the right to vote.
R Taylor


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 10:06:32 EST
Subject: Human being
From: "Sean A. Kelsey" <sakelsey@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>

`Human being' is a gender neutral and accurate translation of `anthrOpos'.  It
is somewhat barbarous English (cp. `canine being' and `feline being'), but it
is philosophically accurate.  Bloom uses it to translate `anthrOpos' in his
translation of the Republic.  Since we're aiming for philosophical accuracy,
and since, as Mr. Orlowski points out, it may turn out that Aristotle does not
think the excellence of a man (anEr) is the same as that of a woman, perhaps
we should use `human being', although it is admittedly unwieldy.

Sean Kelsey


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 10:32:42 EST
Subject: Re: NE:Ends and purposes
From: "Sean A. Kelsey" <sakelsey@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>

"It seems to me that if activities have ends, this is only by social convention
or agreement."

If this were so, and if Aristotle were attempting to develop an ethical theory
that admitted of application beyond the context of his own society, then his
project is doomed to failure.

This is neither to assert Mr. Halls suspicion is correct or incorrect, nor to
assert that this is what Aristotle is up to in the Ethics.  But we should keep
these questions in mind.

        I would be very interested in discussing what sense it could make to
speak of activities in some sense having ends irrespective of the conscious
intentions of the person doing the activity.
        Suppose there was no sense in which activities had ends irrespective
of the conscious intentions of the person doing the activity.  Could anyone
do something wrong so long as he had "good intentions"?
        I realize Mr. Hall's suggestion was more subtle than this, insofar as
he suggested that activities might have ends that arise from social contexts.
E.g., I wave to say `hello', and this `activity' has an end the greeting of the
person I wave to only in virtue of certain social conventions that make it so.
But is this case with all activities.  If I beat someone over the head repeat-
edly with a stout stick, it seems that one of the ends of this type of activity
is damaging the head of the person in question.  This seems to fall out of the
activity itself as opposed to social conventions.
        But is this example based on a confusion?

Sean Kelsey


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 94 10:48:09 EST
Subject: Re: NE: Ostwald text, I.1
From: "james schmidt" <jschmidt@acs.bu.edu>

In response to a request for some thoughts on the following passages (from 
the Ostwald translation):
3. But it is clear that there is a difference in the ends at which they aim:
in some cases the activity [energeia] is the end, in o4hers the end is some
product [ergon] beyond the activity.
4. In cases where the end lies beyond the action the product is naturally
superior to the activity.

Sec. 3 always struck me as fairly straightforward:  there are some things 
that you do in order to do something else (pumping up bike tires in order to
go for a ride) and some things you do for their own sake (bike riding).  In
the first case, the aim is a product which lies "outside" the activity (nice,
firm tires); in the other case the end is the activity (riding).  

Sec. 4 draws out the consequences:  bike riding is superior to tire pumping
(no one rides bikes in order to get a chance to pump up tires).

Note how all of this points to the penultimate section:

7. In all these cases the ends of the master sciences are preferable to the
ends of the subordinate sciences, since the latter are pursued for the sake
of the former.

I take this explain why Politics is superior to Economics [the science of the 
household], though this is not worked out until the Politics. 

Along this line, note how the heirarchy of arts that pursue the good with which
the NE opens is mirrored in the account of the series of associations 
[koinonia] with which the Politics opens (the oikos [domestic association],
the kome [the 'village" -- I suppose a rural association concerned with 
agricultural production?], and final "that association which we call political"
-- the polis).

Jim Schmidt
Boston University


-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 94 08:04:36 -0800
Subject: aristotle's poetics: poet-l
From: "jules n. binoculas" <p00518@psilink.com>

can you tell me how to subscribe to poet-l -- the
discussion of aristotle's poetics?

i've sent a few messages with no replies --

thanks!



-------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 11:16:17 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: NE:Ends and purposes
From: "Peter Orlowski" <orlowski@cap.gwu.edu>

First of all, before I get into purpose, let me say that I highly
recommend the book by Nichols entitled "Citizens and Statesmen." This
piece of feminist literature an Ari. ethics and politics gives a forceful
argument that Ari. did not disparage women.  But let this discussion
continue on another list.  For those who wish, from majordomo@world.std.com,
"subscribe women".


On Wed, 23 Mar 1994 HALL@WVSVAX.WVNET.EDU wrote:

> I am interested in Peter Orlowski's distinction between purposes and 
> ends.  It seems that to him (to A also?) people have purposes
> but activities (techne) arts, ets have ends. 

That is not the way I would draw the distinction.  Purpose (proairesis) is
an efficient cause, a motive i.e. motor cause, not a final cause or end
(telos).  Proairesis is what we propose to ourselves to do.  Purpose is
synonymous with "intention" and it is an imagined or wished for
satisfaction.  So an individual man can have a purpose, but Man cannot. 
Man has an end (telos), which each individual person has by being a man. 
Another way of drawing the distinction is this: ends exist independently
of our willing them, i.e. they do not originate in our willing them, but
pruposes take their origin from our willing them, i.e. purposes would not
be if agents did not give them being. 

An example would be helpful here: the end of an ax is cutting.  The ax has
no purpose itself, because it cannot propose anything to itself to do. 
The woodmen who uses the ax, however, may have many purposes: to clear
land, to obtain firewood, to braze a trail, to attack someone.

> If we accept A at face value here
> will we be on the road to implying intentionality to activities
> regardless of the intentions of the people engaged in them?  It seems
> to me that if activities have ends, this is only by social
> convention or agreement 9( a social construct).  

Again, I would not put it this way.  I agree with you that an axe has a
telos (end) apart from the person who uses it, but this is just because of
what it means to be an axe.  Its form and matter are what they are because
of the end - the matter is hard so that it can resist deformation and its
form is sharp so that it can apply maximum pressure along the cutting
line.  I would not say this is purely conventional, because we cannot all
decide tomorrow that the end of an axe will be sewing.  Neither can we
take jello blocks and decide amongst ourselves that their end will be
cutting trees.

> So at the very least
> I would emphasize that if activities have ends, those ends can 
> change as social practice changes.  I am afraid that A will get
> the ends of various activities so fixed in mind that they will
> become "objective facts" out of which one can build an ethical
> empire.

Okay, I have been talking about an axe, because it is simpler to follow,
but let me take an art and its activity.  The end of the art of medicine
is health.  Now you want to say that this is merely conventional, but I
maintain that Ari. thinks it is by the very nature of medicine and
doctoring.

Consider the Hippocratic Oath.  It prohibits doctors from killing people. 
Why?  Doctors have knowledge about the human body which makes them
especially good at killing (once again, consider Kevorkian.)  Is the oath
given for moral reasons, because killing is bad?  Maybe, but I think it is
given especially for reasons having to do with the protection and
preservation of the art of medicine.  The Oath is not meant to protect
people, but to protect the art of medicine.  Notice that it does not
prohibit any kind of murder, but only those kinds which use (abuse) the
art of medicine.  Thus, a doctor could shoot his patient for sleeping with
his wife without violating the oath, but if he mixed a poison and
administered it to his patient, then he would be violating the oath.

How does the Oath protect medicine?  The oath protects medicine because it
preserves the use of the art for its proper end.  Should medicine not be
used for its proper end, healing, at best it would fail to achieve its
perfection and at worse it would corrupt and cease to be medicine.  Thus,
if a doctor was also a soldier, he would use the military arts to kill
his opponents and thereby achieve victory.  He would thus be prreserving
the martial arts.  If he then went back to his MASH unit and used
his medical art to bandaged up dying men, he would be thus preserving the
arts of medicine.  If however, on the field of battle he tried to use his
martial arts to heal his opponents, and back at the MASH unit he tried to
use his medical art to kill his patients, both arts would suffer.  It is
because of the NATURE and very MEANING of the arts that they have their
ends, or better yet, it is the end which determines the very NATURE of the
activity, and the activity languishes when the end is frustrated. 
Convention has little to do with it.


"de gustibus non disputendum est, sed natura lingua non est."

           /~~~~\     "And therefore never flout at me for what I
          {    /a>--\   have said against it;  for man is a giddy
Peter     [     <===\)  thing, and this is my conclusion."
Orlowski  } , , , \ '                        -William Shakespeare